Abhidhamma Studies

Researches in Buddhist Psychology

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by

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Introduction

These studies originated when the author was engaged in translating into German the *Dhamma-saṅgaṇī* ("Compendium of Phenomena") and its commentary, the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*. These two books are the starting point and the main subject of the following pages which, in part, may serve as a kind of fragmentary sub-commentary to sections of those two works.

The content of these studies is rather varied: they include philosophical and psychological investigations, references to the practical application of the teachings concerned, pointers to neglected or unnoticed aspects of the Abhidhamma, textual research etc. This variety of contents serves to show that wherever we dig deep enough into that inexhaustible mine, the Abhidhamma literature, we shall meet with valuable contributions to the theoretical understanding and practical realization of Buddhist doctrine. So the main purpose of these pages is to stimulate further research in the field of Abhidhamma, much wider and deeper than it was possible in this modest attempt.

There is no reason why the Abhidhamma philosophy of the Southern or Theravāda tradition should stagnate today or why its further development should not be resumed. In fact, through many centuries there has been a living growth of Abhidhammic thought, and even in our own days there

are original contributions to it from Burma, for example, by that remarkable monk-philosopher, the Venerable Ledi Sayadaw. There is a vast number of subjects in the canonical and commentarial Abhidhamma literature that deserve and require closer investigation, and new presentation in the language of our time. There are many lines of thought, only briefly sketched in Abhidhamma tradition, which merit detailed treatment in connection with parallel tendencies in modern thought. Finally, in some important subjects of Abhidhamma doctrine we must deplore the partial loss of ancient tradition, a fact which is clearly indicated by the appearance of technical terms nowhere explained. Here a careful and conscientious restoration in conformity with the spirit of the Theravāda tradition is required unless we would relegate those parts of the Abhidhamma to the status of venerable but fragmentary museum pieces.

Abhidhamma is meant for inquiring and searching spirits who are not satisfied by monotonously and uncritically repeating ready-made terms, even if these are Abhidhamma terms. Abhidhamma is for imaginative minds who are able to fill in, as it were, the columns of the tabulations, for which the canonical Abhidhamma books have furnished the concise headings. The Abhidhamma is not for those timid souls who are not content that a philosophical thought should not actually contradict Buddhist tradition, but demand that it must be

expressly, even literally, supported by canonical or commentarial authority. Such an attitude is contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Buddha-Dhamma. It would mean that the Abhidhamma philosophy must remain within the limits of whatever has been preserved of the traditional exegetical literature and hence will cease to be a living and growing organism. This would certainly be deplorable for many reasons. We are convinced that the Abhidhamma, if suitably presented, could enrich also modern non-Buddhist thought, in philosophy as well as psychology. To state parallels with modern Western thought or the historical precedence of Buddhist versions is not so important in itself. It is more important that the Buddhist way of presenting and solving the respective problems should show modern independent thinkers new vistas and open new avenues of thought, which in turn might revive Buddhist philosophy in the East. We are convinced that from such philosophical exchange there would arise a glorious vindication of those eternal and fundamental truths, at once simple and profound, which the greatest genius of mankind, the Buddha, proclaimed.

Nyanaponika Thera

Preface

The first edition of this book appeared in 1949 as the second volume of the “Island Hermitage Publications” (Frewin & Co., Colombo). This series has since been discontinued. While the book was out of print for several years, a condensation of some of its chapters, by M. O’C. Walshe, appeared in four issues of the quarterly “The Middle Way” (1959, 1960).

The Second (revised and enlarged) Edition, and the present Third Edition, have been issued by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy. To the Second Edition, a new chapter, the first, had been added as a general introduction into the subject. In the Third Edition, only minor changes have been made.

The author’s deep gratitude is due to his revered teacher, the late Venerable Nyanatiloka Mahathera (d. 28.5.57.), who had first introduced the author into the world of the Abhidhamma, and who had helped many Western students of Buddhism to gain a clear understanding of this great Teaching.

Forest Hermitage,
Kandy, Sri Lanka.
March, 1976.

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The High Esteem of Abhidhamma in Buddhist Tradition

The Abhidhamma Piṭaka, or the Philosophical Collection, forms the third great section of the Buddhist Pāli Canon (Tipiṭaka). In its most characteristic parts it is a system of classifications, analytical enumerations and definitions, with no discursive treatment of the subject matter. In particular its two most important books, the Dhammasanganī and the Paṭṭhāna, have the appearance of huge collections of systematically arranged tabulations, accompanied by definitions of the terms used in the tables. This, one would expect, is a type of literature scarcely likely to gain much popular appreciation. Yet there is the fact that the Abhidhamma was, and is, highly esteemed and even venerated in the countries of Theravāda Buddhism.

Two examples taken from the chronicles of Ceylon illustrate that high regard for the Abhidhamma. In the 10th century A.C., on the order of King Kassapa V of Ceylon, the whole Abhidhamma Piṭaka was inscribed on gold plates, and the first of these books, the Dhammasanganī, was set with jewels. When the work was completed, the precious manuscripts were taken in a huge procession to a beautiful monastery and deposited there.

Another king of Ceylon, Vijaya Bahu (11th century), used to study the Dhammasaṅgaṇī in the early morning before he took up his royal duties, and he prepared a translation of it into Sinhalese, which however has not been preserved.

What were the reasons for such an extraordinary esteem for material that appears at first glance to consist of no more than dry and unattractive text books? And what actual importance do the two basic works of the Abhidhamma in particular, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and the Paṭṭhāna, still have today? These are the questions that we shall attempt to answer here.

In considering the reasons for this high esteem and regard for the Abhidhamma, we may leave aside any manifestation of faith, more or less unquestioning, that evokes in the devotee a certain awe owing to the very abstruseness and bulk of these books. That apart, we may find a first explanation in the immediate impression on susceptible minds that they are faced here by a gigantic edifice of penetrative insight, which in its foundations and its layout cannot well be ascribed to a lesser mind than that of a Buddha; and this first impression will find growing confirmation in the gradual process of comprehending these teachings.

According to the Theravāda tradition the Abhidhamma is the domain proper of the Buddhas (*Buddha-visaya*), and its initial conception in the Master's mind (*manasā desanā*), according to the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, is traced to the time immediately after

the Great Enlightenment. It was in the fourth of the seven weeks spent by the Master in the environs of the Bodhi tree that the Abhidhamma was conceived. These seven days were called by the teachers of old 'The Week of the House of Gems (*ratana-ghara-sattāha*)'. 'The House of Gems' is indeed a very befitting expression for the crystal-clear edifice of Abhidhamma-thought in which the Buddha dwelt during that period.

The Abhidhamma as System and Method

Those who have an eye for the ingenious and the significant in the architecture of great edifices of thought will probably be impressed first by the Abhidhamma's structural qualities, its wide, compass, its inner consistency, and its far-reaching implications. The Abhidhamma offers an impressive systematisation of the whole of reality as far as it is of concern to man's liberation from passion and suffering, and the way thereto; for it deals with actuality from an exclusively ethical and psychological view-point, and with a definite practical purpose.

A very striking and deeply impressive feature of the Abhidhamma is the analysis of the entire realm of consciousness. It is the first time in the history of human thought that this was undertaken so thoroughly and realistically, without admixture of any metaphysics and mythology. This system provides a method by which the enormous welter of facts included or implied in it, can be subordi-

nated to, and be utilized by, the *liberating* function of knowledge, which in the Buddha's teaching is the essential task and the greatest value of true understanding. This organizing and mustering of knowledge for such a purpose cannot fail to appeal to the practical thinker.

The Abhidhamma may also be regarded as a systematisation of the doctrines contained, or implied, in the Sutta-Piṭaka, the Collection of Discourses. It formulates these Sutta doctrines in strictly philosophical (*paramattha*) or truly realistic (*yathā-bhūta*) language that as far as possible employs terms of a function or process without any of the conventional (*vohāra*) and unrealistic concepts assuming a personality, an agent (as different from the act), a soul or a substance.

These remarks about the systematising import of the Abhidhamma may perhaps create the impression in the reader that the Abhidhamma is no more than 'a mere method with only a formalistic function'. Leaving aside the fact that this is not so, as we shall see later, let us first quote, against this somewhat belittling attitude, a word of Nietzsche, himself certainly no friend of rigid systematisation: 'Scientific spirit rests upon insight into the method'.

For the pre-eminently practical needs of the Buddhist the Abhidhamma fulfils the requirements stated by *Bertrand Russell*: 'A complete description of the existing world would require not only a catalogue of the things; but also a mention of all their

qualities and relations' (*'Our Knowledge of the External World'*). A systematical 'catalogue of things' together with their qualities, or better 'functions', is given in the first book of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasanganī, a title that could well be rendered by 'A Catalogue (or Compendium) of Things'; and the relations, or the conditionality, of these things are treated in the Paṭṭhāna.

Some who deem themselves 'strong-minded' have called systems 'a refuge of feeble minds'. It is to be admitted that the conceptual labels supplied by systems (and also in Abhidhamma) have often been misused as a surrogate for the true comprehension of a changing, and not at all rigid, world. But if cautiously and critically used, it is precisely one of the advantages of systematic thought that it provides, as it were, 'weapons of defence', means of protection, against the overwhelming assault of innumerable internal and external impressions on the human mind. This unceasing influx of impressions, by sheer weight of number and diversity alone, has an influence, even on 'strong minds', that tends to be either overpowering and fascinating, or confusing, intimidating, distracting, even dissolving, unless this vast world of plurality (*papañca*) is at least partly assimilated by the human mind with the help of systematic and methodical thought. But systems may also be 'aggressive weapons' when wielded by a mind that through its power of understanding tries to control and master the numerous experiences, actions and

reactions occurring in man's inner and outer world, subordinating them to his own purpose.

The Abhidhamma system, however, is not concerned with an artificial abstract world of 'objects in themselves'. In so far as it deals with external facts at all, the respective concepts refer to the relation of those 'external facts' to the bondage or liberation of the human mind; or they are terms auxiliary to the tasks of the understanding and mental training connected with the work of liberation.

The basically dynamic character of the Abhidhamma system, and of the concepts it employs, goes far in preventing both rigidity and any artificial simplification of a complex and ever-changing world — the faults that those inimical to them find in all 'systems.'

System and method bring order, coherence and meaning into what often appears to be a world of isolated facts which only becomes amenable to the purposes of man by a methodical approach. This holds true for the system of the Abhidhamma too, in regard to the highest purpose: man's liberation from ignorance and suffering.

Clarification of Terms

Many thinkers of all times and climes have insisted that a clarification of concepts and terms must be the basis of all realistic and successful thought, action, and, as Kungfutse says, even of govern-

ment. But as shown by the widespread confusion of ideas throughout the centuries, this has been neglected in nearly all branches of life and thought — a fact responsible for much of man's unhappiness.

It is another evidence of the scientific spirit of the Abhidhamma that the definition of its terms and of their range of application occupies a very prominent place. In particular, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is essentially a book of classifications and definitions. In addition, a very elaborate and cautious delimitation of terms is given in the sixth book of Abhidhamma, the 'Yamaka', which to our modern taste appears even over-elaborate and over-cautious in that respect.

The Suttas, serving mainly the purpose of offering guidance for the actual daily life of the disciple, are mostly (though not entirely) couched in terms of conventional language (*vohāra-vacana*), making reference to persons, their qualities, possessions, etc. In the Abhidhamma, this Sutta terminology is turned into correct functional forms of thought, which accord with the true 'impersonal' and everchanging nature of actuality; and in that strict, or highest, sense (*paramattha*) the main tenets of the Dhamma are explained.

While vague definitions and loosely used terms are like blunt tools unfit to do the work they are meant for; while concepts based on wrong notions will necessarily beg the question to be scrutinized and will thus prejudice the issue, the use of

appropriate and carefully tempered conceptual tools will greatly facilitate the quest for liberating knowledge, and is an indispensable condition of success in that quest.

Hence the fact that Abhidhamma literature is a rich source of exact terminology, is a feature not to be underestimated.

Analysis of Consciousness

One of the Abhidhamma's most important contributions to human thought, though still insufficiently known and utilized, is the analysis and classification of consciousness undertaken in the first part of the *Dhammsanganī*. Here the human mind, so evanescent and elusive, has for the first time been subjected to a comprehensive, thorough and unprejudiced scrutiny, which definitely disposes of the notion that any kind of static unity or underlying substance can be traced in mind. However, the basic ethical layout and purpose of this psychology effectively prevents conclusions of ethical materialism or theoretical and practical amoralism being derived from its realistic and unmetaphysical analysis of mind.

The method of investigation applied in the Abhidhamma is inductive, being based exclusively on an unprejudiced and subtle introspective observation of mental processes. The procedure used in the *Dhammasanganī* for the analysis of is precisely that postulated by the English philosopher and

mathematician, *A. N. Whitehead*: 'It is impossible to over-emphasize the point that the key to the process of induction, as used either in science or in our ordinary life, is to be found in the right understanding of the immediate occasion of knowledge in its full concreteness… In any occasion of cognition, that which is known is an actual occasion of experience, as diversified by reference to a realm of entities which transcend that immediate occasion in that they have analogous or different connections with other occasions of experience' ('*Science and the Modern World*').

Whitehead's term 'occasion' corresponds to the Abhidhammic concept *samaya* (time, occasion, conjunction of circumstances), which occurs in all principal paragraphs of the *Dhammasanganī*, and there denotes the starting point of the analysis. The term receives a detailed and very instructive treatment in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, the commentary to the aforementioned work.

The Buddha succeeded in reducing this 'immediate occasion' of an act of cognition to a single moment of consciousness, which, however, in its subtlety and evanescence, cannot be observed, directly and separately, by a mind untrained in introspective meditation. Just as the minute living beings in the microscosm of a drop of water become visible only through a microscope, so, too, the exceedingly short-lived processes in the world of mind become cognizable only with the help of a very subtle instrument of mental scrutiny, and that only

obtains as a result of meditative training. None but the kind of introspective mindfulness or attention (*sati*) that has acquired, in meditative absorption, a high degree of inner equipoise, purity and firmness (*upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi*), will possess the keenness, subtlety and quickness of cognitive response required for such delicate mental microscopy. Without that meditative preparation only the way of inference from comparisons between various complete or fragmentary series of thought moments will be open as a means of research. But this approach too may yield important and reliable results, if cautious and intelligent use is made of one's own introspective results and of the psychological data of meditative experience found in Sutta and Abhidhamma.

In the *Anupada Sutta* (Majjhima Nikāya 111) it is reported that the Venerable Sāriputta Thera, after rising from meditative absorption (*jhāna*) was able to analyse the respective jhānic consciousness into its constituent mental factors. This may be regarded as a precursor of the more detailed analysis given in the *Dhammasangaṇī*.

Let us listen to a voice from Indian antiquity appreciating the difficulty of that analytical work and the greatness of its achievement. We read in the 'Questions of King Milinda': "A, difficult feat indeed was accomplished, O great king, by the Exalted One." — "Which is that difficult feat, O venerable Nāgasena?" — "The Exalted One, O king, has accomplished a difficult task when he analysed a

mental process having a single object, as consisting of consciousness with its concomitants, as follows: 'This is sense-impression, this is feeling, perception, volition, consciousness'." — "Give an illustration of it, venerable sir." — "Suppose, O king, a man has gone to the sea by boat and takes with the hollow of his hand a little sea water and tastes it. Will this man know, 'This is water from the Ganges, this is water from such other rivers as Jamuna, Aciravati, etc.'?" — "He can hardly know that." — "But a still more difficult task, O king, was accomplished by the Exalted One when he analysed a mental process having a single object, as consisting of consciousness with its concomitants."

The rather terse and abstract form in which the *Dhammasangaṇī* presents its subject matter, the analysis of mind, should not mislead the reader into making him believe that he is confronted with a typical product of late scholastic thought. When, in the course of closer study, he notices the admirable inner consistency of the system, and gradually becomes aware of many of its subtle points and far-reaching implications, he will become convinced that at least the fundamental outlines and the key notes of Abhidhamma psychology must be the result of a profound intuition gained through direct and penetrative introspection. It will appear to him increasingly improbable that the essence of the Abhidhamma should be the product of a cumbersome process of discursive thinking and artificial thought constructions. This impression of the

essentially intuitive origin of the Abhidhammic mind-doctrine will also strengthen his conviction that the elements of the *Dhammasangaṇī* and the *Paṭṭhāna* must be ascribed to the Buddha himself and his early great and holy disciples. What is called 'scholastic thought', which has its merit in its own sphere and does not deserve wholesale condemnation, may have had its share later in formulating, elaborating and codifying the teachings concerned.

If we turn from the Abdhidhamma to the highest contemporary achievements of non-Buddhist Indian thought in the field of mind and 'soul', i.e. the early Upanishads and the early Samkhya, we find that apart from single great intuitions, they teem with mythological ritualistic terms, and with abstract speculative concepts. Against that background the realistic, sober and scientific spirit of Abhidhamma psychology (or its nucleus extant in the Sutta period) must have stood out very strongly. To those who could appreciate the import of that contrast, it will have sufficed to instil that high esteem and admiration for the Abhidhamma of which we have spoken.

But even if compared with most of the later psychological teachings of the East or the West, the distance from Abhidhamma psychology remains fundamentally the same; for only the Buddha's teaching on mind keeps entirely free from the notions of self, ego, soul, or any other permanent entity in, or behind, mind.

The Anattā-Doctrine

It is on this very doctrine of Non-Self (*anattā*) that all Abhidhamma thought converges and this is where it culminates. The elaborate and thorough treatment of Anattā is also the most important *practical* contribution of the Abhidhamma to the progress of the Buddha's disciple towards liberation. The Abhidhamma provides him with ample material for his meditations in the field of insight (*vipassanā*), concerning Impermanence and Impersonality, and this material has been analysed down to the subtlest point and is couched in strictly philosophical language.

There will certainly be many to whom the degree of analytical details found in the Suttas will be quite enough for them to understand Anattā, and sufficient for their use in meditative practice. But there are also minds that require repeated and varied demonstration and illustration of a truth before they are entirely satisfied and convinced. There are also others who wish to push their analysis to the greatest detail possible and to extend it to the very smallest unit accessible, in order to make quite sure that even the realm of the infinitesimal, of the material and psychical 'atoms', does not hide any self or abiding substance. To such minds the Abhidhamma will be of great value. But also those who, in general, are satisfied with the expositions in the Suttas, may sometimes wish to investigate more closely a particular point that has roused

their interest or presents difficulties. To them too the Abhidhamma will prove helpful.

Besides helping such individual cases, the Abhidhamma will in general render valuable aid in the slow and difficult change of thought and outlook from the view-point of 'self' to that of 'non-self'. Having once grasped intellectually the doctrine of non-self, one can certainly succeed in applying it to theoretical and practical issues if only one remembers it in time and deliberately directs one's thoughts and volitions accordingly. But except for such deliberate directing of thought, which in most cases will be relatively rare, the mind will contiue to move in the old-accustomed ruts of 'I' and 'mine', 'self' and 'substance', which are deeply ingrained in our daily language and our modes of thinking; and our actions too will still continue to be frequently governed by our ancient egocentric impulses. An occasional intellectual assent to the true outlook of Anattā will not effect great changes in that situation. The only remedy is for bad or wrong habits of action, speech and thinking to be gradually replaced by good and correct habits until the latter become as spontaneous as the former are now. It is therefore necessary that right thinking, that is, thinking in terms of Anattā, is made the subject of regular and systematic mental training until the power of wrong habits of thought is reduced and finally broken. The Abhidhamma in general, and in particular the various Triads and Dyads of terms as listed in the *Mātikā*,

‘Schedule’, of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, provide ample material for such ‘fluency exercises’ of right thinking. Familiarity with the application of the ‘impersonal’ view-point of the Abhidhamma and with the terminology by which it is expressed will exercise a considerable formative influence on the mind.

Abhidhamma and Meditation

A fertile soil for the origin and persistence of beliefs and ideas about a self, soul, god or any other form of an absolute entity, is *misinterpreted meditative experience* occurring in devotional rapture or mystical trance. Such experience is generally interpreted by the mystic or theologian as revelation of, or union with, a godhead; or it is taken for a manifestation of man’s true and eternal Self. Such interpretations are conceived and accepted all the more readily since such meditative experience so greatly transcends the average level of consciousness that the temptation is very great, indeed, to connect it in some way or other with a deity or some other eternal principle. The overwhelming impact of such meditative experience on the mind will produce a strong feeling of certainty of its reality and superiority; and this strong feeling of assurance will be extended to the theological or speculative interpretation, too. In that way these interpretations will obtain a strong hold on the mind; for they are imagined to correspond with

actual, irrefutable experience, while, in fact, they are only superimposed on the latter.

The analytical method of the Abhidhamma gives immunity against such deceptive interpretations. In the *Dhammasanganī* the consciousness of meditative absorption (*jhāna*) is subjected to the same sober analysis as the ordinary states of mind. It is shown that meditative consciousness, too, is a transitory combination of impermanent, conditioned and impersonal mental factors, which differ from their counterparts accompanying ordinary consciousness, only in their greater intensity and purity. They do not, therefore, warrant at all any assumption of a divine manifestation or an eternal Self. It has already been mentioned how the Venerable Sāriputta undertook such an analysis of his meditative experience.

It is characteristic of the spirit of the Buddha's teaching that the disciple is always advised to follow up his meditative absorption by an analytical retrospection (*paccavekkhaṇa*) on the mental states just experienced, comprehending them by Insight (*vipassanā*) as impersonal, evanescent, and therefore not to be adhered to.

By so doing, three main defilements of the mind (*kilesa*) are effectively warded off, which otherwise may easily arise along with the overwhelming impact of meditative experience on the mind:

(1) Craving (*tanhā*) for these experiences, clinging to them and longing for them for

their own sake (*jhāna-nikanti*, ‘indulgence in Jhāna’);

(2) the False View (*diṭṭhi*) that these meditative experiences imply a self or a deity;

(3) the Conceit (*māna*) that may arise through having attained these exalted states.

These remarks refer to the division of Buddhist meditation called *Development of Tranquillity* (*samatha-bhāvanā*), aiming at the attainment of Jhāna.

Turning now to the *Development* of *Insight* (*vipassanā-bhāvanā*), the classificatory terms of the Abhidhamma Schedule (*mātikā*), as explained in the *Dhammasangaṇī*, etc., provide numerous possibilities for including in them the various particular subjects of Insight. By such reference to the triads or dyads of terms in the Schedule a limited subject of Insight can easily be connected with the entire world of actuality, and will thereby gain in significance. Such a particular subject of Insight may either be deliberately chosen from the traditional subjects of meditation (*kammaṭṭhāna*) or may consist in some incidental occurrence in life. The latter again may be either some deeply stirring inner or outer experience or it may be quite an ordinary happening of every-day life taken as an object of Right Mindfulness and Clear Comprehension (*sati-sampajañña*), as is often reported of meditating monks of old. The impulse to deep reli-

gious commotion (*saṃvega*) or the stimulation for Insight derived from such incidental events may be easier retained, utilized and extended to general, universal significance, if that event can be referred at once to one of the triads or dyads of Abhidhammic terms, which comprise the entire actuality. Thus a single act of penetrative understanding starting from a limited object may acquire such intensity, width and depth as to either lead to, or effectively prepare for, that liberating Insight of which a great Buddhist thinker has said:

‘The understanding of one single thing means the understanding of all; the voidness of one single thing is the voidness of all.’ — *Aryadeva* (*Catuhsataka*, *v*. 191).

Knowledge of Abhidhamma, a Requirement for the Preacher and Teacher of Dhamma

The preceding pages will have shown the importance of the Abhidhamma for clarity of thought, for correct understanding of actuality, and for individual inner progress. Yet as far as those are concerned whose life is devoted exclusively to the realisation of Deliverance, a knowledge of the Abhidhamma, at least in the sense of the seven books so called, might well be regarded as optional. But it is different for those who wish to teach and explain the Dhamma to others. Here a familiarity with the Abhidhamma is deemed quite

indispensable by the Theravāda tradition. We read in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*: "Only monks who are proficient in Abhidhamma can be regarded as 'preachers of Dhamma (*dhammakathika*)'. Others, even if they actually engage in preaching, cannot truly be so called. When giving a doctrinal exposition, they may, for instance, mix up the various kinds of karma and karmic results or the various factors found when analysing body and mind. But those proficient in Abhidhamma do not make such mistakes."

Features that make the Abhidhamma so important for teachers of the Dhamma are especially these: systematisation of the huge amount of doctrinal material contained in the Sutta Piṭaka; education in orderly and methodical thinking; clarification of terms; proficiency in, and habituation to, the application of the view-point of ultimate truth (*paramattha*) to various subjects of thought and situations of life; mastery of doctrinal detail.

The Evaluation of Abhidhamma and the Question of its Authenticity

Even in olden days opinions about the Abhidhamma Piṭaka moved between the extremes of unquestioning veneration and entire repudiation. Very early there were doubts about the authenticity of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka as genuine Buddha word. The early sect of the Sautrantikas regarded,

as their name indicates, only Sutta and Vinaya as canonical, but not the Abhidhamma.

It may have been a follower of that sect who is introduced in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* as criticising the Abhidhamma lecture of a monk thus: 'You have quoted, O preacher, a long Sutta that seems to girdle Mount Meru. What is the name of it?' — 'It is an Abhidhamma Sutta.' — 'But why did you quote an Abhidhamma Sutta? Is it not befitting to cite a Sutta that has been proclaimed by the Buddha?' — 'And by whom do you think the Abhidhamma was proclaimed?' — 'It was not proclaimed by the Buddha.' Thereupon that monk is severely rebuked by the preacher, and after that the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* continues: 'He who excludes the Abhidhamma (from the Buddha-Word) damages the Conqueror's Wheel of Dhamma (*jina-cakkaṃ pahāraṃ deti)*. He excludes thereby the Omniscience of the Tathagata and impoverishes the grounds of the Master's Knowledge of Self-confidence' (*vesārajja-ñāṇa* to which Omniscience belongs); he deceives an audience anxious to learn; he obstructs (progress to) the Noble Paths of Holiness; he makes all the eighteen causes of discord appear at once. By so doing he deserves the disciplinary punishment of temporary segregation, or the reproof of the assembly of monks.' This very severe attitude seems somewhat extreme, but it may be explained as a defensive reaction against sectarian tendencies at that period.

The main arguments of Theravāda against those who deny the authenticity of the Abhidhamma, are as follows:

(1) The Buddha has to be regarded as the first Abhidhammika, because, according to the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, 'he had already penetrated the Abhidhamma when sitting under the tree of Enlightenment.'

(2) 'The Abhidhamma, the ultimate doctrine, is the domain of omniscient Buddhas only, not the domain of others' (*Asl*). These profound teachings are unmistakably the property of an enlightened being, a Buddha. To deny this is as senseless as stealing the horse of a World Ruler, unique in its excellency, or any other possession of his, and showing oneself in public with it. And why? Because they obviously belong to and are befitting for a king (*Asl*).

Even to non-Buddhists who do not regard the Buddha as an omniscient Enlightened One, but recognize him as a great and profound thinker it should appear improbable that the Buddha would have remained unaware of the philosophical and psychological implications of his teachings, even if he did not speak of them at the very start and to all his followers. Considering the undeniable profundity of the Abhidhamma, the world-wide horizons of that gigantic system, and the inexhaustible impulses to thought which it offers — in view of all this it seems much more

probable that at least the basic teachings of the Abhidhamma derive from that highest intuition that the Buddha calls *Sammā-sambodhi*, Perfect Enlightenment. It appears therefore a quite credible as well as a reasonable and cautious statement when the old Theravāda tradition ascribes the fundamental intuitions and the framework of the Abhidhamma (not more than that) to the Buddha himself. A quite different question, of course, is the origin of the codified Abhidhamma literature as we have it at present. But this problem cannot be dealt with here, and in any case the sources and facts at our disposal do not allow very much to be said about it with any definiteness.

Theravāda tradition has it that the Buddha preached the Abhidhamma first to the assembled gods of the Tavatiṃsa heaven, headed by his mother. After that, having returned to earth again, he conveyed the bare method to the Arahat Sāriputta. Whatever one may think about this tradition, whether, like the devout Eastern Buddhist does, one regards it as a historical account, or whether one takes it as a significant legend, one fact emerges fairly clearly from it: the originators of this very early tradition did not assume the Abhidhamma texts to have been expounded by the Buddha to human beings in the same way and as literally as the Sutta texts. If one wishes to give a psychological interpretation to that traditional account, one might say that the sojourn in the

world of gods may refer to periods of intense contemplation transcending the reaches of an earth-bound mentality; and that from the heights of that contemplation its fundamental teachings were brought back to the world of normal human consciousness and handed over to philosophically gifted disciples like the Venerable Sāriputta.

In a comparative evaluation of Abhidhamma and Sutta texts, the fact is often overlooked — which, however, has been repeatedly stressed by the Venerable Nyāṇatiloka-Mahāthera — that the Sutta Piṭaka too contains a considerable amount of pure Abhidhamma. This comprises all those numerous Suttas and passages where ultimate (*paramattha*) terms are used, expressing the impersonal (*anattā*) or functional way of thinking, for example, when dealing with the khandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, etc.

One also frequently hears the question asked whether the Abhidhamma is necessary for a full understanding of the Dhamma or for final, liberation. In this general form, the question is not quite adequately put. Even in the Sutta Piṭaka many different methods of practice, many 'gates' to the understanding of the same four Truths and to the final goal, Nibbāna, are shown. Not all of them are 'necessary' or suitable in their entirety for all individual disciples, who will make their personal choice among these various methods of approach according to circumstances, inclination and growing maturity. The same holds true for the

Abhidhamma both as a whole and in its single aspects and teachings.

Concluding Remarks and a Warning

Taking a middle path between overrating or underrating the Abhidhamma, we may say: The Abhidhammic parts of the Sutta, namely the teachings given there in ultimate (*paramattha*) terms, are certainly indispensable for the understanding and practice of the Dhamma; and the additional explanations of these teachings given in the Abhidhamma proper may prove very helpful, and in some cases even necessary, for both these purposes. As to the codified Abhidhamma Piṭaka, familiarity with all its details is certainly not a general necessity; but if it is studied and knowledge of it is applied in the way briefly indicated in these pages, this will surely richly enhance a true understanding of actuality and aid the work of liberation. Also, if suitably presented, the Abhidhamma can provide for philosophical minds a stimulating approach to the Dhamma that will prove helpful to them provided they take care to compensate it adequately with the practical aspects of the Dhamma. Such an approach to the Dhamma should certainly not be blocked by the wholesale disparagement of Abhidhamma study sometimes found nowadays among Buddhists of the West, and even of the East. Dangers of one-sided emphasis and development lurk not only in the Abhidhamma

but also in other ways of approach to the Dhamma, and they cannot be entirely avoided until a very high level of harmonious integration of mental qualities has been attained (cf. the ‘Balance of the Five Spiritual Faculties’; *indriya-samatā*).

To be sure, without an earnest attempt to apply the Abhidhamma teachings in such ways as intimated above, they may easily become a rigid system of lifeless concepts. Like other philosophical systems, the Abhidhamma can very easily lead to dogmatic and superstitious belief in words, for example, to the opinion that one really knows something about an object of cognition if one tacks a conceptual label on to it. The study of the Abhidhamma should therefore not be allowed to degenerate to a mere collecting, counting and arranging of such conceptual labels. In that way, Abhidhamma study (but, of course, not the Abhidhamma itself) would become just one more among the many existing intellectual ‘play-things’ which serve as an escape from facing stark reality, or as a ‘respectable excuse’ with which to try and evade hard work for one’s own inner progress towards liberation, for which purpose alone the Abhidhamma is meant. A merely abstract and conceptual approach to the Abhidhamma may also lead to that kind of intellectual pride which often goes together with specialised knowledge.

If these pitfalls are avoided, there is a good chance that the Abhidhamma may again become a living force which stimulates thought and aids the

meditative endeavour for the mind's liberation. To achieve that, it is necessary, however, that the Abhidhamma teachings, which are extremely condensed in parts, are not merely accepted and transmitted verbally, but that they are carefully examined and contemplated in their philosophical and practical implications. This again requires the devotion of searching and imaginative minds; and as they will have to work on neglected and difficult ground, they should not lack the courage to make initial mistakes, which can be rectified by discussion and constant reference to the teachings of the Sutta Piṭaka.

As to the relation of the teachings of the Abhidhamma to those of the Sutta Piṭaka, two very apt comparisons given in a conversation by the late Venerable Pelene Vajirañāṇa, Mahā-Nayakathera of Vajirārāma, Colombo, may be added, in conclusion:

The Abhidhamma is like a powerful magnifying glass, but the understanding gained from the Suttas is the eye itself, which performs the act of seeing. Again, the Abhidhamma is like a medicine container with a label giving an exact analysis of the medicine; but the knowledge gained from the Suttas is the medicine itself which alone is able to cure the illness and its symptoms, namely craving rooted in ignorance, and the suffering caused by it.

‡†‡

Chapter II

The Twofold Method of Abhidhamma Philosophy

Having used the term "Abhidhamma Philosophy" in the title of this chapter we must first state in what sense these two words are to be taken here.

It is well known that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka forms the third main division of the Buddhist Pāli Canon and consists of seven books. But when speaking in these pages of the Abhidhamma in general we have in mind particularly the first and last of these seven books, namely *Dhammasanganī* and *Paṭṭhāna*, which are aptly characterized by the Venerable Nyanatiloka as "the quintessence of the entire Abhidhamma".[1]

Now, in what sense can the Abhidhamma be called a philosophy? Let us take a rough division of philosophy in phenomenology and ontology, and briefly define them as follows: *Phenomenology* deals, as the name implies, with "phenomena", that is, with the world of internal and external experience. *Ontology*, or metaphysics, inquires into the existence and nature of an essence, or ultimate principle, underlying the phenomenal world. In other words, *phenomenology* investigates the questions: *what* happens in the world of our experience, and how it happens. Of course when enquiring into the

1. "Guide through the Abbhidhamma Piṭaka", 2nd ed. Colombo 1957, p. 12.

What and How, philosophy is not satisfied with the surface view of reality as it presents itself to the naive and uncritical mind. *Ontology*, on the other hand, insists, at least in most of its systems, that the question "How" cannot be answered without reference to an eternal essence behind reality, either conceived as immanent or transcendent. Particularly in the latter case the question "*How*" is frequently changed into a "*Why*" containing the tacit assumption that the answer to it has to be sought somewhere or somehow outside of the given reality.

The Abhidhamma belongs doubtlessly to the first of these two divisions of philosophy, that is, to *Phenomenology*. Even that fundamental Abhidhamma term *dhamma* which includes corporeal as well as mental "things" may well be rendered by "phenomena"[2] if only we keep in mind that, in Abhidhammic usage, "phenomenon", must not be thought to imply a correlative "noumenon", as, for instance, in Kantian philosophy.

In describing the Abhidhamma as phenomenology we must make two reservations, which however will not greatly alter the substance of our statement. First, Nibbāna, mostly under the name of *asankhatā dhātu* ('the Unconditioned Element'), appears in the "Enumeration of Phenomena" (*Dhammasanganī*) in several of the classificatory groups treated in that work. Being "supramundane" (*lokuttara-dhamma*), Nibbāna is certainly, in

2. See the title of the first book of Abhidhamma, *Dhammasangaṇī*, rendered by Nyanatiloka as "Enumeration of Phenomena."

the sense of the term *lokuttara*, a metaphysical or transcendent entity. The latter term "transcendent" may well be rendered by another Abhidhammic classification of Nibbāna, namely, *apariyāpanna*, that is "not included" in the three worlds of the universe as conceived by Buddhism. Though Nibbāna or *asankhatā dhātu*, does in fact appear quite frequently in the Dhammasanganī,[3] for the sake of completeness in that "enumeration of things", it should be noted that (1) in all cases there is only a bare mention of it without any further explanation beyond the respective classificatory heading under which it appears, and so it differs in that respect from the other "things" to all of which a definition is added; (2) the classifications of Nibbāna are all negative in character. On the other hand it is noteworthy that Nibbāna is definitely termed a *dhamma*, and even in classifications where it is certainly not viewed as a possible object of thought (that is *dhamma* in the sense of a mental object, correlated to *mano*, "mind"). So we have to admit that this sole *non-phenomenal* entity belongs likewise to the system of the Abhidhamma, but, and this is relevant in our connexion, it is never enlarged upon because Nibbāna is an object of realisation and not of philosophical research.

Our second reservation with regard to an exclusively phenomenological aspect of the Abhidhamma is this: The results of the penetrative phe-

3. See the table in the English Translation of Dhammasanganī by Mrs. Rhys Davids, 2nd Ed., p. 342.

nomenological investigations in the Abhidhamma are a definite and valuable contribution to ontological problems, that is, to the search for an abiding essence in reality. The results of Abhidhamma philosophy show clearly and irrefutably where such an alleged essence can never be found, namely anywhere in the world of the five Aggregates (*khandha*). The most sublime states of meditative consciousness so frequently identified with the manifestation of, or the mystic union with, a deity of a personal or impersonal nature are included in those five phenomenal objects of Clinging (*upādānakkhandha*) and excluded from the sphere of the Unconditioned Element. At the same time, the thorough analysis of all phenomena undertaken in the Abhidhamma leaves no doubt as to what Nibbāna definitely is not. It is true that these ontological results of the Abhidhamma are "merely negative", but they represent certainly more substantial and consequential contributions to the ontological problem than the "positive" assertions of many metaphysical systems, indulging in unprovable or fallacious conceptual speculations.

Having dealt with these two reservations, we may return to our initial simplified statement and formulate it now in this way: *The Abhidhamma is not a speculative but a descriptive philosophy*.

For the purpose of describing phenomena, the Abhidhamma uses two complementary methods: that of analysis, and that of investigating the relations (or the conditionality) of things.

Both these typical features of the Abhidhamma, that is, the limitation to a purely descriptive procedure and the two-fold method, will become evident if we glance at the fundamental schemata of the two above-mentioned principal books of the Abhidhamma:

(1) The analytical *Dhammasanganī*, or 'Enumeration of Phenomena', has the following descriptive pattern

"At a time when (such or such a type of) consciousness has arisen, at that time there exist the following phenomena…" (See p. 57).

(2) The *Paṭṭhāna* or 'Book of Origination', the principal work dealing with the Buddhist philosophy of relations, uses the following stereotype basic formula:

"Dependent on a (e.g., wholesome) phenomenon there may arise a (wholesome) phenomenon, conditioned by way of (e.g., a root-cause)."

It is evident from the very wording that in both cases the statements made are purely descriptive. In the first case a description is given of what is really happening when we say "consciousness has arisen," that is to say, what are the constituents of that event which is seemingly of a unitary, non-composite nature. In the second case, the description answers the question "How?" that is to say, under what conditions the event is happening.

The mere juxtaposition of these two basic schemata of the Abhidhamma already allows us to formulate an important axiom of Buddhist philosophy:

A complete description of a thing requires, besides its analysis, also a statement of its relations to certain other things.

Though the Abhidhamma, being non-metaphysical, does not deal with any Beyond as to things in general ("meta ta physika"), it does nevertheless go beyond *single* things, that is, beyond things artificially isolated for the purpose of analytical description. The connexion or relation between things, that is, their conditionality (*idapaccayatā*,) is dealt with particularly in the *Paṭṭhāna* which supplies a vast net of relational categories. But the mere fact of relations, that is, the non-existence of things in isolation, is already implicit in the thorough analysis undertaken in the *Dhammasanganī* where it is shown that even in the smallest psychic unit, that is, in a single moment of consciousness, a multiplicity of mental factors is active between which a certain relationship and interdependence must necessarily exist. This fact is frequently emphasized in the commentary to the *Dhammasanganī* called *Aṭṭhasālinī*, for example, when commenting on the first sentence of *Dhammasanganī* (see p. 57) different meanings are given which the word *samaya* ("time" or "occasion") may have in this context, one of which is *samūha*, aggregation (or constellation) of things. If *samaya* is rendered in that way, the respective sentence would

read: “In which aggregation or constellation) of things a wholesome state of consciousness… has arisen, in that aggregation exist: sense impression etc.” Here the Aṭṭhasāliṇī remarks: “Thereby (that is by the above explanation of *samaya*) the view is rejected that any one thing may arise singly.” In other words: thorough analysis implies an acknowledgement of relationship. The necessity of investigating the relations of things is further emphasized in the Aṭṭhasāliṇī by two more axiomatic sentences:

“Nothing arises from a single cause” (*ekakāranavādo*) *paṭisedhito hoti*).

“Nothing exists (or moves) by its own power”[4] (*dhammānam savasavattitābhimāno paṭisedhito hoti*).

We can add as third the already quoted sentence in an abbreviated form

“No thing arises singly” (*ekass*’ *eva dhammassa uppatti paṭisedhito hoti*).

(*Asl* p. 59–61)

These terse sentences represent three fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy, which well deserve to be taken out of the mass of expository detail where they easily escape the attention they merit. Next to the fact of change (*aniccatā*), these three axioms, implying as they do the principle of

4. The opposite view is called in Asl. “the great conceit” or “the great delusion” (*abhimāno*).

conditionality (*idapaccayatā*), are the main support of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of impersonality or unsubstantiality (*anattatā*).

The analysis as undertaken in the *Dhammasangaṇī* shows that the smallest accessible psychic unit, a moment of consciousness, is as little indivisible (a-tomos), uniform and undifferentiated as the material atom of modern physics. Like the physical atom, a moment of consciousness is a correlational system of its factors, functions, energies or aspects, or whatever other name we choose to give to the "components" of that hypothetical psychic unit. In the Abhidhamma these "components" are called simply *dhammā*, that is, "things" or "states".

It should be noted, however, that the *Paṭṭhāna*, the principal work of Buddhist "conditionalism", is not so much concerned with the relations within a single psychic unit (*citta-kkhaṇa*) which we shall call "internal relation", but deals with "external relations", that is, with the connexions between several of such units. But these "external relations" are to a great extent dependent on the "internal relations" of the given single unit or of previous ones, that is, on the modes of combination and the relative strength of the different mental factors within a single moment of consciousness. This shows that the analytical method is as important for the relational one, as the latter is for the first.

The presence or absence, strength or weakness, of a certain mental factor (*dhamma* or *cetasika*) may decide the occurrence or non-

occurrence of a given external relation; for example, in a wholesome state of consciousness unassociated with knowledge, the presence and strength of Energy (*viriya=sammā-vāyāma*) may, by its belonging to the Path Factors (*magganga*), establish a relationship with a future state of consciousness where also the path factor "Right Understanding" is present. In other words, the tendency toward liberation which characterizes the path factors is, in our example, at first mainly expressed by the factor 'energy' that is, the active wish and endeavour directed to liberation. This energy naturally strives to acquire all the other necessities for reaching the goal, particularly the path factor of "Right Understanding". If there is the definite awareness that a certain quality of mind or character is a member of a group of factors having in common a certain purpose, then the respective state of consciousness will possess the inherent tendency to complete that group by acquiring the missing or strengthening the undeveloped members of the group. In that way a bridge is built to another type of consciousness, and we can see from that example how the composition of a state of consciousness, that is, its internal relations, influences its external relations.

As already mentioned, the *Paṭṭhāna* investigates only the external relations, but in another work of the Abhidhamma, the *Vibhanga*, the internal relations, too, are treated. In the *Paccayākāra-Vibhanga*, the "Treatise on the Modes of Conditionality," the schema of the *Dhammasanganī* is com-

bined with the formula of the Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*); for example, "At a time when (the first unwholesome state of consciousness) has arisen, at that time there arises dependent on ignorance the (respective) kamma-formation" (*sankhāro*, in singular!). In that text, there are some deviations from the normal formula of the Dependent Origination, varying in accordance with the type of consciousness in question. This remarkable application of the Paṭiccasamuppāda is called in the commentary *ekaccittakkhaṇikapaṭiccasamuppāda*, that is, "the Dependent Origination within a single moment of consciousness." The commentary indicates which of the 24 modes of conditionality (*paccaya*) are applicable to which links of that "momentary" *paṭicca-samuppāda*. In that way, by showing that even an inifinitesimally brief moment of consciousness is actually an intricate net of relations, the erroneous belief in a static world is attacked and destroyed at its root. In that important, but much too little known chapter of the *Vibhanga*, both methods of the Abhidhamma are exemplified and harmonized at the same time, namely the analytical and the relational.[5]

The Buddha, who is so rightly called "skilful in his method of instruction" (*nayakusalo*), has used on other occasions too, the same ingenious

5. It is to be regretted that the statements of the Vibhanga text are (as so often in the Abhidhamma) rather laconic and are only partly elucidated in the commentary. It will require patient scrutiny and reflection till at least the most important implications of that text will be clearly understood.

approach of first applying separately two different methods and afterwards combining them. Here are only a few examples:

According to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* the contemplation of different objects of attention should proceed in two phases:

Phase I:– (1) *ajjhatta*, the contemplation of phenomena (corporeal and mental) as appearing in oneself;

(2) *bahiddhā*, phenomena appearing in others;

(3) *ajjhatta-bahiddhā*, the combination of both.

Here the synthetical or relational method is applied by breaking down wrong differentiations between ego and non-ego and by showing that the life-process is an impersonal continuum. Only a thorough practice of the first two stages (I, 1 and 2) will lead to the result.

Phase II:– (1) *Samudaya-dhamma*, phenomena viewed as arising,

(2) *vaya-dhamma*, phenomena viewed as passing away;

(3) *samudaya-vaya-dhamma*, the combination of both.

Here the analytical method is applied for breaking up wrong identifications.

In the course of the practice of *Satipaṭṭhāna*, both partial aspects, the synthetical and the analytical (Phases I and II), gradually merge into one perfect and undivided "vision of things as they really are."

Also the following instruction for the gradual practice of Insight (*vipassanā*), frequently given in the commentaries and the *Visuddhi Magga*, follows a similar method:

(1) Analysis of the corporeal (*rūpa*) (2) " " " mental (*nāma*)	Analysis
(3) Contemplation of both (*nāma-rūpa*) (4) Both viewed as conditioned (*paṭiccasamuppāda*)	Synthesis

(5) Application of the three characteristics to mind-and-body-cum-conditions=combination of analysis and synthesis.

Only the application of both methods — the analytical and the synthetical — can produce a full and correct understanding of the impersonality (*anattatā*) and insubstantiality (*suññatā*) of all phenomena. A one-sided application of analysis may easily result in the view of a rigid world of material and psychic atoms. When science has come close to the Buddhist Anattā-doctrine, it has done so (at least up to the beginning of this century) mostly through

radical application of the analytical method, so its kinship to the Buddhist concept, is only a partial one, and has to be accepted with reservations. However, this analytical approach of science has been supplemented by the dynamic world view that dominates the latest trends in modern physics, psychology and philosophy. To be fair, we have to admit that even distinguished Buddhist writers of the past and of our times as well, have not always avoided the pitfalls of a one-sided analytical approach. This may easily happen because analysis takes a very prominent place in Buddhist philosophy and meditation. Furthermore, in striving for Insight; that is, for a "vision of things as they really are," analysis comes first. The first task is to remove by analysis the basis for all the numerous false notions of substantial unities, such as the unquestioned belief of the average man in an identical Ego, or theological faith in an individual soul, or the various concepts of materialist or idealist systems. Finally, analysis tends to be overemphasized in expositions of the Abhidhamma, because the analytical *Dhammasanganī* presents relatively easier reading than the *Paṭṭhāna*, giving more concrete facts than the latter book. The *Paṭṭhāna* furnishes only an abstract scheme of all possible relations scantily illustrated. It deals with the formal aspect of the life process. The "bodies" within which these abstract principles operate, are supplied in the analytical books of the Abhidhamma. In other words, analysis describes by crit-

ically chosen terms, the "things" which actually enter into those relations dealt with by the synthetical method. All these points are strong temptations to stress unduly the analytical aspect of the Abhidhamma philosophy. So it is all the more imperative to supplement it by constant awareness of the fact that the "things" presented by analysis, are never isolated, self-contained units,[6] but are conditioned and conditioning. They occur only in temporary aggregations or combinations which are constantly in a process of formation and dissolution. But the word "dissolution" does not imply the complete disappearance of all the components of the respective aggregation. Some of them always "survive" or, more correctly, recur in the combination of the next movement, while others may, conditioned by their previous occurrence, re-appear much later. Thus the flux of the life stream is preserved uninterrupted.

Bare analysis starts, or pretends to start, its investigations by selecting single objects, existing in the sector of time which is called "present". The present is certainly "the only reality" in the sense of "existence", but it is a very illusive "reality" which is constantly "on the move" from an "unreal" future to an "unreal" past. But strictly speaking, the object of analysis when it is considered, already belongs to the past, and no longer to the present. This is stated by the commentators of old: "Just as it is

6. See the commentarial axioms on p. 22.

impossible to touch with one's finger-tip that very same finger-tip, so, too, the arising, continuing and ceasing of a thought cannot be known by the same thought" (Commentary to Majjhima Nikāya, Anupada Sutta). This statement that, strictly speaking, a thought has not a present, but a past object, holds good even if we have in mind the much wider term of the "serial present" (*santatipaccuppanna*), that is, the perceptible sequence of several moments of consciousness which alone is actually experienced as "present", and if we ignore the so-called "momentary present" (*khaṇapaccuppanna*), which consists of a single practically imperceptible moment of consciousness. To a philosophical mind, the duration of the object of bare analysis in an artificially delimited, elusive, and not even genuine present lends to it a strangely illusory character which contrasts quaintly with the frequent assertion of "pure analysts" that only they deal with "real facts"; yet these facts are constantly slipping through their fingers. A frequent and vivid experience and contemplation of that illusory nature of the present, not in the well known general sense but as established by Abhidhammic analysis, will greatly help in the final understanding of *suññatā*, that is, voidness or unsubstantiality.

We have noted how bare analysis starts with single objects occurring in the present. But even the most complacent analysts cannot afford to stop at that point. They have to take cognizance of the fact that other "single" objects existing in the "same"

space-time, act upon their original object, and are "acted upon" by it. They also have to take notice that the object chosen undergoes before their eyes a series of consecutive changes. In view of these facts, analysis must renounce its self-sufficiency and admit within the range of its scrutiny at least those two relational facts mentioned above. After that extension of range we can now speak of "qualified analysis", as distinct from the previous "bare analysis." In its widened scope, "qualified analysis" spreads, as it were, its objects and the results of its investigations over a plane or surface, only with the two dimensions of breadth and length. The "breadth" consists in the first-mentioned relational fact the co-existence of other phenomena in so far as they are in interconnection with the original object of analysis. The "length" signifies the second relational fact: the sequence of observed, consecutive changes stretching forward in time. Thus, in qualified analysis only those of the 24 Modes of Conditionality (*paccaya*) treated in the *Paṭṭhāna* are taken into consideration that refer to co-existence (e.g. *sahajāta-paccaya*, "conascence") or to linear sequence (e.g. *anantara-paccaya*, "contiguity").

Both bare and qualified analysis are closely bound to a spatial view of the world, and, as we have seen, to a two-dimensional space only. Those who rely on these two kinds of analysis fear nothing so much as the disturbing intrusion of the time-factor into their well-ordered but static, sham world of supposedly "unambiguous and palpable

facts." Having had to admit the time-factor, at least partially, by way of the two relational facts mentioned above, qualified analysis endeavours to render the time-effect as harmless as possible by trying to reduce it to spatial terms of juxtaposition, etc. The co-existent things are, as we have seen, arranged into the dimension of breadth which we might accept provisionally. The fact of change is disposed of by imagining the single phases of the change to be arranged in the dimension of length as if the time during which these changes occurred, were an extent in space along which the object moved. Obviously, the strange assumption is that while the object "changes its place" along that stretch of time it also changes in some mysterious way its nature, that is, it undergoes the observed alterations of, say, ageing.

In that way, sequence in time appears to bare and qualified analysis like a cinema in which a great number of single static pictures are substituted quickly enough to produce in the spectator the effect of moving figures. This illustration, after Bergson, is very frequently used in literature with or without the implication that, properly speaking, motion or change is illusory, or a reality of a lesser degree, while only the single static pictures, that is, self-identical physical and/or psychic (time) atoms have genuine reality. But according to the Buddha the very reverse is true: change or flux is real, and the single static pictures, (that is; individuals, atoms, etc.) are illusory. If we take up another

aspect of that same simile, we shall get a more correct view of the facts concerned: to take a film of moving objects with the help of a mechanism called a "camera" and thereby to dissect the continuous motion of the objects, might be compared to the perceptual activity of the mind which, by necessity, must fictitiously arrest the flux of phenomena in order to discriminate. But that function of dissecting is only an artificial device based on the peculiarity of our perceptual "mechanism", just as in the case of the camera; it is not found in the actual phenomena any more than in the moving objects converted into static pictures by the camera. These static pictures obtained by filming correspond to the static images or percepts, concepts or notions, resulting from the act of perceiving.

But let us now leave this simile. We said before that the spatial world of qualified analysis is limited to the two dimensions of breadth and length. Bare or qualified analysis dare not admit those conditioning and conditioned phenomena which are bound up with the third dimension, that of depth, because the latter is too closely connected with the disturbing time-factor. By "depth" we understand that subterraneous flow of energies (a wide and intricate net of streams, rivers and rivulets) originating in past actions (kamma) and coming to the surface unexpectedly at a time determined by their inherent life rhythm (time required for growth, maturing, etc.) and by the influence of favourable or obstructive circumstances. The ana-

lytical method, we said, will admit only such relational energies as are transmitted by immediate impact (the dimension of breadth) or by the linear "wire" of immediate sequence (the dimension of length). But relational energies may also arise from unknown depths opening under the very feet of the individual or the object; or they may be transmitted, not by that linear "wire" of immediate sequence in time-space, but by the way of "wireless" communication, travelling vast distances of space and time. It is the time factor that gives depth and a wide and growing horizon to our world view. By the time factor the "present moment" is freed from the banality and insignificance adhering to it in the equalizing and levelling world of space and one-sided analysis. The time factor as emphasized by the philosophy of relations, invests the "present moment" with that dignity, significance and decisive importance attributed to it by the Buddha and other great spiritual teachers. Only by the synthetical method, by the philosophy of relations, can due regard be given to the time factor, because in any comprehensive survey of relations or conditions, the past and future, too, have to be considered, while one-sided analysis may well neglect them.

Precisely because the following pages are mainly concerned with the analytical part of the Abhidhamma, we felt the need to underline the importance of the other aspect.

But we wish to stress the harmonization of both methods, not only on philosophical grounds,

but also on account of its practical importance for spiritual development. Many will have observed in themselves or in others, how greatly it often affects the entire life of man if the activity of mind is dominated by a dissecting (analytical) or connecting (synthetical) function, rather than the two being well balanced. The consequences can extend beyond the intellectual to the ethical, emotional, social and imaginative side of the character. This can even be observed when one's own mental activity is temporarily engaged in one or the other direction. But it can be clearly seen in extreme analytical or synthetical types of mind; here the particular virtues and defects of both will be very marked. We need not enlarge on this. Enough has been said to point out how important it is for the formation of character and for spiritual progress, to cultivate both the analytical and the synthetical faculties of one's mind and to follow also in that respect the Middle Way of the Buddha that alone leads to Enlightenment.

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Chapter III

The Schema of Classification in the Dhammasanganī

The First Type of Wholesome Consciousness

The investigations undertaken in the following chapters, are all based on the 1st Type of Wholesome Consciousness dealt with in the first paragraph of the *Dhammasanganī*. For the convenience of the reader a translation of it, preceded by the Pāli text, is given here. Each mental factor has been numbered to facilitate reference in the following pages; they will be referred to as "F" (=factor) 1, etc.

"Katame dhammā kusalā? Yasmiṃ samaye kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti somanassa-sahāgataṃ ñāṇasampayuttaṃ rūpārammaṇaṃ saddārammaṇam gandhārammaṇam, rasārammaṇam phoṭṭhabbārammarṇam dhammārammaṇaṃ, yaṃ yaṃ vā pan'ārabbha, tasmiṃ samaye phasso hoti vedanā hoti… avikkhepo hoti, ye vā pana tasmiṃ samaye añño pi atthi paṭiccasamuppannā arūpino dhammā, ime dhammā kusalā."

"Which are the things that are wholesome? At a time when a state of wholesome consciousness belonging to the sensuous sphere has arisen accompanied by joy and associated with knowledge (and spontaneous), referring to any one object, be it an object of sight, sound, smell or taste, a tangible

object, or a mental object, — at that time there are present:

1.	Sense Impression (*phassa*)	Pentad of Sense Impression (*phassa-pañcaka*)
2.	Feeling (*vedanā*)	
3.	Perception (*saññā*)	
4.	Volition (*cetanā*)	
5.	Consciousness (*citta*)	

6.	Thought-conception (*vitakka*)	Factors of Absorption (*jhān’anga*)
7.	Discursive Thinking (*vicāra*)	
8.	Interest (*pīti*)	
9.	Pleasure (*sukha*)	
10.	Mental One-pointedness (*cittass’ ekaggatā*)	

11.	Faculty of Faith (*saddh’indriya*)	Faculties (*indriya*)
12.	" " Energy (*viriy’indriya*)	
13.	" " Mindfulness (*sat’indriya*)	
14.	" " Concentration(*samādh’indriya*)	
15.	" " Wisdom (*paññ’indriya*)	
16.	" " Mind (*man’indriya*)	
17.	" " Joy (*somanass’indriya*)	
18.	" " Vitality (*jīvit’indriya*)	

19.	Right Understanding (*sammā-diṭṭhi*)	Path Factors (*magg’anga*)
20.	" Thought (*sammā-sankappa*)	
21.	" Effort (*sammā-vāyāma*)	
22.	" Mindfulness (*sammā-sati*)	
23.	" Concentration (*sammā-samādhi*)	

24.	Power of Faith (*saddhā-bala*)	Powers (*bala*)
25.	" " Energy (*viriya-bala*)	
26.	" " Mindfulness (*sati-bala*)	
27.	" " Concentration(*samādhi-bala*)	
28.	" " Wisdom (*paññā-bala*)	
29.	" " Moral Shame (*hiri-bala*)	
30.	" " Moral Dread (*otappa-bala*)	

31.	Non-Greed (*alobha*)	Wholesome Roots (*kusala-mūla*)
32.	Non-Hatred (*adosa*)	
33.	Non-Delusion (*amoha*)	

34.	Non-Covetousness (*anabhijjhā*)	Wholesome Ways of Action (*kusala-kammapatha*)
35.	Non-illwill (*avyāpāda*)	
36.	Right Understanding (*sammā-diṭṭhi*)	

37.	Moral Shame (*hiri*)	The Guardians of the World (*lokapāla*)
38.	Dread (*otappa*)	

39.	Tranquillity of Mental Concomitants (*kāya-passaddhi*)	
40.	" " Consciousness (*eitta-passaddhi*)	The Six Pairs (*yugalaka*)
41.	Agility of Mental Concomitants (*kāya-lahutā*)	
42.	" " Consciousness (*citta-lahutā*)	
43.	Pliancy of Mental Concomitants (*kāya-mudutā*)	
44.	" " Consciousness (*citta-mudutā*)	
45.	Workableness of Mental Concomitants (*kāya-kammaññatā*)	
46.	" " Consciousness (*citta-kammaññatā*)	
47.	Proficiency of Mental Concomitants (*kāya-pāguññatā*)	
48.	" " Consciousness (*citta-pāguññatā*)	
49.	Uprightness of Mental Concomitants (*kāyujukatā*)	
50.	" " Consciousness (*citta-ujukatā*)	

51. Mindfulness (*sati*) 52. Mental Clarity (*sampajañña*)	}	The Helpers (*upakāraka*)
53. Calm (*samatha*) 54. Insight (*vipassanā*)	}	The Pairwise Combination (*yuganaddha*)
55. Exertion (*paggāha*) 56. Undistractedness (*avikkhepa*)	}	The Last Dyad (*piṭṭhi-duka*)

These, or whatever other conditionally arisen uncorporeal things there at that time, these things are wholesome."

The supplementary Factors (*ye-vā-panaka*), as given in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, are the following:

57. Intention (*chanda*)
58. Decision (*adhimokkha*)
59. Attention (*manasikāra*)
60. Mental Equipoise (*tatramajjhattatā*)
61. Compassion (*karunā*)
62. Sympathetic Joy (*muditā*)
63. Abstinence from wrong Bodily Action (*kāyaduccarita-virati*)
64. " " " Speech (*vaciduccarita-virati*)
65. " " " Livelihood (*ājīvaduccarita-virati*)

The purpose of the first part of the *Dhammasan-gaṇī*, the "Book of Consciousness" (*cittuppāda kaṇḍa*), is to give

(1) a classification of all consciousness;

(2) a detailed analysis of the single types of consciousness.

The classification is given in the first part of the principal sentences: "At a time when (such and

such) a state of consciousness has arisen." Here the respective type of consciousness is briefly characterized with the help of certain categories.

The detailed analysis follows in the concluding part of the sentence: "…at that time there are: sense impression," etc. This enumeration of mental factors will be called the "List of Dhammas". The word, *dhamma*, of course, is here again used in the sense of "thing" or "phenomenon".

The classifying categories used in the first part of the sentence, are statements (1) about the "subjective" side of the cognitive process, (2) about the "objective" side.

The statements about the "subject" refer to

(a) the plane or sphere of consciousness (*bhūmi*); in our example: the sensuous sphere;
(b) the kammic value; here: wholesome;
(c) the emotional value; here: joyful;
(d) presence or absence of knowledge; here: associated with knowledge;
(e) spontaneous or non-spontaneous occurrence; here: spontaneous.

(2) The statement about the "object" is generally not used for constituting separate classes of consciousness. The six kinds of sense-objects are considered only as variations of the same type. In nearly all cases it is the "subjective" relation to the object which is used for the differentiation of consciousness. The objects determine the classification

only in the case of initial five-sense perception in its narrowest sense (called *dassana*="seeing" etc.), that is, that still very primitive phase of the perceptual process which follows immediately after the first "adverting of the mind" (*āvajjana*). At that time the impact of the object is predominant, and the activity of the subjective factors is still weak, as shown by the small number of mental concomitants present in these types of consciousness.

From the, above subjective categories (a)–(e), the following are anticipations of factors contained in the complete analysis as given in the List of Dhammas:

(b) the kammic value, here "wholesome", is determined by the presence of the "wholesome roots". If the state of consciousness is "associated with knowledge", as in our case, all three "roots" are present, namely non-greed, non-hate and non-delusion (F31, 32, 33); if "dissociated from knowledge", the last is missing.

(c) The emotional value, here "joyful" is represented by the factors: feeling (F2), pleasure (F9) and joy (F17).

(d) The association with, and dissociation from, knowledge is determined by the presence or absence of the third "wholesome root", non-delusion (F33), and its various synonyms or aspects (e.g., F15, 19, etc.).

The category of spontaneous or non-spontaneous occurrence cannot be traced to any factor of the

respective present moment of consciousness but depends on previous mental processes. We speak of "spontaneity" if the reaction or decision takes place without being prompted, by force of inclination or habit, both of which may have their roots in a distant past, or even in a previous existence. We speak of "non-spontaneity" if the reaction or decision is preceded by one's own deliberation or by an outer influence in the way of advice, request or command; so, the non-spontaneity of a state of consciousness may be due either to premeditation or to instigation.

‡†‡

Chapter IV

The List of Mental Constituents (Dhamma) in the Dhammasanganī

> "In psychology 'a difference of aspects is a difference in things'."
> *James Ward*, Ency. Brit., art, Psychology

1. General Remarks

When one reads through the list of the constituents of consciousness as given in the *Dhammasanganī*, this list appears, at first sight, to heap up rather arbitrarily and superfluously a great number of synonyms, thus presenting a strange contrast to the otherwise so terse, lucid and strictly systematic plan of that work. Precisely, this striking contrast will make us hesitate to ascribe the seemingly unsystematic character of the List to a lack of the most elementary skill in methodical exposition. If we look at the admirable architecture of the *Dhammasanganī's* groundplan and details, we shall certainly not be willing to suppose that its author — be it the Buddha Himself or His early disciples — was unable to undertake the simple procedure of summarizing parallel factors under a single heading, as in later periods it was actually done in the commentary (*Aṭṭhasālinī*), the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Abhidhammattha-Sangaha*.

The *Aṭṭhasālinī* (p. 135) actually discusses a criticism alleging lack of system and superfluity of repetitions in the List of Dhammas. The commentator puts into the mouth of the critic the following drastic indictment: "It is a disconnected exposition, as disorderly as booty carried off by thieves or grass scattered by a herd of cattle in their track. It is made without an understanding of the matter." The *Aṭṭhasālinī* meets that criticism with the following simile: A king levies a tax on the different crafts and professions, commanding that those who execute several crafts pay the corresponding amount of tax units. Now, the different professional activities of a single person correspond to the different functions of a single factor of consciousness. The number of tax units payable by the same person are to be compared to the number of classifications corresponding to the various functions of a single factor.

This simile, however, only explains the inclusion of parallel factors, regarded separately and as functions of a single mental quality. It does not do justice to another important fact which properly rounds off and completes the explanations, namely, the arrangement of these quasi-synonyms into groups. A factor, by force of its various functions, enters into combination with various sets of other factors grouped around a common function or purpose. This fact is important because these very groups represent the formal principle of arrangement in our list. The names of these groups (as given on pp. 57–59) are assigned to them partly

in the text of the *Dhammasanganī* itself[7] and partly in *Aṭṭhasālinī*, but the fact of the grouping is quite evident from the list itself. On the other hand, if the grouping were nothing more than a formal principle of arrangement, it would not have been allowed to determine the composition of the list. Though the predilection of the Indian mind for purely formalistic methods of exposition is well-known, this peculiarity rarely impairs the treatment of the subject-matter itself. And it would certainly not be permitted to do so in this case, in a work that offers psychological instruction in a form so tersely concentrated and reduced to the bare essentials with no embellishments. We cannot suppose that in a work of this character the List of Dhammas should have been cluttered with tautologies merely for formalistic reasons. The groups among which we find these different parallel terms are more than devices of arrangement; they are also psychic realities in themselves; for they represent purposive associations of single factors, that is, their concurrent directions of movement and their common tendencies of development. We shall soon give an example for a single factor's membership in several groups and shall deal with it further in the chapters that follow, which are devoted to the various groups.

The introduction of partly overlapping groups indicates the subtle and complicated structure of a

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7. In the chapter called *Sangaha-vara*, i.e. 'Summary'.

moment of consciousness. It shows that a psychic unit is not "composed" of rigid parts, arranged, as it were, in juxtaposition like a mosaic but is rather a relational and correlational system of dynamic processes.

In order to give to the groups the place they deserve within the simile of the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* quoted above, we may supplement it by adding that the person executing various professions and paying the corresponding taxes should also belong to each of the respective professional guilds, which would correspond to the groupings. But the different applications of one faculty may become clearer by another simile. If the simile chosen by the teachers of old is somewhat banal, that will be an excuse if ours is likewise so.

Let us suppose a man, as the head of his family, is in charge of the household purse; in his professional capacity he is a cashier, and in his club its treasurer. Thus his general skill in reckoning is applied to different aspects of life and to different social groups to which he belongs. Consequently his skill serves different purposes, to attain which he has to combine it, in each case, with some quite different qualities of his own. It also brings him in contact with quite different sorts of people. The application to our case is this: Our man's general skill in reckoning corresponds to a single factor (viewed *in abstracto*), belonging to a certain moment of consciousness. The three practical applications of that skill are the different actual

functions of that factor. The various other faculties which our man has to summon to his aid in the three different spheres of his activity correspond to the other members of those groups to which our factor belongs; they signify the *internal* relations within the same moment of consciousness. The fact that the man is executing his skill in different kinds of environment and meets there different sorts of people, corresponds to the *external* relations to other states of consciousness, which may belong to the same or different classificatory type.

The various functions of a mental factor might start quite different lines of development, that is, different external relations. For example, "one-pointedness of mind" (*cittass'ekaggatā*) can be deliberately cultivated as a "factor of (meditative) absorption" (*jhān'anga*) and be developed up to the degree of complete absorption of mind (*appanā*). Or with emphasis on its liberating quality, "one-pointedness" may have the aspect of the Path Factor "right concentration", and it can be developed for the purpose of Insight (*vipassanā*) only up to Access Concentration (*upacāra-samādhi*). Or "one-pointedness" may appear as "calm", (*samatha*) in the pair-wise combination of calm and insight (F53, 54).

It will at first be a single function or aspect of a mental factor that initiates a certain external relation with the succeeding moments of consciousness, but this does not exclude other aspects of the same factor also manifesting themselves more

prominently in later states of consciousness. In the same way the relative strength or weakness of any factor might have no visible consequence just now but may produce effects at any later moment when conditions are favourable. The net of relations, conditions or causes extending from a single moment of consciousness may reach very far in space as well as in time.

The relational system of the functions within a single moment of consciousness extends not only to the future but also to the multiplicity of past states of consciousness which are its conditions. That is to say: mental factors, far from being self-contained units, are "open" towards the past as well as the future, and, though meeting in one moment, they are related to quite different "layers" of those time periods. From that we can gauge the highly dynamic nature of the processes going on in a single moment of consciousness.

All these facts, and other reasons too, exclude the assumption of later Buddhist schools, for example, the Sarvāstivādins, that mental factors (*dhamma*) are a kind of Platonic ideas or psychic atoms in the literal sense of indivisibility. These schools have misunderstood the old grammarian's definition of *dhammā* (Skr. *dharma*) — *attano sabhāvaṃ dhārenti* — as implying that each *dhamma* is the "bearer" of a single quality (*sabhāva*) or of a single characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*). But, in the true spirit of Buddhist philosophy, that definition means only that the Dhamma are not reduc-

ible by further retrogression to any substantial bearers of qualities. it does not imply that these Dhammas themselves are such “substances” or “bearers”, nor are they to be distinguished in any way from their qualities or functions, which in no phase of their existence can be said to have self-identity. The sub-commentary to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* (*Mūlā-ṭikā*) says: “There is no other thing than the quality borne by it” (*na ca dhāriyamāna-sabhāvā añño dhammo nāma atthi*). And these things (*dhammā*) themselves, as the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* expressly says, “are born by their conditions” (*paccayehi dhariyanti*). Therefore, they cannot be said to be ultimate, that is, unconditioned “bearers”. Furthermore, it is impossible to speak of a thing as the bearer of single quality in a strict sense, if the functions of the respective factor, its direction of movement, its intensity and kammic quality are variable, in accordance with the relational system to which that factor belongs.

Now here are a few illustrations of possible variations of so-called “identical” factors or qualities. We have already mentioned the varying functions, directions of movement and degree of intensity in the case of mental one-pointedness (p. 67) and we add what follows. The intensity of “one-pointedness” may sink to such a low level that this fact is expressly registered in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* by an abbreviation of the stereotype definition, restricting into mere “stability” (*ṭhiti*); the terms denoting greater intensity (*sanṭhiti-avaṭhiti*,

etc.) are left out. Variations with regard to kammic quality are shown, for example, by the fact that "one-pointedness" is present in unwholesome consciousness too.

Even such an elementary factor as "perception" (*saññā*) is not unequivocal. According to the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* and *Mūla-Ṭikā*, its reliability and steadfastness are dependent on the presence or absence of knowledge and on the higher or lower degree of concentration.

Furthermore, even consecutive states of consciousness of the same type, that is, having the same mental factors, are not strictly identical. The very fact that they are conditioned by repetition (*āsevanā-paccaya*) means that certain factors are intensified by force of practice. But even this effect of repetition or habit is not stationary in any phase. After gradually reaching its peak, the effect will wear off, and certain factors, for example, "interest" (*pīti*), will become weak. There is yet another reason why the first occurrence of a state of consciousness differs from its repetition: at the first occurrence an outer stimulus may have been the primary condition (e.g., of "inducement", *upanissaya*) while for the repetition its place will be taken by the first occurrence of the respective thought — a circumstance which will certainly give a different character to the subsequent repetition.

In view of such numerous possible variations even among so-called identical factors of the same type of consciousness, there is no justification for

believing in any unchangeable "bearers" of definite qualities.

By arranging the mental factors in relational groups a subordinate synthetical element has been introduced into the mainly analytical *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*. By so doing, the danger inherent in purely analytical methods has been avoided. This danger consists in erroneously taking for genuine separate entities the "parts" resulting from analysis, instead of restricting their use to sound practical method with the purpose of classifying and dissolving composite events wrongly conceived as ultimate unities. Up to the present time it has been a regular occurrence in the history of physics, metaphysics and psychology that when a Whole has been successfully dissolved by analysis, the resultant "parts" themselves come again to be regarded as little "Wholes". Early Buddhist schools succumbed to this danger, for example, the Vaibhasikas, better known as Sarvāstivādins, which belong to the so-called Hinayāna. It was these schools that, according to Otto Rosenberg ("*Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*"), have defined Dhammas as "substantial bearers of their specific exclusive qualities". They assumed that "the *substance* of all things has a permanent existence throughout the three divisions of time, present, past and future"[8] and that only the manifestations of these "substantial bearers" were impermanent and subject to

8. Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (Calcutta 1912), p. 100.

change in the three divisions of time. The teachings of these schools were probably the reason why "Hinayāna" in general has been called a "pluralistic" doctrine by Mahayana thinkers as well as by some modern writers.[9] But this statement is certainly not applicable to the Theravāda School and still less to the Pāli Canon itself, as is amply proved in these pages. Besides, the charge of "pluralism" cannot be restricted to Hinayāna alone, since quite a number of Mahāyāna schools too accepted this pluralistic "Dharma Theory", as is shown in Rosenberg's book. On the other hand, a prominent Mahāyāna School (the Mādhyamikas) vigorously rejected and criticized the pluralistic Dharma Theory. In relation to what we said about the "twofold method of the Abhidhamma", it is significant that this criticism of pluralism comes from the Mādhyamikas, a school which particularly emphasized the synthetical method, that is, the philosophy of relations, against one-sided analysis that too easily tends to become dogmatic. The Mādhyamikas even exaggerated the application of that principle by denying the ultimate validity of the formula of Dependent Origination and of the 24 Modes of Conditionality. By doing so, they carried the principle of relativity to an extreme where it destroys its own basis. However, by rejecting the other extreme, namely that of one-sided analysis, this Mahāyāna school has preserved the spirit of the

9. 'See Stacherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad 1927).

pure Doctrine, at least in this respect, more faithfully than the Hinayāna school of Sarvāstivādins. We would emphasize once more that the genuine tradition of the Theravāda is in our opinion not affected by that criticism, provided that its standpoint is formulated with due caution, that is, by using both the analytical, and the synthetical method, as done by the Buddha in the Suttas as well as in the Abhidhamma. By following herein the Master's example, the danger of converting or perverting concepts of relative validity into entities of ultimate reality will be avoided.

From the mistaken assumption of separate units of whatever description (ultimate Dhammas, Platonic, ideas, atoms, elements, qualities, traits of character, etc.), follows the belief in the actual existence of clear-cut opposites of some kind or other. In this context we shall say a few words about one pair of opposites only: identity and diversity. These opposites have no absolute validity, but are relative terms denoting various degrees of similitude or divergence indicating different grades in the closeness and range of ever-present relations. The ultimate reality of these two terms has been denied by many philosophical systems, but this denial has a truly secure foundation only in a doctrine that disposes "of substantiality as radically as the Buddhist philosophy of relations does. We would emphasize again that the "voidness of substance", the Anattā-doctrine, can only be established securely with help of an all-

comprehensive philosophy of relations, and not by analysis alone.

The Buddhist philosophy of relations shows that there is no complete identity or diversity in life, but only a continuous process of identifying or diversifying, of assimilating and dissimilating. There is a persistent struggle between these two forces, resulting in merely a temporary dominance of one but never in the complete exclusion of the other. In every phase of assimilation there is an irreducible remainder of diversity making for dissimilation; and in every phase of dissimilation there is an irreducible remainder of identity making for assimilation.

These factors also furnish the explanation of the famous Buddhist dictum on the problem of rebirth: *na ca so na c'añño*, "it is neither the same nor another" who is reborn. The differences in each and every mental and corporeal factor forming the two concatenations involved in the process of rebirth exclude "sameness", that is the Ego-identity of a transmigrating soul. But the existing close relations between these two series of life processes exclude absolute diversity between the "old" and the "new" existences. These close relations are represented, for example, by the correspondence between the rebirth-producing kamma and the resultant; rebirth-consciousness, and by the immediate contiguity of death consciousness (*cuti-citta*) and rebirth consciousness (*paṭisandhi-citta*). The same principle — "neither the same nor another"

— holds true also for normal consciousness during life time: for though there is no identity between successive states of consciousness, there is also no complete diversity since there is an overlapping of some factors and groups. In our analogy of the man with three different fields of activity, the relative identity is represented by his general skill in reckoning, which forms the common basis for all three kinds of his activity. The relative diversity is shown by the application of that skill in different social spheres (i.e. difference of groupings), in a different manner (i.e. difference of functions) and with different purposes (i.e. difference in the direction of movement).

To express it generally: absolute *identity* is excluded by the internal differentiation of things, that is, by the difference of intensity, function, direction and composition, existing in even apparently identical phenomena. Absolute *diversity* is excluded by the continuity and interdependence of things which restrict the effects of the differentiating tendencies.

In contemplating the relativity of these two concepts of identity and diversity, the true nature of change or impermanence (*aniccatā*) will become clear, by revealing the two complementary aspects of change, namely, its dissolving and connecting function. They are like two faces turned towards opposite directions. The fact of change implies both breaking off old units and establishing new ones. Change performs simultaneously a twofold func-

tion: dissimilating or diversifying, and assimilating or identifying. When expounding the Characteristic of Impermanence (*anicca-lakkhaṇa*), the Suttas and also popular treatises on Buddhism stress mainly or exclusively that aspect of change which consists in separation, dissolution or dissimilation. This particular emphasis is fully justified in so far as the ultimate purpose of Buddhist instruction is the practical one: the final deliverance of the mind. This lofty goal is reached when the last traces of belief in (*diṭṭhi*), and clinging to (*tanhā*), an ego-identity or any other kind of substantiality are destroyed. With that goal in view and this work in hand, that aspect of change which consists in the final separation and dissolution inherent in all composite things furnishes the strongest emotional call to practical renunciation. At least this will be so with most men, though not with all; for there are some who firmly believe or pretend that they enjoy "variety" at any cost, for its own sake. But theoretical or philosophical understanding of reality must also start with the dissimilating aspect of change, that is, with its dissolving effect on apparently ultimate units. This corresponds to the precedence which analysis takes in Buddhist philosophy in general as well as in the practice of meditation. The first task of Insight (*vipassanā*) is what the commentators call *ghaṇavinibbhoga*, that is, the dissecting of an apparently compact mass. Possibly, this might have been the reason why in arranging the seven books of the Abhidhamma the first place

has been given to the analytical *Dhammasanganī* and not to the *Paṭṭhāna*. Both books are equal in importance, but analysis comes first in the method of procedure.

But notwithstanding the great practical and theoretical importance of contemplating the dissolving effect of change, we must also give due attention to its connecting function. Only by doing so will a well-balanced view of reality be obtained, which is indispensable for endowing Insight with its full liberating power.

The apparent repetitions in the List of Dhamma demonstrate (1) the multiple internal relations within a single moment of consciousness and (2) the multiple external relations with past and future moments. This two-fold plurality of relations has its parallel in the two-fold "differentiation" (*cittatā*) of consciousness which *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* mentions in its didactic definition of *citta*:[10] (1) Consciousness is differentiated in itself with regard to its object, its sphere (*bhūmi*), its quality etc., (2) it produces differentiation (*citta-karaṇa*) by causing various activities in the outer world, and in the case of kammic consciousness by producing various rebirth processes.

The microscope and the subtle experimental methods of modern science have analysed and "smashed" ever smaller material units until the

10. It is of course only a play with words for a didactic purpose, and not meant as a linguistic derivation when '*cittata*' (from skr. *citra*, "variegated") is used for explaining *citta*, 'mind' (same in Pāli and Skr).

most minute results are no more perceptible directly, but only deducible from observed phenomena. Modern research has penetrated to a point where even the least accessible components of the material world have lost their static appearance and have been recognised as dynamic processes. What is here the gradual result of painstaking research through many hundreds of years by many hundreds of scientists, was achieved with regard to the "psychic atom" by a single great thinker, the Buddha. With a unique power of penetration in which intuition of genius was combined with scientific method, the master-mind of the Buddha showed by analysis that even the smallest — and likewise only deducible — psychic unit is not uniform and homogeneous, but varied and complex; and in his complementary philosophy of relations he showed that this complexity is not static but dynamic by nature.

In the detailed treatment of the single groups of Dhammas that follows, the opinion is expressed that at least in parts, an intentional order exists in their sequence. Such opinion seems to be expressly rejected in the following passage of *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p: 107): "Concerning the mental factors arising in a single moment of consciousness, it is not possible to say that one appears first and another later… sense impression is mentioned first only by reason of sequence in the exposition. One could as well enumerate them as follows: There is feeling, sense impression…', or, 'There is feeling, perception,

thinking etc.' Just as here so in the case of the other factors too, one should not enquire into the sequence of what comes earlier and later." This objection does not invalidate our opinion that the groups of factors in the list, are enumerated in an intentional order. Obviously, the commentarial objection is directed only against the supposition that the arrangement of the list implies a sequence in time. This, of course, is not the case, for the simple reason that all these factors appear simultaneously in a single moment of consciousness. But the assumption that the list gives, for the purpose of exposition, a meaningful and not arbitrary sequence is not contradicted by that objection. We maintain only that there is an interconnection between certain factors, as established already by the fact of grouping, and that there is also an interrelation between some of these groups. Further, we believe that, at least in some cases, the particular character of the groups explains why some are enumerated before others. The commentary is surely carried away by its argument if, in the passage quoted above, the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* goes so far as to imply that the arrangement of the single factors is purely arbitrary. In the last example of possible variations given by the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* in the passage quoted above, even members of different groups have been mixed together. Against that it should be remembered that the canonical text itself emphasizes the fact and the importance of the group arrangement by regularly adding a Chapter of

Summaries (*sangaha-vāra*) that serves to indicate which groups and how many group members are present in the particular type of consciousness.

We have to admit, however, that only in the case of the first six or eight groups have we been able to establish an interconnection. But even if it should not be possible to find any such connection between the other groups, this would not exclude an inner relation between the first groups which contain the most important concrete factors on their first occurrence in the list. In any case our observations on that point may contribute to the achievement of a better understanding of the distinctive characteristics of the groups and of the manner in which they operate within a single moment of consciousness: in other words, a better comprehension of the complicated inner relations prevailing in a conscious moment.

In these "General Remarks" not all reasons have been mentioned which may be assumed to have motivated the inclusion of parallel factors in the list. Additional reasons will result from the detailed survey of the single groups that follows and a summary will be given in the "Concluding Remarks".

2. The Pentad of Sense Impression (*phassa-pañcaka,* F 1–5)

The first five factors, enumerated in the list, are called in the Aṭṭhasāliṇī *phass -pañcaka*, that is, the

Pentad, or the five-fold group, (beginning with) Sense Impression. These five are the basic non-rational elements in a state of consciousness, and therefore they are rightly given the first place in the list. They are also the briefest formulation, by way of representatives, of the four mental Aggregates (*khandha*). The aggregates of feeling and perception are represented by the same terms (F2, 3); for the aggregate of consciousness (*viññāṇakkhandha*) the synonymous term *citta* (F5) is given; while the aggregate of mental formations (*sankhāra-kkhandha*) is represented by two of its most typical general factors:[11] sense impression (F1) and volition (F4).

A fundamental axiom of Buddhist psychology finds expression in the composition of that Pentad: the inseparableness of the four mental aggregates, namely, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness. Even in the weakest state of consciousness (including subconsciousness) all of them are represented.

Verification of the terms in the Suttanta

In order to illustrate how widely the Abhidhamma is based on the Sutta Piṭaka we shall now trace the respective Abhidhamma terms to their source in the Suttanta. We shall do so in the following sec-

11. These general factors, seven in all, are called in the later Abhidhamma books *sabbacittasādhārana*, i, e. factors common to all consciousness.

tions too, but only where it is not evident and where it is of particular interest.

The name of the Pentad occurs as *phassa-pañcama* in *Theragāthā* verse 907:. "*ete pacchimakā dāni munino phassapancamā*", "these are now the last Pentads of Sense-impression of the sage". This seems to be the only passage in the Suttanta where the group's name appears. But the five terms constituting the group are frequently mentioned seriatim. They appear, for example, in a longer sequence of doctrinal terms in *Mahā-Sati-paṭṭhāna-Sutra* (Digh. Nik. 23) and at the beginning of the *Rāhula-Saṃyutta* (Samy. Nik. XVIII, No. 1 sq:)

> "visual consciousness — visual impression — feeling produced by visual impression — perception of visual objects — volition relating to visual objects…"

> "*cakkhu-viññāṇam — cakkhu-samphasso — cakkhusamphassajā vedanā — rūpa-saññā — rūpa-sañcetanā…*"

Here the order of enumeration and the naming of the factors differs slightly from that in the *Dhammasanganī*, but all the five terms are consecutively given.

These terms occur also in the *Anupada-Sutta* (Majjh. Nik. 111), a text which is of particular interest for a study of the genesis of the Abhidhamma: There the five factors are mentioned

among others as the result of a psychological analysis of jhanic (meditative) consciousness, undertaken in retrospect by the Venerable Sāriputta after rising from Absorption (*jhāna*). The passage referring to the First Absorption runs as follows

> "The things occurring in the First Absorption, namely, thinking, deliberation, interest (rapture), happiness and mental one-pointedness; *sense impression*, *feeling*, *perception*, *volition*, *consciousness*, intention, decision, energy, mindfulness, equanimity, attention — these things (or mental factors) were determined by him one after the other."

> "*Ye ca pathamajjhāne dhammā*: *vitakko ca vicāro ca pīti ca sukhañca cittekaggatā ca*; *phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ chando adhimokkho viriyaṃ sati upekkhā manasikāro*, — *tyassa dhamma anupada-vavatthitā honti*."

Here the five Factors of Absorption (*jhān'aṅga*) *are* enumerated first, being the main characteristics of jhanic consciousness to which that retrospective analysis refers. Then our Pentad of Sense Impression follows, with its members named in the same order as in the *Dhammasanganī*.

In another passage of that Discourse the Buddha gives that analysis the name of *anupada-dhamma-vipassanā,* i.e. "insight into the things taken one after the other", and He mentions further that

the Venerable Sāriputta practised it for a fortnight. During that period, "these things were determined by him one after another", or as the commentary to the Sutta says: the nature of these mental factors was defined by him through their characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*). The analysis given in the Discourse extends to all nine Absorptions and represents a precursor of the detailed analysis of jhanic consciousness as given in *Dhammasanganī*. So we may regard this fortnight of the Venerable Sāriputta's practice of analytical Insight as one of the germ-cells of the later Abhidhamma literature. The *Anupada Sutta* shows that an elaboration of the doctrine in the manner of the Abhidhamma had already been undertaken in the Master's life-time by analytically and philosophically gifted disciples. This development was expressly encouraged by the Buddha when, in that Discourse, He mentioned and highly praised the Venerable Sāriputta's fortnight of analytical enquiry.

Also two traditional views expressed, for example, in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, are supported by the Anupada Sutta.

(1) The Venerable Sāriputta's close connexion with the origin and the handing down of the Abhidhamma. According to an ancient Buddhist tradition it was the Venerable Sāriputta who received, as the first on this earth, the Abhidhamma teachings from the mouth of the Master after they had been enunciated by the Buddha in the Heavenly Mansions of the Thirty-three Gods (see *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, p. 16, 32, 410).

(2) It tallies also with the statement in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 16) that the Venerable Sāriputta had only used and elaborated the method or the key words of the Abhidhamma indicated to him by the Buddha, who is said to have been the first *Abhidhammika*. With regard to the Pentad of Sense Impression, the Venerable Sāriputta may well have taken as such an indication the terms of the *Mahā-Satipaṭṭhāna-Sutta* mentioned above, and made use of them in his psychological analysis of jhanic consciousness.[12]

As to the origin of the Abhidhamma, we are inclined to think that the Buddha did not regard it as His task to expound His Abhidhammic knowledge in full detail. We think that in His decision to continue His earthly life after attaining to Enlightenment He was primarily moved by the wish to give the first decisive spiritual impulse and instruction to as many beings as possible. Instead of giving difficult and detailed philosophical expositions comprehensible only to a few, the Buddha mostly preferred to repeat all the more frequently, the fundamental features of His liberating doctrine bearing the distinct stamp of His first great inspiration under the Bodhi Tree. This is impressively demonstrated by the very numerous repetitions or slight variations of those fundamental expositions faithfully recorded in the Sutta Piṭaka by the monks of old.

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12. See the Appendix “The Authenticity of the Anupada Sutta”, at the end of this Chapter.

A striking example of these repetitions or variations is the last book (*Mahā-Vagga*) of the Saṃyutta-Nikāya. In accordance with His frequent appeal to the listener's own effort and judgment the Buddha mostly left it to the individual to develop by himself the spiritual or intellectual impulse received from the Master, and to apply it to his personal life and thought. In particular the Master left it to some of his eminent disciples specially proficient in certain theoretical or practical aspects of the Doctrine to give additional help and instruction to those in need of it. This is clearly shown by the often recurring passages in the Suttas where monks ask the Buddha for a brief summary of the Doctrine or a terse maxim for use as their subject of meditation. Sometimes these monks, so we read, approached later one of the chief disciples and asked for an elucidation. So it is quite probable that the Buddha transmitted the gist of His Abhidhammic knowledge to such individual monks as he knew to be capable of elaborating and applying the briefly indicated summary by their own penetrative intellect, as, for example, in the case of the Venerable Sāriputta. This theory of ours agrees with the commentarial statement that the Buddha transmitted to the Venerable Sāriputta only the Mātikā, that is, the Schedule of the Abhidhamma. From this we may also conclude that the ancient tradition regarded the Buddha as the "*auctor*", but not as the "author" of the Abhidhamma books, that is, as the creative genius to whom the ideas, and

perhaps the frame of the system, but not the literary formulation, should be ascribed.

The Pentad in the post-canonical Pāli literature

Apart from the single reference to the name of the Pentad we were able to trace in the *Theragāthā* of the Sutta Piṭaka, the group's name appears only in the post-canonical period, and first probably in the *Netti-ppakaraṇa*, in the variant *phassa-pañcamaka.*[13] We have to assume it to be earlier than or at least contemporary with Buddhaghosa, as the latter quotes it under the abbreviated name '*pakaraṇa*' in his commentary to the Satipaṭṭhāna-Sutta. But it is possible that the term *phassa-pañcaka* was already in the old commentaries on which Buddhaghosa's were based. This seems more probable than the assumption that the term was first coined in the *Netti*.

The relevant passage in the *Netti-ppakaraṇa* runs as follows: "Mind-and-Body" (*nāma-rūpa*) are the five Aggregates forming the objects of grasping (*upādāna-kkhandha*). Here, the things having sense impression as their fifth (*phassa-pañcamakā dhammā*) are 'mind' (*nāma*). The five corporeal sense faculties are the 'body' (*rūpa*). Both together

13. The variant *phassa-pañcaka* is preferable, as *phassa-pañcamaka* means "having Sense Impression as the fifth", while *phassa* is always enumerated first.

are ‘Mind-and-Body’ connected with consciousness (*viññāṇna-sampayuttaṃ*) (PTS ed., p. 15).[14] From the separate mention of *viññāṇa* in the last sentence, we have to conclude that in this passage “consciousness” (*viññāṇa* or *citta*) is not included in the Pentad. Probably *manasikāra* (“attention”) takes its place, being mentioned in another passage of the *Netti* (PTS. ed., p. 78) where six factors are enumerated with inclusion of citta: “Feeling, perception, volition, consciousness, sense impression, attention — these are called the ‘mental group’ (*nāma-kāya*).” The enumeration in this passsage is derived from the *Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta* (Majjh. 9).

Buddhaghosa (at least as in the manuscripts and editions of our days) uses both forms of our term. For example, in his commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta we find *phassapañcaka* in the section on Respiration Mindfulness, and *phassapañcamaka* in the section on the Contemplation of Feeling. There the five components of the Pentad are identical with those in *Dhammasangaṇī*, that is, including *citta* and excluding *manasikāra*.

Before Buddhaghosa’s time the same five factors, in the same order, but without the group name, occur and are explained in the *Milindapañhā* (*Tatiya Vagga*). But there is also a passage in the *Milinda-pañhā* where, in giving a representative selection of mental concomitants, *manasikāra*, too, is included: “And the Elder enlightened King

14. See *The Guide* (*Nettippakaraṇa*) transl. by Ñāṇamoli (P. T. S. Transl. Series; London 1962), p. 28.

Milinda with words from the Abhidhamma: "The origin of visual consciousness, O King, is dependent on the sense organ of sight and visual objects. And such things as arise simultaneously, namely, sense impression, feeling, perception, volition, concentration, vitality and attention, arise in dependence thereon" (*Dutiya Vagga*). It is worth pointing out that this enumeration agrees with the seven general mental factors (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*) mentioned in the *Visuddhimagga* (P.T.S. ed., p. 589) and the *Abhidhammattha-Sangaha*. It is significant that Buddhaghosa does not mention this group of seven factors in his *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*. His reason for not doing so was most probably the fact that the Lists in the *Dhammasangaṇī* commented upon in *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, are not meant to give an abstract and systematic arrangement of factors but refer to definite moments of consciousness in their dynamic actuality where these factors appear as members of relational groups.

To the difference consisting in inclusion and exclusion of *manasikāra* we shall revert when dealing with the Supplementary Factors (See. 14).

‡†‡

Appendix

The Authenticity of the Anupada Sutta.

Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in the Preface to her translation of the *Dhammasanganī*,[15] throws doubt on the authenticity of the Anupada Sutta (Majjh, Nik. 111) as a genuine discourse of the Buddha. She says: "The Sutta, as are so many, is an obvious patchwork of editorial compiling, and dates, without reasonable doubt, long after Sāriputta has preceded his Master in leaving this world. We have first a stock formula of praise spoken not once only of Sāriputta. Then, *ex abrupto*, this tradition of his fortnight of systematic introspection. Then, *ex abrupto*, three more formulas, of praise. And that is all. The Sutta, albeit put into the mouth of the Founder, is in no way a genuine discourse." So Mrs. Rhys Davids. We do not agree at all. There is certainly no reason why we should doubt that the Master in fact remembered with words of praise His great disciple. On the contrary, it would have been strange if He had not done so. Instead of sharing Mrs. Rhys Davids' impression that the parts of the discourse succeed each other abruptly it seems to us quite natural that, between the words of praise at the beginning and the end, there should be embedded an illustration to this eulogy of the Venerable Sāriputta's wisdom, namely, the account

15. *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*, 2nd Edition, London 1923, p. VIII sq.

of his period of analytical introspection, as an example of his penetrating wisdom. The fact that set formulas are used is not peculiar to the *Anupada Sutta* but can be met with throughout the Sutta Piṭaka. It can scarcely be maintained that all the numerous texts in which stock passages occur are "compilations" and that these passages themselves are consequently insertions. Even if the *Anupada Sutta* were a compilation, this would not exclude the possibility that the single parts composing it were the authentic words of the Buddha. "But," Mrs. Rhys Davids says, "the intrusion of two words — of *anupada*, and of *vavatthita* 'determined' — which are not of the older idiom, suggest a later editing…. Though *anupada* does not occur frequently in the Piṭakas, it is also not at all an expression characteristic of any later period of Pāli literature; so we cannot draw any conclusions from the mere fact of rare occurrence. With regard to the other word, it is true that derivatives of the verb *vavattheti*, *vavatthita*, and particularly *vavatthāna*, are found very frequently in later canonical books as the *Paṭisambhidā-Magga* and the *Vibhanga*, and especially in the commentaries and the *Visuddhimagga*. But *vavatthita*, "determined" or "established", is likewise not such a highly technical term that the dating of a text could be based on that evidence alone. There are many other words too which occur only once or sporadically in the Sutta Piṭaka. Even if one of these words, for example *vavattheti*, became the fashion in later idiom in

preference to its synonyms, such a development (very frequent in the history of words) does not exclude that the same word was used occasionally in an earlier period too.

Mrs. Rhys Davids writes further: "Buddhaghosa either did not know the *Anupada Sutta* or forgot to quote it. Yet to quote it, is precisely what he would have done just here, when he was writing the Aṭṭhasāliṇī on the Dhammasangaṇī. And his canonical erudition was remarkable. How did he come to overlook the Sutta?" He did not overlook it. But Mrs. Rhys Davids has overlooked the fact that Buddhaghosa's commentary to Majjhima Nikāya deals, of course, also with the *Anupada Sutta*. Besides, in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, too, Buddhaghosa makes a quite unmistakable allusion to that Sutta by mentioning (p. 208) the most characteristic term occurring in it, *anupada-dhamma-vipassanā* (see p. 83), an expression which does not, to our knowledge, appear anywhere else in the Piṭakas. It need not surprise us that Buddhaghosa did not quote the incomplete List of Dhammas, as given in that Sutta. In commenting on the *Dhammasangaṇī*, he was not concerned with historical research, and besides, he did not need to prove what was quite evident at his time: that the Abhidhamma has widespread and deep roots in the Suttantas. Only today has it become necessary to emphasize the latter fact against such hyper-criticism as that of Mrs. Rhys Davids, who goes even so far as to say (1. c., p. XII)

that the "Abhidhamma… is not the message of the Founder; it is the work of the monkish world that grew up after him". It is to be regretted that such a gifted scholar as Mrs. Rhys David marred the value of her latest works by hasty and prejudiced judgements.

In conclusion, we repeat that we do not see any reason why the Anupada Sutta should not be regarded as an authentic Buddha Word. We therefore feel fully justified in quoting that Discourse as a Suttanta source for Abhidhamma terminology.

3. The Factors of Absorption (*jhānaṅga*, F6–10)

The group of five factors which follows now, is well known through its frequent occurrence in the Suttantas, representing the most characteristic constituents of the First Absorption (see. p. 83). Their group name, Factors of Absorption (*jhānaṅga*), does not occur in the Suttas. But we find it in the *Dhammasanganạī* where it occurs, rather unexpectedly, in the 'Summary' section (*sañgaha-vāra*) P.T.S., p. 17) relating to the First Class of Consciousness, though the state of consciousness treated here does not belong to jhanic consciousness of the Sphere of Form (*rūpāvacara*) but to normal consciousness of the Sensuous Sphere (*kāmāvacara*). Evidently the term "Absorption" (*jhāna*) is used here in the same wide sense as in the case of one of the 24 Modes of Conditionality,

namely *jhāna-paccaya*. This "condition by way of absorption" likewise refers not only to meditative states of mind, that is, to Absorption proper; but may appear in nearly all types of consciousness and in all spheres (*bhūmi* or *avacara*). In that wider application, *jhāna* refers to any stronger "absorption" in an object, that is, to an intensive concentration on it. Each of these five Factors of Absorption exercises an intensifying influence, both on the other associated bad or good factors arising in the same moment of consciousness, and on the simultaneous corporeal phenomena. Even more than that: not only do they influence corporeal phenomena, but according to commentarial tradition[16] it is their presence that enables a state of consciousness to produce corporeal phenomena (*rūpa-samuṭṭhāpaka-citta*).[17]

Now, after the above definition agreeing with that of *jhāna-paccaya*, we can express more distinctly the general function of the *jhānaṅgāni* in their wider sense by denoting them as *intensifying factors*. In doing so, we are supported by the *Mūla-Ṭikā* to the *Khandha-Vibhanga* where they are spoken of as *bala-dāyaka*, "strength-givers".

We shall now briefly examine the single factors composing this group. Pleasure or happi-

16. See Commentary and Sub-Commentary to the Khandha Vibhanga.

17. "*Cittam angato aparihinam yeva rūpam samuṭṭhāpeti*:– (*Mūla-Ṭikā*:) *angato'ti jhānangato*: *jhānangāni hi cittena saha rūpasamuṭṭhāpakāni*. — Corporeal processes which are produced by consciousness (*citta-samuṭṭhāna* or *citta-ja*) are, e.g., Bodily and Vocal Intimation (*kāya-*, *vacī-viññatti*), which are expressive of intention.

ness (*sukha*, F9) was already included, under the name of "feeling" (*vedanā*, F2), in the Pentad of Sense Impression. But since it may have a strongly intensifying effect on the respective state of consciousness and contribute to the absorption in the object, it enters also into the Factors of Absorption. Here we meet the first multiple classification of factors and overlapping of groups. In the case of the type of consciousness treated here, "feeling" in the Pentad corresponds to "pleasure" among the Factors of Absorption. In other classes of consciousness it may correspond to "pain" (*dukkha*) or to "indifference" (*upekhā*). The fact that (mental) "pain", too, counts as Factor of Absorption illustrates the extended meaning in which the term *jhānaṅga* is used here.

Compared with the relatively primitive and non-rational (we may even say pre-rational) character of the Pentad of Sense Impression where the grasp of the object is still weak and incomplete, the Factors of Absorption represents a phase of consciousness where also a rational element has entered and which at the same time possesses a higher degree of *differentiation* and *intensity*. The rational factors are thought conception (*vitakka*, F6) and discursive thinking (*vicāra*, F7). Primarily, it is by these two that the greater *differentiation* and complexity of consciousness, and also its greater agility are caused, while all five factors serve to *intensify* the activity of consciousness in general.

The intensifying effect of *pīti* (F8) in its two aspects of interest and rapture is quite evident. But, in particular; it is mental one-pointedness or concentration (*cittas' ekaggatā*, F10) that, by counteracting and distracting, dissolving and thereby weakening influences, is the main force making for intensification and absorption. However, a minimal degree of intensifying concentration is indispensable in every state of consciousness, even the weakest, in order to enable it to interrupt the stream of subconsciousness (*bhavaṅga*). Therefore, mental one-pointedness belongs to the seven mental concomitants common to all consciousness (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*) together with attention (*manasikāra*), vitality (*jīvitindriya*) and four factors of the Pentad (excepting consciousness). Now one may ask why One-pointedness, being such a fundamental factor, was not added to the first group of the list, the Pentad. In reply we suggest that it was included among the Factors of Absorption, because firstly, it has its traditional place there according to the Sutta sense of that group, being the most typical factor of jhāna consciousness, and on the other hand, as we have seen, the Pentad forms a distinct unit in the older sources, too. Secondly, mental one-pointedness or concentration is that general factor which is most decisive for any further development of consciousness, and therefore its place is rightly among the generally intensifying Factors of Absorption. Still one may ask why it was not classed in both groups, the Pentad and the Factors of Absorption, all the more so, since mental

one-pointedness does appear in our list, anyway, under a great number of headings. The answer is that *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is not concerned with formal or abstract arrangement of factors, for example, whether they are common to all consciousness, but only with the actual function of a factor within a given state of consciousness and within the group of factors. These groups are more than a formal principle of arrangement; they register the common denominator or purpose of the various single factors or functions. In that strict sense the Pentad does not form a homogeneous group, and perhaps, for that reason it is not mentioned as such in the Chapter of the Summary (*sangaha-vāra*) of the *Dhammasangaṇī*, but the factors constituting it are enumerated there singly: "There is one Sense Impression, one Feeling, etc." The group name *phassa-pañcaka* is found only in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, having been taken from other sources as mentioned above.

It is worth noting that the intensifying Factors of Absorption follow immediately after the relatively primitive Pentad of Sense Impression, which is fully developed in the dullest consciousness, even in that of animals. This juxtaposition of a relatively low level of mind and of one possessing vast potentialities points to the thought-provoking fact that from an average state of consciousness movement in two opposite directions is possible. The downward way resulting from an insufficient cultivation of the Intensifying Factors leads to a gradual weakening, dulling and animal-like degeneration

of consciousness, which in due time may even end in an actual rebirth as an animal. The upward way consists in developing and strengthening the Intensifying Factors. In its progress this development may quite transcend the coarse and crude consciousness of the sensual sphere (*kāmāvacara*) which limits the intensification of consciousness. It may rise to a different plane of mind: to the meditative or jhanic consciousness of the sphere of form (*rūpāvacara*), incomparably more intense, powerful, luminous and agile. This ascent to a higher level may be of brief duration in one who attains meditative Absorptions during life in the world of sense; or it may be of longer duration when rebirth in the world of form (*rūpaloka*) has been obtained, where this refined state of mind is the normal condition of consciousness.

This shows that the seeds of "another world", i.e. of a higher level of consciousness, are present in the average human mind where they are waiting to be nursed to full growth and fruition. It shows that these two worlds are not separated from each other by an abyss to be overcome only by a forcible leap or by "divine grace". The two worlds, the sensuous and the jhanic, meet and overlap within our everyday consciousness. From the figurative expression "seed", used above, it should not be inferred that the constituents of the sphere of form are necessarily diminutive and weak in the sense sphere. On the contrary, they are the main elements in many types of sense consciousness, and for the purposes of that

sphere four of them may be quite strongly developed. It is mainly the fifth factor, mental one-pointedness, which needs special cultivation for reaching the degree of intensity required for the meditative Absorptions; and of course, a change in the direction of factors is necessary.

Starting from the degree of strength which the factors of Absorption possess in an average state of consciousness, a further intensification of consciousness aiming at realisation of the Noble Eightfold Path may develop in different directions: (1) Emphasis on thought-conception and discursive thinking (*vitakka-vicāra*) leads to an intensification of the intellectual faculties to be directed towards the growth of Insight (*vipassanā*); (2) emphasis on mental one-pointedness leads to the attainment of Full Absorption (*appanā* or *jhāna*); (3) from here a side road may branch off on which, after having reached the fourth Absorption, the four Dominant Factors (*adhipati;* i.e., intention, will, investigation and consciousness), are developed up to the level of the corresponding four Roads to Power (*iddhipāda*). Here the intensity of consciousness is increased to such a degree that the Magical Powers (*iddhividha*) may be obtained, giving a far-reaching control over mind and matter. This magical control of matter may be viewed as an extension of a feature of the Factors of Absorption in their general aspects as Intensifying Factors as mentioned already, namely, that owing to their

presence consciousness is enabled to produce certain corporeal phenomena (see p. 93).

On the other hand, as mentioned already, the possibilities latent in the average human consciousness may also lead to the downward path, to rebirth in the world of animals. The fact that all the Intensifying Factors, more or less developed, may be present in higher animals implies both the chance of sinking to and of rising from the level of animals. If human consciousness had not certain factors in common with the lower and the higher worlds, rebirth as an animal or in the sphere of form would not be possible.

The intensity of a state of consciousness does not allow anything to be said about its ethical value or its spiritual rank. It is a point common to the Intensifying Factors and the Pentad of Sense Impression that both groups are ethically indifferent; they may occur in wholesome, unwholesome, and kammically neutral consciousness. Both groups take, as it were, the colour of their "root sap", that is, they assume the quality of the wholesome, unwholesome or neutral "root causes" (*mūla* or *hetu*) associated with them. One of the differences between these two groups is that the Pentad contains only constant factors, while among the Factors of Absorption there appear, for the first time in our list, also non-constant ones, namely thought-conception, discursive thinking and interest, which are not present in every type of consciousness.

4. The Faculties (*indriya*, F11–18)

Next comes a group of eight factors called *indriya*, Their common function consists in exercising a dominating, governing or controlling influence over the other mental factors associated with them (*sampayutta-dhamma*) and over simultaneously arising corporeal phenomena. This function is indicated in the *Aṭṭhasālinī* by reference to the derivation of the word *indriya* from *inda* (Sanskr: *indra*), "lord"; for example, "Faith exercises lordship under the sign of devotion" (*adhimokkhalakkhaṇe indaṭṭhaṃ kāreti'ti saddhindriyam*; Asl. p. 119). Like *jhāna*, *indriya* too is one of the 24 Modes of Conditionality (*paccaya*) "in the sense of predominance" (*adhipaccaṭṭhena*); as the commentary to the *Paṭṭhāna* says. Relying on these traditional explanations, we may call the Indriyas "Controlling Factors," though we shall also retain the somewhat vague name of "Faculties", which is the one mostly used in translations.

First in order of enumeration there is a subgroup of five factors beginning with the faculty of faith which we shall call "The Five Spiritual Faculties." Of these, besides the general definition mentioned above, an additional explanation of their *indriya*-nature is given by the commentators, saying that they are called *indriya* because "they master their opposites" (*paṭipakkhābhibhavana*; Cy to *Indriya-Vibhanga*), that is, they keep them

under control. Faith (or devotion, confidence; F11) brings faithlessness (or lack of devotion and confidence) under control. Energy (F12) controls indolence; Mindfulness (F13) controls heedlessness; Concentration (F14) controls agitation, and Wisdom (F15) controls ignorance (see *Paṭisambhidā Magga*, *Indriya-kathā*). These five Spiritual Faculties occur so frequently in the Suttanta that we need not give any Sutta references for them.

The sixth place in that group is occupied by the faculty of mind (*manindriya*), F16. It belongs to the six Sense Faculties and is identical with the factor 'consciousness' (*citta*, F5) in the Pentad of Sense Impression. "Mind" is a Controlling Faculty on account of its pre-eminent position among the mental factors (*cetasika*) associated with it. These latter factors, among them also the other faculties; by fulfilling their own particular tasks, serve at the same time the purpose of the general function of consciousness or mind (*citta*, *mano*, *viññāṇa*) which consists in discriminating (*vijānana*) the object.

Besides, in the sense of the already given general definition of *indriya*, there is also implied the control exercised by mind over certain corporeal phenomena. An example of that control is the conscious intention accompanying and directing purposeful bodily movements (=*kāyaviññatti*) and vocal utterance (=*vacīviññatti*), This indriya-quality of consciousness, as manifested in a certain control over matter, is capable of far-reaching

development. It reaches its peak in one of the four Roads to Power (*iddhipāda*). The efficacy attributed to it is illustrated by the following passage in the Iddhi Chapter of the *Patisambhidā Magga*: "If he wishes to resort to the Brahma world with his body remaining invisible, then he forces the body by his consciousness, he directs the body by his consciousness" (P.T.S. ed., 11, 209).[18] Neither the *cittasamādhi-iddhipada* nor the corresponding *cittadhipati* ("predominance of consciousness") is sufficiently explained in the texts or the commentaries. It is, however, rather easier to understand how such a powerful influence could be ascribed to the other three constituents of these two groups, that is, intention, energy and investigation. But now, with our reference to the general Indriya-quality of consciousness, that is, its controlling power, we hope to have contributed to a better understanding of the role of consciousness too. It will now be clearer how the "mere fact of being conscious" can achieve such prominence as a "predominant factor" (*adhipati*) or a "Road to Power" (*iddhipāda*). It is the *manindriya*-aspect of consciousness, namely, its controlling power, which is the starting-point of these developments. In this connection, it should be recalled that the ancient teachers expressly define *indriya* by *adhipaccam* (being the abstract form of *adhipati*), that is, predominance or sovereignty.

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18. See *Visuddhi-magga*, P.T.S. ed., p. 402, 404, 405; Samy. Nik. LI. No 22.

With this brief excursion into the "realm of magic" we have tried to show that the inclusion of the controlling aspect of consciousness is justified not only by its normal influence over mental and corporeal phenomena, but also because it represents one of the starting-points of higher development inherent in normal consciousness. Of course, not only the Faculty of Mind, but the Five Spiritual Faculties and the intensifying Factors of Absorption as well form the foundation on which the lofty structure of spiritually developed consciousness can be built. But it is of particular interest that such an active part in that development is ascribed to "mere consciousness". Obviously, these ancient Buddhist thinkers clearly comprehended (without formulating it *in abstracto*) that developed consciousness represents an eminently activating and mobilizing force against the tendencies to stagnation and inertia of nature in general and of the human mind in particular. They have pointed to that aspect of consciousness (*citta*) by defining it as *citta* (=*citra*) – karana, "that which makes for differentiation" (see p. 46). This activating and thereby governing influence of consciousness is due to its *manindriya*-aspect, that is, consciousness considered as a controlling faculty: or, as we may also express it, it is due to "conscious control".[19] This general aspect of consciousness

19. See the title and contents of a book by an eminent practical psychologist, F. Matthias Alexander, *Constructive Conscious Control of the Individual* (London, Chaterson).

forms the basis on which other activating and controlling factors, like mindfulness (*sati*) etc., might be successfully cultivated. With their help the field of conscious control might be extended far beyond the imagination of those who have lost sight of the ideal of Man Perfected or of that type of Superman (*mahā-purisa*) which the Buddha defines as the embodiment of perfect mindfulness (*sati*) and perfect clarity of consciousness (*sampajañña*).[20]

Returning to our subject proper, we repeat that the above examples serve to show that the apparent repetitions in the List of Dhammas are not superfluous but serve to point out essential aspects as well as potentialities of the respective mental factor. Careful consideration of these aspects and potentialities will yield important aids to a deeper understanding of the theory and practice of the Buddha's doctrine.

We can now resume our cursory treatment of the eight Faculties. The seventh of them, the Faculty of Joy (*somanassindriya*, F17), belongs to the five Faculties relating to feeling, namely, bodily pleasure and pain, joy, grief and indifference. "Joy" is an *indriya*, a Controlling Faculty, because when a joyful mood arises it dominates one's whole being. It suffuses all the other associated mental qualities (e.g., the intellectual activity), giving them a mood of joyfulness, and it enlivens the accompanying bodily activity as well. Also "Grief"

20. See Samyutta Nikāya XLVII. No. 11 (P.T.S. vol. V, p. 158).

and "Indifference" appear as Controlling Faculties, in the respective classes of consciousness. It need not be elaborated here how sadness (or aversion, which likewise counts as *domanassa*, "grief") and indifference (or equipoise) influence or control mental and bodily activities.

The eighth Faculty is that of Vitality (*jīvit-indriya*, F18), which represents the life-force of mental phenomena, as distinct from the identically named factor, which governs physical vitality and has its place among the constituents of corporeality (*rūpa-kkhandha*). The Faculty of Psychic Vitality controls and guards the continuance of the mental life-process.

Among the faculties there appear (for the first time in the list) factors that occur only in good consciousness.[21] These faculties are faith, mindfulness and wisdom. The ethical value of the remaining two Spiritual Faculties, concentration and energy, is variable. The Faculty of Concentration is identical with the mental one-pointedness in the Factors of Absorption. "Energy" appears here for the first time.

In order to perform their governing and controlling functions the faculties require a high degree of strength and intensity which is imparted to them by the intensifying Factors of Absorption.

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21. We shall use the expression "good consciousness" as a rendering of *sobhana-citta*, a later Abhidhamma term coined in order to include not only kammically wholesome consciousness (*kusala*), but also the results of wholesome kamma (*kusala-vipāka*) and the functional "good action" of an Arahat (*kriya-javana*).

It is therefore consistent that the Controlling Faculties are preceded in the list by the intensifying Factors of Absorption, which are their supporting condition. The following examples illustrate the connexion between these two groups, exemplifying at the same time the "internal relations" mentioned above (p. 43).

Faith, devotion or confidence, has a controlling or governing influence on the character only if the Factors of Absorption *pīti*, that is, joyful interest or enthusiasm, and *sukha*, that is, pleasure or happiness, themselves possess a considerable degree of intensity, and, in their above-mentioned function impart it to "Faith" as well. It is from joy that faith derives a good part of its conquering power; and it is keen and enthusiastic interest that makes for the constancy of faith or devotion. Furthermore, faith is able to become exclusive devotion only if there is also a high degree of mental one-pointedness to perform the intensifying function of a *jhānaṅga*.

For the Faculty of Wisdom to comprehend its objects fully, keenness of intellect must be highly developed by the two Intensifying Factors, "thought-conception" (*vitakka*) and "discursive thinking" (*vicāra*). For the unfolding of the Spiritual Faculties of Energy, Mindfulness and Concentration a high degree of stimulating "interest" (*pīti*) is required in order to intensify their activity. On the other hand, when mindfulness and concentration are progressing well, their part is to sustain and increase "Interest" by preventing it from fading away.

The Mind-Faculty, in its general function of control over the cognitive process and in its inherent potentiality for greater alertness, lucidity and power, is helped by the intensifying effect of all five Factors of Absorption, particularly mental one-pointedness.

The Faculty of Joy is identical with the Factor of Absorption, "pleasure" (*sukha*), but it is stronger and more enduring when linked to a high degree of intensifying with the grades of interest, enthusiasm and rapture. In the Pāli scriptures *pīti* forms very frequently a compound either with *somanassa* or with *sukha*.

The Faculty of Psychic Vitality too is enlivened by Interest and transmits this intensifying effect, received from interest, to physical vitality too. For example, in old or sick people, vivid interests, whether in persons, affairs or ideas, may prolong life by giving the incentive to muster all physical and mental powers of resistance, as any physician will confirm. On the other hand, it happens just as often that old or sick people quickly deteriorate when they "lose interest in life," owing, for example, to the death of a beloved person, or to a disappointment.

The five Spiritual Faculties together with the corresponding five Spiritual Powers (dealt with in the next chapter) continue the work begun by the Factors of Absorption. They increase the agility and pliancy of the mind and its capacity to effect deliberate inner changes, whether positive, negative or

adaptive. These last features are the basis for any mental and spiritual progress. It is mainly owing to the operation of these five Spiritual Faculties and Powers that noticeable transformations of character, conduct, ideas and ideals are made possible. Sometimes it even appears as if quite a new personality has emerged. One can cite, for example, the vast inner and outer changes, or the "revaluation of all values" occurring in the life of the great men of religious faith after their "conversion" or after receiving their "revelations".

If, on the contrary, the Intensifying and Controlling Factors are weak or partly absent, a general heaviness and unwieldiness of the mental processes results: force of habit predominates; changes and adaptations are undertaken slowly and unwillingly, and to the smallest possible degree; thought is rigid, inclining to dogma. It takes long to learn from experience or advice; affections and aversions are fixed and biased; in general the character proves more or less inaccessible. In such a condition the human mind is dangerously near the level of the higher animals with their very limited mental agility; for in them too the Intensifying Factors may be partly present, but in a very weak degree (see p. 97, 98). It is owing to the fixity and unwieldiness as well as to the weakness of the animal mind that, as the Buddha often pointed out, the emergence of a being from the animal kingdom to a rebirth in the human world is so exceedingly difficult.

We have dealt in detail with the positive and beneficial side of the controlling power wielded by the five Spiritual Faculties over the other mental factors. But there is a negative, or at least a somewhat dangerous, aspect of it, too: the controlling and influencing activity of these faculties may develop to an excessive degree. If a single faculty is developed exclusively while the others, especially the counterparts, are neglected or deliberately suppressed, that faculty may develop a tendency to dominate. For example, faith (*saddhā*) and reason (or wisdom, *paññā*), energy (or activity, *viriya*) and concentration (or tranquillity, *samādhi*) may each seriously impair and weaken the others, if allowed to grow at the expense of the rest. As in the macrocosm of human society so in the microcosm of the human mind: those in control are often tempted to abuse their power. In both cases the final result is bad: balance is disturbed and continuous and harmonious development is prevented. This shows the importance as well as the wisdom of insisting on the "Harmony of the Five Spiritual Faculties" (*indriya-samatta*) as taught by the Buddha and elaborated in the commentaries.[22] It is the faculty of mindfulness (*satindriya*) that watches over the harmonization of the other four faculties, and so has the "chief control" over the other Controlling Factors.

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22. See Ang. Nik. VI. No. 55 (Simile of the Lute); 'The Way of Wisdom' (The Wheel No. 65/66).

Appendix

The Omission of Memory in the List. — On the Nature of saññā

Here, with the first occurrence in the list of the factor "mindfulness" (*sati*), we would draw the attention to a problem. We mentioned already that *sati* occurs only in "good consciousness" (*sobhaṇa citta*). This implies that *sati* means here first of all *sammā-sati*, Right Mindfulness, referring to the four "Foundations of Mindfulness" (*satipaṭṭhāna*). The original meaning of *sati* (Skr: *smrti*) as "memory" is, however, not quite excluded, since it has its place in the definition given in the *Dhammasanganī*, but it stands rather in the background and refers always to "good consciousness"). The question now suggests itself: why has such an important and frequent mental function as that of memory not been expressly included in the List in its quality as an ethically neutral factor? We cannot suppose that it has simply been forgotten. Against any such explanation stands the fact that this List of Dhammas is too obviously the product of a mind working with the greatest accuracy. The list is undoubtedly the result of careful investigation supported by introspective intuition. Certainly no essential aspects of the subject-matter have been overlooked here; though, of course, the list does admit of condensation as well as extensions.

This question of Memory as ethically neutral function was actually raised in *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 249). Here is the passage in full: "In a mind devoid of (right) faith (*asaddhiya-citte*) there is no mindfulness (*sati*). How then, do not adherents of wrong views remember actions performed by them? They do. But that is not *sati* ("mindfulness"). It is merely an unwholesome thought-process occurring in that aspect (*ten'ākārena akusala-cittappavatti*). That is why *sati* is not included (in unwholesome consciousness). But, why, then, is wrong mindfulness (*micchā-sati*) mentioned in the Suttantas? For the following reasons: because unwholesome aggregates (*khandha*) are devoid of mindfulness; because it is the opposite of mindfulness, and in order to complete the group of factors of the wrong path (*micchā-magga*). For these reasons wrong mindfulness is mentioned in an exposition of relative validity (*puriyāyena*). But in an exposition of absolute validity (*nippariyāyena*) it has no place." We cannot say that these explanations are very satisfactory. They still leave unanswered the question why memory has not been included in the List under some other name, such as *paṭissati*, to distinguish it from *sammā-sati*.

In the sub-commentary (*Mūla-Ṭikā*) to the passage just quoted from the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, we find, however, a hint for plausible theory about the omission of memory. There it is said: "(According to that passage in the Asl,) wrong mindfulness is explained as the unwholesome aggregates which are void of

mindfulness and contrary to it. This again should be understood as follows: when reflecting on previous actions, for example, in the case of inimical feelings, those unwholesome aggregates are associated with keen perception (*patu-sañña-sampayutta*).” Taking up this suggestion we can assume that ancient Buddhist psychology ascribed the main share in the process of recollecting to perception (*saññā*), regarding it merely as a department of the latter. It should be recalled that *saññā* belongs to the Pentad of Sense Impression and to the factors common to all consciousness (*sabbacittasādhāraṇa*), so that the requirement of universal occurrence as a neutral and general factor is fulfilled. We are supported in our theory by the definition of *saññā* found in *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 110). There two sets of explanations are supplied, given in the customary categories used for definitions (*lakkhaṇa*, *rasa*, etc.). According to the first explanation the characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*) of perception, applicable to all cases, is “perceiving” (*sañjānana*, lit. “cognizing well”); the essential property or function (*rasa*) is “re-cognizing” (*paccabhiññāṇa*), said to be applicable only to certain cases, namely, when perception proceeds with the help of a distinctive mark of the object, either fixed to it intentionally (as by wood-cutters to trees) or being a characteristic of the object itself (e. g, a mole in the face of a man). The second explanation is said to apply to all cases of perception. The characteristic is again “perceiving”. The essential property given here is: “making marks as a condi-

tion for a repeated perception (i.e., for recognizing or remembering; *puna-sañjānana-paccaya-nimitta-karaṇa*)." So we may sum up: perception (*saññā*) is the taking up,[23] the making and the remembering of the object's distinctive marks. In this connexion it is noteworthy that "mark" or "signal" is also one of the different meanings of the word *saññā* itself.

Not only the "taking up", but also the "making" and the "remembering" of marks may be relevant to all cases of perception if it is understood as follows: What really happens in a simple act of perception is that some features of the object (sometimes only a single striking one) are selected. The mental note made of that perception is closely associated with those selected features, that is, we attach, as it were, a tag to the object, or make a mark on it as woodcutters do on trees. So far every perception is "a making of marks" (*nimitta-karaṇa*). In order to understand how "remembering" or "recognizing", too, is implied in every act of perception we should mention that according to the deeply penetrative analysis of the Abhidhamma the apparently simple act, for example, of seeing a rose, is in reality a very complex process composed of different phases,[24] each con-

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23. Commentary to *Patisambhidā Magga*: "Perception means taking up the appearance of a thing." (*Ākāragāhika saññā*). Note that the Latin word *per-cipere* from which the English "perceive" is derived, means literally "to seize or take up thoroughly"; the prefix "*per*" corresponding to the Pāli "sam" in *san-jānana-saññā*.

24. "Compendium of Philosophy" (trsl. of the *Abhidhammattha Sangaha* by S. Z. Aung), London 1929, p 32 ff. — The perceptual "phases" treated and briefly mentioned above, are elaborations by later Abhidhamma scholars and not found in older works.

sisting of numerous smaller combinations of conscious processes (*citta-vīthi*) which again are made up of several single moments of consciousness (*citta-kkhaṇa*) following each other in a definite sequence of diverse functions. Among these phases there is one that connects the present perception of a rose with a previous one, and there is another that attaches to the present perception the name "rose", remembered from previous experience. Not only in relation to similar experiences in a relatively distant past, but also between those infinitesimally brief single phases and successive processes the connecting function of rudimentary "memory" must be assumed to operate, because each phase and each lesser successive state has to "remember" the previous one — a process called by the later Abhidhammikas "grasping the past" (*atīta-ggahana*). Finally, the individual contributions of all those different perceptual processes have to be remembered and co-ordinated in order to form the final and complete perception of a rose.

Not only in such microscopic analysis of sense-perception, but also in every consecutive thought-process, for example in reasoning, can the phase of "grasping the past" be observed, as, e.g., when the parts of an argument are connected, that is, when conclusions are built on premises. If that "grasp" of the past is too weak to be effective, one says that one has "lost the thread". The way in which one remembers the earlier phases of one's thought-process is likewise through selected marks

(*nimitta-karaṇa*) because it is neither possible nor necessary to consider all the minor aspects of a thought. But if the "selection" is too incomplete and overlooks essential features or consequences of the past thought, then a faulty argument built on wrong premises follows.

In these two ways we can understand how "remembering", that is, connecting with the past, is a function of perception in general. We can now formulate the following definition: *saññā* is cognition as well as recognition, both being by way of selected marks.

We can summarize our findings as follows:

(1) Memory as we usually understand it, is not mentioned as a separate component of a moment of consciousness because it is not a single mental factor but a complex process.

(2) The mental factor which is most important for the arising of memory is perception (*saññā=sañjānana*), being that kind of elementary cognition (*jānana*) which proceeds by way of taking up, making and remembering (i.e., identifying) marks.

(3) Apart from what, in common usage, is called "remembering", the reminiscent function of perception in general operates also (a) in the imperceptibly brief phases of a complete perceptual process, the sequence of which is based on the connecting function of "grasping the past phases"; (b) in any consecutive train of thoughts where this

"grasping of the past", is so habitual, and refers to an event so close to to the present, that in normal parlance it is not called "memory", though it is not essentially different from it.

Another reason for the omission of memory from either the components or the classes of consciousness is this: remembrance means merely the fact that a state of consciousness has objects of the past (*atītārammaṇa*). But as mentioned already (p. 25), in the *Dhammasanganī* the object-side of the perceptual process is used for the classification of consciousness only in a single instance and refers only to the division into visual objects, etc. The time-relation of objects, in particular, does not enter into the classification or analysis of consciousness at all, being irrelevant to them. Still less could the time-relation, for example, that of memory, be counted as a separate component of consciousness. In the *Dhammasanganī* the time-relation of objects is treated separately in the Triad of Things with Past, etc., Objects (*atītārammaṇa-tikā*). But the fact that a moment of consciousness has objects of the past does not warrant the inclusion of a separate factor called "memory".

As a point of comparison between the Pāli Abhidhamma of the Theravadins and the Abhidhamma of later Buddhist schools, it deserves mentioning that in the Lists of Dhammas composed by the hinayanist Sarvastivadins and by the mahayanist Vijnānavādins, *sati* (=*smrti*) is given as a neutral factor. It is included there in a group,

called *mahābhūmikā*, composed of factors common to all consciousness, corresponding to the category of *sabbacittasādhāraṇa* in Theravāda. The fact that *smrti* is really intended there as an ethically neutral and not a wholesome factor, is also proved by the definition given, in this same connection, in the commentary to the Abhidharma Kosa: *anubhūtasya asampramosa* ("the not forgetting of that what has been experienced"). This divergence from the list given in the *Dhammasangaṇī* shows that these old thinkers too had noticed the absence of memory in that list, assuming perhaps that it had been forgotten. But for the reasons given above we think that this omission was not only deliberate but fully justified. In other cases of divergence, too, we have found that, on close examination, the Theravadin's List of Dhammas is far preferable, being based on a much more mature judgment of psychological facts. But here we are not concerned with any such comparative study of Abhidhamma systems.

5. The Powers (*bala*, F24–30)

We have already remarked how the faculty of controlling presupposes a certain intensity of the mental factors concerned. We have seen how the function of intensifying is performed by the Factors of Absorption, and we have given examples of it in the particular case of the five Spiritual Faculties.

The resultant intensity of those Faculties is described and emphasized by repeating them in the list under the name of "Powers" (*bala*).

The commentarial explanation (e.g. Asl. p. 124) says that the five factors corresponding to the Spiritual Faculties, and also the two additional constituents of this group, namely, Moral Shame (*hiri*) and Moral Dread (*ottappa*), are called "Powers" because they are "unshakable" (*akampiya*) by their opposites; so, for example, Faith is not shaken by Faithlessness (Unbelief), etc. But in view of the fact that all these psychological statements refer in the first instance only to the duration of a single moment of consciousness, and since the "Control" or "Power" won at that moment may well be lost in the next one, it is consequently better and less ambitious to render the word *akampiya* by "firm". So we may say that these seven factors are powers of firm preponderance. In the case of the five Spiritual Faculties, this signifies that the "control" exercised by them has gained a degree of stability.

It should be kept in mind that the five Spiritual Faculties and the five Spiritual Powers are simply two different aspects of the same qualities. How their nature is basically one, though their functions are different, was illustrated by the Buddha in the following simile: Suppose there is a river flowing eastward and in the midst of it an island. In this case, the stream can be regarded as one, when seen in its flow at the eastern and western side of the island; it can be regarded as

two, when the island's northern and southern sides are considered. The identity of the Spiritual Faculties and Powers has to be understood in the same way. (Condensed from Samy. Nik. 48, No. 43).

When the function of these five Powers is considered within a single moment, merely the somewhat self-evident fact is implied that in order to be in existence at all the corresponding five Spiritual Faculties must necessarily have been able to "overpower" the opposing tendencies for the duration of that moment (*indriya*-quality), and that by doing so they have achieved a certain "firmness" (*bala*-quality) for that period. The Powers can be said to be present to that extent even when the Faculties are relatively weak. But this does not exhaust the Power-aspect. They are not only those limited actualities of the brief present moment, but also potentialities of the future. We have already mentioned that the enumeration of a factor under different group headings points to potential connections with such other constituents of these groups as are not included in the given state of consciousness; in other words, new perspectives are opened up beyond the present moment. In that case, the potentialities refer to an increasing width of relations with other wholesome factors. Here in the case of the Spiritual Powers the potentialities included in that aspect refer to strength increasing to the degree when these Powers become "unshakable" (*akampiya*) in the full sense of the word. This takes place on attainment of the Stages of Sanctity (*ariyamagga*). Only then,

when certain Fetters (*samyojana*) and Hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) have been completely abolished do those Faculties, and other spiritual qualities too, become really "unshakable", that is, they can no more be lost. For example, Faith becomes "unshakable" when the Fetter or Hindrance, of Scepticism (*vicikicchā*) is radically destroyed on reaching the State of Stream-entry (*sotāpatti*).

So for the practical purpose of spiritual development the mention of the Power-aspect may serve as an incentive to be not content with the Spiritual Faculties' exercise of momentary or short-lived control or power, but to strive untiringly until they have reached the full status of "Unshakable Powers".

If we consider the potentialities and not only the limited actualities, we can say that the Power-aspect of these five factors, though actually present in the given moment, need not be as strongly developed as the controlling (*indriya-*) aspect. This is corroborated by the fact that in certain types of consciousness the Power-aspect may be quite absent, though the Faculty-aspect is present. We shall give the details of this in a later chapter of this treatise (see ch. 15).

The last two Powers given in the list are Moral Shame (*hiri*, F29) and Moral Dread (*attappa*, F30). They strengthen wholesome consciousness, making it "unshakable" by Shamelessness and Unscrupulousness. If their roots go deep enough in the character of the individual, they will automatically

set up spontaneous reactions of restraint and curb all evil influences. Therefore, in the repeated occurrence that follows in the List (F37, 38) these two Powers are called "The Guardians of the World" (see ch.9) They are indispensable for the securing, protecting and stabilizing of moral qualities and are therefore the pre-requisites of further spiritual growth. While in general we called the factors of this group "Powers of Firm Preponderance", these two in particular may be called protective powers. Owing to their purely "defensive" function, they have no counterpart among the more active Indriyas, as the other five Powers have.

6. The Path Factors (*magg'aṇga*, F19–23)

In the actual order of the list the Path Factors are placed before the Powers which we preferred to explain immediately after the Spiritual Faculties on account of their close connection with them.

Only five of the factors of the Noble Eightfold Path are given in the List. The remaining three, namely, right speech, right action and right livelihood, are not included because they are variable factors, that is, they do not necessarily appear in every instance of that type of consciousness; and they do not arise together at the same moment. They are included in the Supplementary Factors (*ye-vā-panaka*), under the names of Abstinence from Evil Conduct in Words, Deeds and Livelihood.

Of the Path Factors given specifically, four are identical with — or better, different aspects of — the corresponding Spiritual Faculties (*indriya*).

Right	Understanding (F19)	=	Faculty of	Wisdom (F15)
"	Effort (F21)	=	"	"	Energy (F12)
"	Mindfulness (F22)	=	"	"	Mindfulness (F13)
"	Concentration (F23)	=	"	"	Concentration (F14)

The fifth, right thought (*sammā-saṇkappa*, F20), is counted as a repeated enumeration of the Factor of Absorption "thought-conception" (*vitakka*, F6).

If we search for a reason why in the arrangement of the List, the Path Factors are enumerated after the Faculties, we may find it perhaps in the fact that the Path Factors continue the work of the Spiritual Faculties in effecting a stronger directive or purposive energy within the flow of wholesome consciousness — a tendency already prominent in the Spiritual Faculties, as we have seen. But as was mentioned earlier, the four Spiritual Faculties when not harmonized tend to dominate and to suppress their counterparts, and there lies the danger that they will lose to some extent their orginal measure of directive energy. Their functions can easily become a purpose in itself and an enjoyment in itself. The goal towards which the respective faculty was originally working and moving, will lose its importance and so its directive influence on that faculty and on the entire personality will diminish. It can even happen that the original goal is easily replaced by its opposite. For example, the strong urge felt by some people to "believe in some-

thing" (=*saddh'indriya*) may cause them to change with surprising facility the object of their belief. Or a keen intellect (=*paññ'indriya*), enjoying its versatility and superiority, may all too soon be ready to "prove" just the opposite of what it had advocated a while ago; this leads to intellectual dishonesty and to indifference or cynicism with regard to spiritual values: We know, besides, how a fervid thirst for unceasing activity (=*viriy'indriya*) tries to quench itself in sundry ways, often very indiscriminately chosen. These examples show how great the danger can be that arises from the dominating tendency of the Indriyas. It can be countered (1) by their harmonization (see p. 110) and (2) by emphasizing their aspect as Path Factors which is inherent in them. If one remembers constantly that the noblest use of those Faculties is in the service of the liberating Path, then they will be less liable to go astray.

With the Path Factors we enter the sphere of definite and unmistakable values and value attributions, and their directive and purposive energy is consequently greater than that of the Spiritual Faculties. These features of the Path Factors find expression in the commentarial explanation of them (Asl p.154) as "Factors of Deliverance" (*niyyān'aṭṭhena*, lit. "leading out", i.e., from the Saṃsāra) and as "conditions" (*hetu-atthena*), that is, as conditions or requirements for the attaining of saintship (*arahatta*). For example, if the factor 'Concentration' (=Mental One-pointedness), being

in itself neutral, that is, outside the sphere of values, receives the value-attribution "right" (*sammā*), it then becomes a Path Factor, that is, a factor of deliverance: because from the highest standpoint of the Buddhist doctrine, only that what is conducive to Deliverance is called "right".

However, the Path-Factor quality of a certain mental concomitant is not necessarily quite distinct in every occurrence of the type of wholesome consciousness concerned; still less is there always a conscious awareness of it. The knowledge associated (*ñāṇasampayutta*) with the 1st type of wholesome consciousness (dealt with here) may not always be strongly developed, being frequently limited to the immediate occasion for the arising of that thought without looking beyond it. Besides, the individual concerned need not necessarily be acquainted at all with the Noble Eightfold Path and its goal. Nevertheless, the Path-Factor aspect is actually present in those cases too, signifying at the very least, a minute contribution to the process of preparing a way to deliverance.

We now add a few remarks on interrelation and co-operation between the last two groups and the Path Factors.

The *indriya*-quality supports the Path-quality of the corresponding factors through its controlling and thereby co-ordinating influence on the other simultaneous mental concomitants and bodily activities, making them subservient to the liberating purpose of the Path and engaging them,

as it were, as auxiliary workers for "preparing the way".

The *Power*-quality, having the nature of being "unshakable" by opposite qualities, supports the Path-aspect by its "preponderant influence", in keeping "the way" free from obstruction and preventing deviations, thus ensuring a firm and steady course.

On the other hand, if the character as a *Path Factor* is strongly marked and highly developed in the corresponding Faculties and Powers, arbitrariness in their application to other purposes will be reduced and eventually abolished; they will be less threatened by separation and disruption caused by a lack of balance; they will be directed more purposefully to Deliverance as the sole salutary goal.

The inclusion of the Path Factors in the analysis of wholesome consciousness means the raising of the spiritual eye from the narrow confines and limited purposes of everyday consciousness to the horizon of the ideal. It means that, in the midst of life's dense jungle, of its labyrinths and blind alleys, the glorious freedom of a Way is open. It means the gradual liberation of the mind from sceptical or muddled aimlessness by pointing to a well-marked Way leading to a definite and noble destination. Already from the mere awareness that such a Way does exist and that it is traceable in the wholesome thought arising right now, from that knowledge alone, there comes assurance and peace, solace and encouragement. The Path Factors are an appeal to

make every moment of one's life a part of the Great Way and to continue in that effort until the Goal is near and assurance of reaching it is attained, until the Way is transfigured and becomes the Supramundane Path (*lokuttara-magga*).

7. The Wholesome Roots (*kusala-mūla*, F31–33)

The three wholesome Roots are the main criteria by which a state of consciousness is determined to be wholesome. The first two, non-greed (*alobha*) and non-hate (*adosa*), are present in every class of kammically wholesome consciousness.

Non-delusion (*amoha*) is found only in those wholesome states of consciousness which are "associated with knowledge" (*ñāṇa-sampayutta*).

Non-greed and non-hate appear here for the first time in the List and they occur once more later on among the "Ways of Wholesome Action" (F34, 35). Non-delusion was earlier represented in the list by other aspects (F15, 19, 28), and it occurs three times more (F36, 52, 54).

Non-greed and non-hate may, according to the particular case, have either a mainly negative meaning signifying absence of greed and hate; or they may possess a distinctly positive character, for example: non-greed as renunciation, liberality; non-hate as amity, kindness, forbearance. Non-delusion has always a positive meaning; for it represents the knowledge which motivates the res-

pective state of consciousness. In their positive aspects, non-greed and non-hate are likewise strong motives of good actions. They supply the non-rational, volitional or emotional motives, while non-delusion represents the rational motive of a good thought or action.

The three Roots may be called “motive powers”, in the double sense of these words, since they induce and impel the other simultaneously arisen mental factors to act in the service of that motive. Their “root sap” actuates and nourishes these other factors and gives to such as are in themselves “colourless”, that is, neutral, the “colour” of a wholesome quality.

The wholesome Roots too belong to the “sphere of values”, but they have not necessarily the strong purposefulness of the Path Factors or their unvariable directedness towards the goal of deliverance. Like the Spiritual Faculties, they may in many instances be entirely limited to the particular occasion.

Common membership of the “sphere of values” seems to be the only connection between the wholesome Roots and the preceding group of Path Factors, as well as the following “Ways of Action”.

8. The Ways of Action (*kammapatha*, F34–36)

The same three Wholesome Roots, though differently named, are now given again in their aspect

of wholesome Ways of Action. Here they are called Non-Covetousness (*anabhijjhā*), Non-Illwill (*avyāpāda*) and Right Understanding (*sammādiṭṭhi*). They comprise mental action or kamma, and they alone among all the ten Ways of Action enter this analysis of consciousness. The remaining seven Ways of Action refer to the actual performance of bodily and verbal actions and therefore do not enter into an analysis of consciousness. Only the volitions combined with them might be thought to be included in the "Supplementary Factors", Abstinence from Wrong Bodily and Verbal Action (F63, 64).

While these three factors, if considered as Roots, belong to the "impelling" or "motive powers" of the unceasingly turning Wheel of Life, they are here regarded as sections of that Wheel, as far as it moves on a wholesome Course of Action. Thus they belong to the formative powers (*abhisaṅkhāra*) of a happy rebirth. They and their unwholesome counter-parts are treated in detail in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*.

9. The Guardians of the World (*lokapala*, F37, 38)

This group comprises the two factors Moral Shame (*hiri*) and Moral Dread (*ottappa*). In their first enumeration as "Powers" (F29, 30; see p. 121), they may be regarded as Guardians of the self, that is as protectors of the wholesome character of the other mental factors arising at the same moment. That means that they refer, in that instance, mainly to the

inner world and to individual ethics. Here in their character as Guardians of the World, their relation to the outer world is emphasized. They appear here as the guardians and regulators of the relations between the individual and society, that is, they refer to social ethics. The presence of Moral Shame and Moral Dread in each wholesome moment of consciousness forms a protection against the deterioration of the average moral standard of mankind. They are, as it were, the brakes of our mind-vehicle and the restraining forces against their opposites, Shamelessness and Unscrupulousness. The more spontaneous and strong the voice of Shame and Conscience is in man the less force and coercion is required to maintain a high moral level in society. Therefore, these two qualities were rightly called by the Buddha "Guardians of the World."[25]

We would draw the attention of the reader to the beautiful exposition of these two qualities in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 124). No inner connection of this group with the preceding one and the subsequent one can apparently be established. This holds true also of the groups that follow.

10. The Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors (*yugalakāni*, F39–50)

The twelve factors, beginning with "Tranquillity of Mental Concomitants" (*kāya-passaddhi,* F39),

25. See Angutt. Nik. No. 7, whence the name of this group is derived.

always arise together. They occur only in good consciousness (see p. 106n.) and are common to all types of it (*sobhaṇa-sādhāraṇa*). In the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* they are sometimes called "the six pairs" (*cha yugalakāni*) for short. We shall now describe them singly by way of their own distinctive features and through their opposites.

Description of the Six Pairs.

1. ***Tranquillity*** is the quiet, equable and composed condition firstly of consciousness in general (*citta-passaddhi*, F40) and secondly of its single concomitant factors (*kāya-passaddhi*, F39). It therefore refers (1) to the tranquil "key note" of the mind, (2) to the quiet, smooth and even way of functioning of the mental factors, undisturbed by agitation and restlessness. According to the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, it is opposed to anxiety (*daratha*) and to the Hindrance of Agitation (*uddhacca*). We may add that in its aspect of a "good conscience" it is also opposed to the Hindrance of Worry (*kukkucca*) due to bad conscience or scruples. As to the influence of Tranquillity on single mental factors, we shall give only two examples: (1) In the case of Joy (*sukha*, *somanassindriya*), the presence of Tranquillity means that Joy will be a "tranquil happiness" without admixture of agitation (*uddhacca*), which would render it unwholesome (*akusala*). (2) Energy (*viriyindriya*), in connection with Tran-

quillity, will be a "quiet strength" displaying itself in a well-balanced, measured and therefore effective way, without boisterousness or uncontrolled exuberance that spends itself quickly and often in vain.

Within the sensuous sphere (*kāmāvacara*), Tranquillity is the inner peace bestowed by any moral act or thought, that is, the peace of an unruffled conscience. It is also equability of the mental functions necessary for effective work in the field of Insight (*vipassanā*), making, for example, for an unwavering and cool, reliable and dispassionate judgment. *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 130) says: "The manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of Tranquillity is the unwavering and cool state (*aparipphandana-sītibhāva*) of consciousness and its concomitants".

Beyond that, Tranquillity prepares the entry into the jhanic consciousness of the sphere of form (*rūpāvacara*), being a prior condition for the Factors of Absorption "joy" (*sukha*) and "concentration" (*cittekaggatā*). Of that it is said in a passage of the Suttas, often preceding the treatment of the Absorptions: "…being tranquil in mind, he finds concentration" (Digh. Nik. No. 9).

Finally, Tranquillity is the seed, present in every wholesome consciousness, that can grow to full stature in the Factor of Enlightenment "Tranquillity" (*passaddhi-sambojjhaṅga*), which, when perfected, belongs to Supramundane Consciousness (*lokuttara-citta*).

2. ***Agility*** (*lahutā*, lit.: "lightness") of wholesome states of consciousness refers to one of the fundamental qualities of mind in general: its "lightness" and mobility that distinguishes it from heavy and inert matter.

Agility of good consciousness signifies (1) buoyancy of the mental condition in general (*citta-lahutā*, F42), and "the capacity of the mind to turn very quickly to a wholesome object or to the contemplation of impermanence, etc." (*Mūla-Ṭikā*). (2) In the case of the single mental factors (*kāya-lahuta*, F41), it signifies the swiftness of their functions: their capacity to act and to react quickly; for example, to seize at once an occasion to do a good deed, or to grasp quickly the implications of a thought or a situation. It is the basis for such qualities as presence of mind, ready wit, etc.

Agility is said to be the opposite of the Hindrance or Defilement (*kilesa*) "rigidity and sloth" (*thīna-middha*), which causes heaviness (*garutā*) and hardness (*thaddhabhāva*); that is, of a general sluggishness, dullness and apathy of consciousness as well as of the slowness of its various functions, which causes, for example, slowness of apprehension or response intellectually as well as emotionally.

A noteworthy passage in the *Mūla-Ṭikā*, the old subcommentary of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, says: "Agility in its operation is a condition of swift emergence from subconsciousness (*bhavaṅga-vutthāna*)."

3. ***Pliancy*** (*mudutā*, lit. "softness") is the susceptibility, elasticity, resilience and adaptability of mind which bestow on it a greater and longer-lasting efficiency, a "sounder health",[26] than it could be expected to possess when the mind were to be in a rigid state. "Soft conquers hard", says Laotse. It should also be remembered how often mental insanity is associated with an excessive rigidity or lack of pliancy or resilience of the mind. If this factor refers to the condition of mind in general, it is called "Pliancy of Consciousness" (*citta-mudutā*, F42).

Pliancy of the Concomitants (*kāya-mudutā*, F43) consists, for example, in adaptability of the respective functions to their various tasks. It is, moreover, a high impressionability or sensitiveness in the perceptive and cognitive faculties and in moral emotion. It is the capacity of the intellectual faculties to learn and to unlearn ever anew, to be benefited by experience. It allows one to get rid of inveterate habits and prejudices pertaining to thought, emotion or behaviour. It contributes to the devotion and self-surrender in faith (*saddhā*); to the gentleness and forgivingness in non-hate (*adosa*) or love (*mettā*). Due to its aspect of sensitive susceptibility it increases also the the mind's imaginative capacity which again is an important factor in the development of intuition.

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26. To understand this figurative expression, it may be noted that one of the connotations of *kusala*, "wholesome", given in the Asl., is *ārogya*, i.e. (mental and moral) health.

Agility and Pliancy may be regarded as a kind of counterpart to Tranquillity. The commentator cites "anxiety" (*daratha*) as one of the defilements particularly countered by Tranquillity. We venture to introduce here the canonical term *khila* (barrenness, obstruction, stoppage) as the opposite of Pliancy and as a counterpart of *dharata.* Here, in these negative counterparts, the expectant tension of "anxiety" stands over against the oppressive dullness of being hopelessly obstructed. The commentary expressly names as opposites: the defilements, *diṭṭhi* (which here may be rendered best as "dogmatism" or "opinionatedness") and *māna* (conceit). Both defilements are said to cause hardness or inflexibility (*thaddhabhāva*). As opposed to dogmatic rigidity, Pliancy appears as open-mindedness. Conceit and any other egocentric hardenings of the heart are countered by Pliancy in its aspects of humane accessibility to others, appreciation of others and making allowance for them. The "manifestation" (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of Pliancy is said to be non-resistence (*appatighāta*), which may refer, for example, to the "non-resistence" to appeals (or impulses) to selfless action, or may refer to readiness to yield in argument, etc.

Pliancy of mind counteracts any tendency in the human character and intellect to become rigid; it widens the boundaries of the so-called Ego by admitting into it new elements from the world of Non-Ego; it is a prerequisite for true tolerance that includes understanding.

4. ***Workableness*** (*kammaññatā*, F45, 46,) is that medium consistence, or that tempered state, of consciousness and its concomitants in which neither firmness nor softness are excessive. Perfect "workableness" of mind means that these two qualities, firmness and softness, are just in the right proportion to permit the greatest efficiency of the mental functions and to suit best the formative and transformative work of spiritual development (*bhāvanā*). This is how the *Mūla-Ṭikā* expresses it: "Workableness signifies that specific or suitable degree of Pliancy or Softness (*muduta-visiṭṭhā*, or *anurūpa-mudutā*) which makes the gold, that is, the mind, workable. While the mind is in the flames of passion it is too soft to be workable, as molten gold is. If, on the contrary, the mind is too rigid then it is comparable to untempered gold."

"Excessive rigidity of mind, being an insufficient impressionability, resists any attempt to transform or reform it. On the other hand, excessive pliancy makes the mind too easily impressionable, and with the mind in such a condition, impressions are not retained long enough to leave any noticeable effect, but are soon obliterated by new ones.

So it is most important for anyone aiming at an effective transformation of consciousness through spiritual training, to achieve, as perfectly as possible for a beginner, that medium quality of mind implied in the term "Workableness".

The *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* says that the opposites of Workableness are "all those remaining Hindrances that render consciousness and its concomitants unwieldy". This may refer particularly to sensual desire (*kāmacchanda*) and hate (*vyāpāda*). Sensual desire "softens" the mind, makes it "shapeless", effaces its characteristic contours, dilutes and dissolves. Hate (aversion, resentment, etc.) represents the other extreme: it hardens, contracts, imprisons, alienates. Therefore in proportion to the achievement of that medium state of Workableness the mind will be assisted in uprooting the two unwholesome Roots of lust and hate.

5. ***Proficiency*** (*pāguññatā*, F47, 48) is, according to the *Dhammasangaṇī*, fitness and competence of mind and mental factors, and is, according to the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, opposed to their "sickliness" (*gelaññabhāva*), caused by such defilements as lack of faith or confidence (*asaddhiya*), etc. That is to say, it is opposed to feebleness of the mental and moral constitution and to inefficiency, which appear also as inner uncertainty and lack of self-confidence. The commentarial explanation by "sickliness" points again to the meaning of *kusala* as "moral and mental health".

Inner certainty, assurance and efficiency in the doing of a good deed, which are expressed by the factor Proficiency, are increased in proportion to the repeated performance of that act, resulting in its spontaneity. Generally, it can be said that all these last-mentioned five pairs, and particularly

Proficiency, are more highly developed in those good states of consciousness classed as "spontaneous" (*asankhārena*).

6. ***Uprightness*** (*ujukata*, F49, 50) is opposed to insincerity, hypocrisy etc. This factor prevents a state of consciousness from being called "good" when selfish secondary motives are hidden behind thoughts, words, and deeds of moral significance. The inclusion of the factor Uprightness serves to emphasize that the ethical, that is, kammic quality of a state of consciousness is determined only by an unambiguous intention (*cetanā*). An example will make it clearer and will also show how the abstract but penetrative analysis of the Abhidhamma may be used for the practical purpose of an introspective scrutiny of motives, etc. Let us suppose, a charitable act has the secondary or even the primary object of winning fame for the donor. Then that moment of consciousness in which the selfish motive appears will be kammically unwholesome, being rooted in greed and delusion. But the state of consciousness accompanying the actual performance of the charitable act will be kammically wholesome, because the actual relinquishing of the object to be given away will generally imply non-greed. This type of consciousness would probably have the following classification: "without (right) knowledge", because inspired by desire for fame; "non-spontaneous", because preceded by deliberation referring to a secondary motive; probably emotionally "indifferent", because there will

scarcely be much joy in such a case. With these classifications, the thought in question is included in the 8th Type of Wholesome Consciousness, which is also the last and lowest in quality, though in the case of other types, the order of enumeration does not always represent an order of value.

Interrelation between the Six Pairs

The following examples may suffice to illustrate the Six Pairs' mutual relations.

Tranquillity and Agility balance each other: Tranquillity has a moderating influence on Agility, and Agility a stimulating influence on Tranquillity.

As we have seen, Pliancy is a fundamental condition of Workableness, while the requirements of the latter set a limit to the degree of Pliancy or Softness desirable.

Uprightness prevents the Agility and Pliancy of mind from falling into insincerity, while Agility and Pliancy take care that Uprightness does not grow unimaginative and rigid and so impair the adaptability of wholesome consciousness to actuality.

Proficiency gives Agility that sureness and smoothness of movement which comes from long practice. On the other hand, Agility, implying the capacity to admit of modifications and changes, prevents Proficiency from becoming an overspecialized and inflexible habit, and so limiting the adaptability as well as the potentialities of the mind.

Only the pair of Proficiency appears untraceable to the Suttanta. The abstract noun *pāguññatā* does not, to our knowledge, occur there at all. The adjective *paguṇa*, being more characteristic of latter Pāli literature, is met only very rarely in the Sutta Piṭaka and in such irrelevant contexts that our term has certainly not been derived from these passages. It is possible that the Suttanta-use of *kusala* and *kusalatā*, in the sense of "skilful" (e.g., "skilful in the doctrine of the Aggregates etc." (*khandh'ādi-kusala*), may have contributed to the inclusion of that mental factor into the List, though under a different name.

We have already observed (p. 132) how *Tranquillity* occurs in the Suttas as a condition for the Factor of Absorption "Happiness" and as a Factor of Enlightenment (*bojjhanga*). In explaining the latter, both kinds of Tranquillity are mentioned in the Saṃyutta Nikāya XLVI, No. 51: "Monks, there is tranquillity of the mental factors (*kāya-pasaddhi*) and tranquillity of consciousness (*citta-passaddhi*)".

Agility or lightness (*lahutā*) of mind in general, is referred to in the following passage: "Monks, I do not know of any one thing that is as lightly changing (*lahuparivattaṃ*) as the mind (*cittaṃ*)" (Angutt. Nik., *Eka-Nipāta*). This passage has certainly influenced the definition of our mental factor *lahutā* (in the *Dhammasangaṇī* § 42) by

lahu-parināmitā which is synonymous with the Sutta term *lahu-parivattaṃ*. The context of that brief Sutta passage from the *Anguttara Nikāya* suggests that not only the general idea of the transitoriness of mind is implied in it, but also the particular aspect of its being capable of quick transformations or modifications, a quality of mind useful to moral and spiritual development. This quotation is in fact preceded by the well-known passage "O Monks, I do not know of any one thing that, if developed and cultivated, is as pliant (*mudu*) and workable (*kammaññu*) as the mind." Therefore we feel justified in quoting the former passage as a source of our term.

An increased feeling of lightness (*lahuka-saññā*) is mentioned as being present when the Buddha employed His supernormal powers (*iddhi*): "Ānanda, when the Exalted One subordinates the body to the mind, or the mind to the body, and a feeling of happiness and lightness descends on the body, at that time, Ānanda, the body of the Exalted One is lighter (*lahutaro*) and more pliant (*mudutaro*), better workable (*kamma-niyataro*) and more luminous (*pabhassaratataro*)" (Samy. Nik. LI, No. 22). In this and the previous passage we find also other terms belonging to the Six Pairs. We shall refer again to these quotations later on.

Uprightness is frequently mentioned in the Suttas as part of a compound formed with the balancing quality of *Pliancy*. In that compound, slightly

different expressions are used *ajjava-maddava*, explained in the commentary by *ujutā ca mudutā ca*. In these occurrences however, *maddava* has not so much the psychological meaning of “pliancy of mind and concomitants”, but has rather to be understood in the ethical sense of “gentleness”, which however is intimately connected with the psychological faculty “Pliancy”, as we have seen before (p. 134). This twofold concept “straightness and gentleness” occurs, for example, in the *Anguttara Nikāya* (*Duka-Nipāta*, No. 68) and is probably the source for its inclusion into the compendium-like *Sangīti Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* and into the Suttanta Dyads of the *Dhammasanganī* (§§ 1339–1340). In the latter text the definitions of *ajjava-maddava* agree to a great extent with those of our two Pairs *ujutā* and *mudutā*, in the same work (Dhs §§ 44, 45; 50, 51). Furthermore, these two terms (*ajjava-maddava*) appear in the *Anguttara Nikāya*, (*Catukka Nipata*, No. 112) among the four qualities of a thoroughbred horse comparable to those of a noble monk, the other two qualities being “swiftness” (*java*) and “patience” (*khanti*). These latter two are likewise complementary qualities corresponding to our factors, Agility and Tranquillity. In *the Sutta-Nipāta* we find (v. 250) “…delighted in straightness linked to gentleness” (*ajjava-maddave rato*); in another passage (v. 292) they are given as qualities of the noble Brahmins of old; in another (v. 143; *Mettā Sutta*) synonymous expressions appear among the qualities of an ideal monk:

Sakko ujū ca sūjū ca suvaco c' assa mudū anatimāni

"Let him be capable and upright, truly upright,
Easily admonished, gentle and not haughty...."

The first part of this verse refers to firmness and strength of character, the second to gentleness. It furnishes an excellent though usually overlooked example how, also in the formation of character, the Buddha advocated a Middle Path on which seemingly contrary trends of character are harmonized into complementary qualities.

Pliancy and *Workableness* of mind very frequently occur in the Suttas and are mostly mentioned together. We have already given two passages above (p. 140) and shall quote only two more:

> "With consciousness thus purified and cleansed, without blemish and stain, pliant and workable, steady and unshakable, he turns his mind to the extinction of passions" (Majjh. Nik., No. 51).

> "Monks, there are five defilements of gold, owing to which gold is not pliant, not workable, impure, brittle and cannot be well wrought.... Likewise, Monks, there are those five defilements of the mind, owing to which the mind is not pliant, not workable, impure, brittle and cannot concentrate well upon the extinction of passions. Which are those five? Sensual desire, illwill, rigidity and sloth, agi-

> tation and worry, scepticism — these are the defilements of the mind, owing, to which…."
> (Samy. Nik. XLVI, No. 33).

Perhaps passages like this last were not only the source of the two pairs of Pliancy and Workableness, but also inspired the composition of the entire group of Six Pairs, of qualitative factors, and their inclusion in the List of Dhammas. When the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* in its treatment of the Six Pairs frequently refers to the Five Hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) and when the Sub-Commentary (see p. 85) uses the simile of the gold to illustrate the consistency of mind necessary for the purpose of spiritual development, that too can be referred back to the passages just quoted.

The Purification of the Mind

Each wholesome thought, but especially the systematic culture of the mind (*bhāvanā*), is, as it were, a process of elimination and refinement by which the gold of consciousness is gradually freed from blemishes and alien dross, and so brought to its true purity, as stated by the Buddha in the following words:

> "Monks, this consciousness is pure (or: luminous, *pabhassaram*),[27] but is defiled by intru-

27. Explained by the commentary as the subconscious life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*)

> sive (or alien, *āgantukehi*) defilements;… and it is (now) free from intrusive defilements."
> (*Angutt. Nik.*, *Eka-Nipāta*).

Anything evil or unwholesome is to be seen as the "intrusion of a foreign element" that disturbs the mind's tranquillity with agitation; that prevents its agility with obstruction and its pliancy with hardening and its workableness with unbalance and its proficiency with weakness; that deflects its uprightness. From that it follows that the Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors belong in their totality only to good consciousness, and it is only as an inseparable group that they are included in the List. It might be objected that there is keen-witted agility and adaptable pliancy also in a crook when thinking of some fraud. But, in that case, these qualities are subservient to greed or hate, present in the same moment of consciousness and consequently they have a defiling effect on the mind of the evildoer. Therefore they are not to be identified with the purifying qualities treated here. Besides, "Agitation" (*uddhacca*), being a constant factor in each case of unwholesome consciousness, excludes the presence of Tranquillity, and also the other five Pairs would scarcely be complete in any unwholesome state of mind owing to the action of the specifically evil factors. Therefore the Six Pairs in their totality cannot enter unwholesome consciousness. But it is precisely the harmonious completeness (*sāmaggī*) of all the six pairs that gives

them their peculiar character and makes them specific aspects of good consciousness. Only if all of them are present will they be able to exert their refining, tempering and balancing influence on the structure of a good state of consciousness. Of course, they will not always be equally strong or perfectly balanced, but they are present in a minimal degree in each case of good consciousness (*sobhana-sādhārana*).

To contemplate the nature of these Six Pairs of Qualitative Factors is of great practical help to those who strive to purify the mind. In that contemplation particular attention has to be given to the balancing of these factors. This has been briefly dealt within the paragraph on their interrelation (p. 139). The Sutta about the qualities of a thoroughbred horse (see p. 142) and other passages quoted above show how the postulate of harmonization of character is inherent in Buddhist Scriptures, even when not expressly formulated in abstract terms. The balancing of the Six Pairs is complementary to the "Harmonizing of the Spiritual Faculties" (*indriya-samatta*), the former referring to the formal or structural quality of consciousness, the latter to its actual functions.

In concluding this chapter, we would again stress that the most prominent feature in the Buddha's teaching, that it is a Middle Path, not only refers to transcending extremes of thought and conduct but also applies to formation and transformation of character.

11. The Helpers (*upakāraka*, F51, 52)

12. The Pairwise Combination (*yuganaddha*, F53, 54)

We suggest that the intention in including these two groups was to show that the mental factors present in any wholesome state of consciousness associated with knowledge afford the chance to practise different methods of spiritual development (*bhāvanā*), of which two examples are given here. They exemplify the *potentialities* of the respective wholesome thought which belong as much to the dynamic structure of a state of consciousness as its actualities do.

The name "Helpers" (*upakāraka*), given here to mindfulness, (*sati*) and Mental Clarity (*sampajañña*), we derived from the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 131: *upakāra-vasena*) and from the *Mula-Ṭika*. These two factors refer to the practice of the Satipaṭṭhāna-method. The *Mūla-Ṭikā* makes a noteworthy comment, expressing well the character of Satipaṭṭhāna as the Only and Unique Way (*ekāyano maggo*): "These two factors (*sati-sampajāñña*) are 'helpers' (*upakāraka*) for any meditator, in any subject of meditation and at any time because they remove obstacles and enhance spiritual development."

Calm (*samatha*) and Insight (*vipassanā*) are the two complementary halves of Buddhist mental culture. They also signify the different starting-

points for meditative practice chosen according to the disposition of the disciple (*samatha-* or *vipassanā-yānika*, that is, having Calm or Insight as vehicle). Lastly they are the two main headings under which the traditional subjects of meditation may be classified. Though all these points may well be considered in this connexion, in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*, however; these two factors are viewed as phases of a particular method of meditation, called the Pairwise Combination (*yuganaddha*). This name was given to it because in that method periods of Calm alternate with periods of Insight. In the phase of Calm, for example, when the First Absorption (*jhāna*) as been attained, the meditator does not enter at once into the Second Absorption or endeavour to do so but now inserts a period of Insight (*vipassanā*), which consists in a discerning retrospection to the past meditative experience; that is, the phenomena appearing in that jhanic state are viewed as impermanent, unsatisfactory and impersonal. This alternation of Calm and Insight is continued either through the whole sequence of Absorptions or until, in the course of it, one of the stages of Sanctity (*ariya-magga*) is reached.

13. The Last Dyad (*piṭṭhi-dukā*, F55, 56)

The two components of this group, Exertion (*paggāha*) and Undistractedness (*avikkhepa*) have been frequently mentioned already under various

synonyms or aspects. There would have been no need to repeat them were it not in order to point out for the last time that these two factors are fundamental to spiritual progress. By making a separate group of them it is emphasized that they should be not only strong singly but also well-balanced, the one against the other. It is the harmony of the two Spiritual Faculties, "energy" and "concentration" (cf. *indriya-samatta*, p. 110), in other words, the Middle Path, that is stressed again here. This explanation is confirmed by the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 131): "These two terms are included in order to express the union of energy and concentration (*viriya-samādhi-yojanatthāya*)." The Subcommentary adds: "With these two factors evenly joined (*samaṃyuttā*) sluggishness as well as agitation are absent in every wholesome state of consciousness."

It should, however, be noted that both factors can also appear in unwholesome consciousness where, in a different "environment", their kammic quality and their application are, of course, different.

14. The Supplementary Factors (*ye-vā-panaka*, F57–65)

The concluding passage in our text, called in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* "the addition" (*appaṇā*), runs as follows: "These, or whatsoever (*ye vā pana*) other conditionally arisen incorporeal phenomena there are at that time, these phenomena are kammically wholesome." Thereby supplementions of the list

are admitted, implying that the enumeration of mental factors given in it is not to be regarded as final. Such additions are in fact supplied by the commentaries (see Asl. p. 131 f.) and named the "or-whatsoever-factors" (*ye-vā-panakā*): an allusion to the above-quoted passage. The *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* says that these factors "are to be found in various passages of the Suttantas."

The nine Supplementary Factors which may appear in good consciousness are given in the table on p. 59. There are seven other factors[28] which occur only in unwholesome consciousness, in addition to the first three of the set of nine. All of them are incorporated into the condensed and systematized version of the List of the Dhammas given in the *Visuddhi-magga* and the *Abhidhammattha-sangaha*. The "first three factors — intention (*chanda*), decision (*adhimokkha*) and attention (*manasikāra*) have rather important places in the later version of the List: "attention" belongs to the seven Factors Common to All, Consciousness (*sabbacittasādhāratṇa*); "decision" appears in 78 of the 89 types of consciousness; and "intention" too is one of the most frequently occurring factors. All three of them are mentioned in that earlier list of Dhammas given in the Anupada Sutta of the Majjhima-Nikāya (see p. 82). In particular, the factor Attention is very prominent in the Suttas. It is mentioned as one of the three typical representa-

28. i.e., Agitation (constant in all unwholesome states), envy, avarice, rigidity, sloth, doubt and conceit.

tives of the Aggregate of Mental Formations (*saṅkhāra-khandha*), for example, in the *Sammā-Diṭṭhi Sutta* (Majjh. 9)[29] which was likewise delivered by that first early Abhidhammika, the Elder Sāriputta: "Feeling, perception, volition, sense-impression and attention — these, brethren, are called mind (*nāma*)." Also in post-canonical books, Attention is mentioned, for example, in the *Milindā Pañhā* and the *Netti Pakaraṇa* (see p. 88). In view of all these facts it is surprising that at least Attention was not included in our List. In view of the prominent place occupied by this mental factor in the Canon, oversight has to be excluded and intentional omission to be assumed, also in the case of the other Supplementary Factors. But we have not been able to form any convincing opinion about the reasons for this. Obviously in the first composition of the List these factors must have been thought supernumerary, but were again admitted by the later redactors.

It may be of interest to compare in this respect the lists of dhammas composed by the later Buddhist Schools. In the lists of both the hinayanist Sarvāstivādins (Vaibhāsika) and the mahāyanist Vijnānavādins the three neutral Supplementary Factors (Intention, Decision and Attention) and the unwholesome ones are present. In the list of the Sarvāstivādins the three neutral ones are included among the "factors common

29. See "*Right Understanding*" (*Sammādiṭṭhi-Sutta*), Discourse and Commentary, Translation with Introduction by Bhikkhu Soma; Colombo 1946, Bauddha Sahitya Sabha.

to all consciousness" (called there *mahābhūmika*) and in that respect they differ from the Theravadins who allow only Attention in that group. The Vijnānavādins, agreeing in that point with the Pāli list, relegated Decision and Intention to a group of inconstant neutral factors.

This concludes the treatment of the single groups forming the List of Dhammas in the *Dhammasanganī*.

15. Gradations of Intensity among Parallel Factors

Having dealt with the single groups among which the various parallel factors appear, we may now point to some facts that show how the multiple enumeration of apparently identical factors serves to express a difference of intensity or quality. As far as we know, these facts, as registered in the following table, have so far not been noticed. There is no mention of them in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* and *Mūla-Ṭikā*, nor apparently in any later literature.

Let us take a set of parallel factors, for instance:

> Mental One-pointedness, Faculty of Concentration, Power of Concentration, Path Factor of Concentration (right and wrong), Calm, and Undistractedness.

Now if we look for their definition as given after each principal paragraph in the *Dhammasanganī*, we find that these definitions are almost identical for all par-

allel factors, in nearly every case. There are only the following differences: in unwholesome consciousness Right Concentration is replaced by Wrong Concentration in the text of the definition itself, not only in the enumeration of factors. In supramundane consciousness (*lokuttara*) the Factor of Enlightenment "Concentration" (*samādhisambojjhaṅga*) is added. These divergences do not refer to differing intensity. But one case of a varying definition does so, and it is unique in this respect among all other factors: in the case of 17 weak types of consciousness (see the foll. table), the definition of mental one-pointedness, usually composed of ten terms, stops with the first term "stability" (*ṭhiti*). If we were to judge only by comparing the definitions, the last-mentioned single exception would only prove the general rule that no differentiation of intensity is intended among the parallel factors. But the definitions in *Dhammasanganī* are not a sufficient criterion since they are rather rigid formulas which undergo only those very few changes mentioned above. Owing to their rigidity even some minor inconsistencies between the definitions and the structure of the respective states of consciousness do occur, as we shall see later on. Therefore, for deciding the question of degrees of intensity among parallel factors, we shall also have to examine and to compare the actual inclusion or omission of those quasi-synonyms in the single states of consciousness. There is only one set of parallel factors, beginning with mental one-pointedness (see above) which allows such a survey of the

whole field or consciousness (that is, wholesome, unwholesome, kamma-resultant and functional).

We supplement it by one variation occurring in the case of Energy (*viriya*) and tabulate the result as follows:

Type of Consciousness		**Parallel Factors**	
Tab no. [a]	***Description***	***present***	***absent***
32	unwholesome, associated with doubt	Mental One-pdt. (defined only by "stability")	Concentration as Faculty, Power, Path-Factor, Calm, Undistractedness.
34–38 50–54	5-sense perception	do.	do.
39–55	Receiving of that sense perception; resultant	do.	do.
40	Investigating and Registering (joyful)	do.	do.
54–56	Investigating and Registering (indifferent), Rebirth & Death-Consc.,[b] Subconsciousness	do.	do.
70	functional: Adverting to the 5-sense object	do.	do.
71	functional: Adverting to 5-sense-objects & mind-objects, Deciding	(a) One-ptd. (complete definition); Concentration as Faculty; (b) Faculty of Energy	Concentr. as Power, and Path Factor; Undistractedness Power of Energy, Effort as Path Factor; Exertion
72	functional: the state of mirth in an Arahat	do.	do.

a. See Nyanatiloka's Table of the Five Khandhas printed in his "Buddhist Dictionary" and "Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka".

b. twofold, as results of wholesome or unwholesome Kamma.

This tabulation permits the following conclusions:

(1) Among the set of parallel factors, denoting "concentration", three degrees of intensity are noticeable:

(a) Mental One-pointedness, standing alone; in that case its definition is always limited to "stability", signifying the weakest degree of concentration; see Tab. No. 32ff.

(b) Mental One-pointedness joined only by the Faculty of Concentration, as in Tab. No. 71, 72; the definition has nevertheless the complete number of terms.

(c) Mental One-pointedness with the entire set of parallel factors, as in all other classes of consciousness.

(2) In the case of Energy (*viriya*), there are only two gradations of intensity; there is no weaker degree of it than the Indriya-aspect; for Energy is not a constant factor like Mental One-pointedness. This implies that Energy has always a certain controlling influence, but that Mental One-pointedness in its weakest state has not. The two gradations are:

(a) Faculty of Energy standing alone, as No. 71 in Table.

(b) Faculty of Energy with the entire set of parallel factors.

(3) According to the use of the two terms in the Abhidhamma, the Faculty-aspect of a quality may be present without the Power-aspect. This applies, however, only in the case of the two ethically neutral Faculties, “Concentration” and “Energy”, and occurs only in two types of consciousness (Tab. Nos. 71, 72). It implies that the three exclusively wholesome Faculties (faith, mindfulness and wisdom) appear always together with their Power-aspect.

(4) The Powers, Path Factors, Calm, Exertion and Undistractedness occur exclusively (a) in kammic consciousness (wholesome and unwholesome), (b) in those “strong” kamma-resultant (*vipāka*) and functional (*kriya*) states which exactly correspond in their structure to the eight wholesome kammic types; they are the eight main resultants of wholesome kamma (*mahā-vipāka*) and the eight functional states occurring only in the case of the Arahat (*kriya-javana*).

If the facts tabulated above, and especially our conclusions (1) – (3) had been noticed, they would certainly have been mentioned in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*. These facts, indeed, would have necessitated definitions more differentiated than those given in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* for Mental One-pointedness and for the Faculties and Powers of Concentration, and Energy, taking into consideration the above gradations of intensity.

The instances of the separate occurrence of the Faculties without the Powers cannot be explained as an unintentional omission of the Power-aspect by scribes, because we are here able to check the correctness of the text by reference to the chapter of the Summary (*saṅgaha-vāra*) in the Dhammasanganī, where the number of Faculties, Powers etc. is always listed.

The definitions in the Dhammasanganī include the different aspects, that is, the parallels of the respective factors. But on comparing them with their actual appearance in the given states of consciousness as given in the List, some minor inconsistencies between the definition and the List are found: in Nos. 71, 72 in the Table, the definition of Mental One-pointedness includes the Faculty as well as the Power of Concentration, but the latter is not present in these types as a separate factor, as the above table shows; there is a corresponding divergence in the case of the Faculty, and the Power, of Energy. This illustrates our previous remark that the definitions cannot be used as the sole criterion for determining the quality of the respective factor.

The facts pointed out in this chapter contribute to support our contention that the multiple enumeration of mental factors in the List is not a mere dispensable elaboration, and that each parallel factor has a more or less important and varying individual significance.

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16. Concluding Remarks

These investigations arose out of the question: Why is the List of Dhammas in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī filled out with so many quasi-synonyms, and what purpose do these synonyms serve? This poses a further question: Are there any reasons for still making use of these original and somewhat cumbersome Lists in view of their handy abbreviation and systematization in the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Abhidhammattha-sangaha*?

The answer to these questions may now be given by summarizing our investigations as follows:

The enumeration of parallel factors has an individual and a relational significance; that is, it concerns, firstly, the particular nature of the single factor itself and, secondly, the various connexions or relations of that factor.

Individual significance

(1) The multiple enumeration illustrates the *different functions and ways of application of a single quality*. This is the only explanation given in the Aṭṭhasāliṇī (see p. 12 ff.); all the others which follow are inferences and conclusions drawn from a close examination of the sources.

From the point of view of theoretical and abstract psychology the inclusion of mere functions

and aspects may appear superfluous or even a proof of "loose thinking" and "unscientific procedure". But for the ultimately practical, that is, spiritual, purposes of Buddhist psychology it is essential to stress the several important functions and applications of qualities. But even in the field of theory, the more advanced psychology of our own days recognizes this procedure, for instance in those succinctly coined words of *Prof. James Ward* chosen as a motto for our Chapter IV: "A difference in aspects is a difference in things". This is a remarkable approach to the dynamic psychology of the Abhidhamma.

(2) The multiple enumeration makes it possible to register varying *degrees of intensity* in the actual functioning of a single factor (see the previous section).

II. *Relational significance*

(1) The multiple enumeration, together with the arrangement in groups, shows the *internal* relations of a factor, that is, its varied connexions with other factors present in the same moment of consciousness. These internal relations include such common functions as the controlling function of the Faculties; such common purposes as the liberating purpose of the Path Factors. This implies two postulates of great practical importance: the postulate of co-operation by several factors to achieve a

common purpose of worldly or spiritual nature; further, the postulate of the supplementation and harmonization of isolated qualities wrongly conceived and used as opposing forces instead of complementary ones.

(2) The multiple enumeration and the arrangement in groups suggests, by implication, that we pursue and investigate the *external relations* of factors and groups; that is, the connexion of a given moment of consciousness with past and future ones. This includes the close investigation of the conditioned as well as of the conditioning nature of a single state of consciousness — a task to be undertaken with the terminological tools provided in the *Paṭṭhāna*. The conditioned nature of a phenomenon points to its external relations with the past, while the conditioning aspect draws the attention to the external relations with the future. But it should be kept in mind that in both cases internal relations as well are involved, that is, conditions obtaining in the present (support, mutuality, etc.).

(3) The multiple enumeration and the arrangement in groups can help to find the *potentialities* of a factor or a group or an entire state of consciousness. Properly, this point is included in that last mentioned, namely, in the external relations with the future. But for the sake of emphasis it is mentioned here separately. *In order to do full justice to the dynamic nature of consciousness, not only its actual functions but also its inherent poten-*

tialities have to be considered. Particularly in Buddhist psychology, which is, or should be, completely subservient to the practical task of spiritual development, it is imperative to look out for the "seeds" embedded in a given situation, that is, to observe whether a state of mind possesses the potentiality for good and better or for bad and worse. To give an example: an *actual* but limited control wielded by the Spiritual Faculties implies the *potential* increase of that control; an *actual* but weak liberating influence exercised by Path Factors implies the *potential* strengthening of their liberating effect. Besides, potentiality means sometimes that the particular state of mind *gravitates* in the direction indicated by the "potentiality". So by giving due attention to the "potentiality" one can foresee future developments and either assist or counter them in time.

These and other considerations will show that the elaborate original version of the List of Dhammas as given in the Dhammasanganī is not in the least rendered superfluous by its condensation in the Visuddhi-magga and its systematization in the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha. Of course, the reverse is not suggested here, namely, that those latter versions should be disregarded in favour of the original. Their handiness is a great advantage, and in many cases it suffices to use them instead of the elaborate original. These later versions have also made the valuable contribution of incorporating the Supplementary Factors. On

the other hand, it has to be regretted that, to our knowledge, the use of the original canonical Lists has been completely superseded in later Abhidhamma literature by the condensed version. Owing to that, several important and fruitful lines of thought implied in the particular features of the original version or derivable from it, have been left undeveloped. There is, for example, the arrangement of the factors in groups, which has been emphasized in these pages. Having been almost obliterated in the later condensed versions of the List, it should be restored to its rightful place. The arrangement in groups is not only relevant to the details of the subject matter but is also of great general and methodological importance. For the fact of grouping has introduced a synthetical or relational element into the pre-eminently analytical Dhammasanganī. It serves as a corrective and as a complementary principle. This is required because — as already said at the beginning of this treatise — a composite thing is not yet sufficiently described if only its single parts are enumerated separately without due regard to their internal and external relations. If wheels, axle, carriage, etc., are placed separately on the ground, they cannot yet be called "a cart". Only if parts of a whole are shown in their purposeful combination, if not in their actual operation, are we dealing with realities and not with artificial abstractions. In our analytical endeavours we should never forget the fundamental, though temporal,

"unity of experience", that is, the internal relations, and the greater "unity of the continuous flux", that is, the external relations. This should be always remembered by those engaged in studying the Abhidhamma.

Here only a modest beginning has been made in the investigation of the ingenious combination of analytical and synthetical method in Buddhist philosophy. These pages appeal for research in that direction to continue. For those who want to do this work thoroughly, tremendous preliminary labour is waiting, namely, to convert the abstract formulas of the *Paṭṭhāna* into terms of actuality giving concrete examples in a sufficiently comprehensive selection for the relations treated there.

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Chapter V

The Problem Of Time

I. Time and Consciousness

The formula of the Dhammasangaṇī — "At a time when..." (see p. 56) — implies close connection between time and consciousness, which is described in a verse quoted in the Aṭṭhasāliṇī, as a mutual relationship

> "By Time the Sage described the Mind
> And by the Mind he described the Time;
> In order, that by such a definition,
> The dhammas there in classes may be shown."

> *Samaye niddisi cittaṃ cittena samayaṃ muni*
> *niyametvāna dīpetuṃ dhamme tattha pabhedato.*

The state of consciousness classified in the first part of the schematic sentence of the Dhammasangaṇī (see page 56) is, in its existence, *limited* as well as *described* by Time. The duration of that mind-defining time-period is circumscribed by the simultaneity of the mental factors enumerated in the second part of the sentence ("…at that time there are Sense-Impressions…"). In other words, a state of consciousness lasts as long as the combination of its single factors. This represents the *limitation* of consciousness by time. Its *description* too is only possible by reference to time, namely, to the tem-

porary simultaneity of the single factors. But on the other hand, these mental factors, in other words, the internal relations, for their part, determine the time by furnishing the measure of the time-unit, which consists only in the duration of that temporary combination of factors. The conclusion to be drawn from that mutual relation between Time and Consciousness may be formulated in the words of Bertrand Russell: "We cannot give what may be called *absolute* dates, but only dates determined by events. We cannot point to a time itself, but only to some event occurring at that time" (*Our Knowledge of the External World*). Our commentator (Aṭṭhasāliṇī p. 58) expresses the same idea when, in explaining the word *samaya* (rendered in our translation, p. 56, by "time"), he says: "Chronological time (*kālo*), denoted by reference to this or that (event) is merely a conventional expression… since it has no existence in itself (cannot be found in reality) one has to understand it as a mere concept" (*Taṃ taṃ upādāya paññatto kālo vohāramattako… so pan'esa sabhāvato avijjamānattā pāññattimattako evā ti veditabbo*).

But "chronological time" (*kālo=pavatti-kālo*, "duration") is only the first of five meanings which, according to the Aṭṭhasāliṇī, the term *samaya* expresses in the case of our Dhammasangaṇī sentence. The other meanings are as follows:

(2) Concurrence (*samavāya*) of circumstances, that is the completeness of conditions (*paccaya-samaggī*) necessary for the occurrence of

the respective state of consciousness. For example, visual organ, visual object, light, attention etc., are required for the arising of visual consciousness. — This meaning of *samaya* relates the given moment of consciousness to the present, that is, to co-existing conditions.

(3) Condition (*hetu*), that is combination of those Modes of Conditionality which are operative in the respective case. For example, for visual consciousness, the visual organ and object are conditions by way of pre-nascence (*purejāta-paccaya*); visual consciousness (*dassana*) is related to the preceding perceptual phase of incipient attention (*āvajjana*, "adverting to the mind") by way of immediate contiguity (*samanantara-paccaya*); for the subsequent phases of that visual experience the visual consciousness is a condition by way of Inducement (*upanissaya*), Object (*ārammaṇa*), Predominance (*adhipati*), etc, — This meaning of *samaya* relates to all three divisions of time. The future is likewise included because every state of consciousness is not only conditioned, but is itself a condition for subsequent states.

(4) The right Moment (*khaṇa*) refers only to wholesome consciousness. It means: the right occasion for additional wholesome activity for which the present moment of wholesome consciousness is capable of being an inducement, a support and starting-point. Whether this "right moment" is utilized or whether the potentialities inherent in it are lost, depends on the presence or absence of aware-

ness of that opportunity. This connotation of *samaya* refers only to the future.

(5) Aggregation (*samūha*), that is, the momentary union of the single components of consciousness, the “constellation” which determines the psychological time, just as the constellation of *samaya* refers only to the present.

The simultaneity of mental factors referred to above, is not a static juxtaposition of self-contained units, as in a mosaic. Their simultaneity results rather from different processes of psychic movements meeting temporarily in the constellation of the present moment, partly overlapping each other but without achieving complete congruity, just as there are also no truly congruent triangles in nature.

A glance into the “antecedents” and the subsequent “life story” of the factors of a single moment of consciousness will show us (1) that the simultaneity of these factors has to be conceived as something fluid and not static, (2) simultaneous factors in so far as they are variable (non-constant), meet each other at quite different stages of their own “life-history”: some factors might already have been parts of preceding moments, but are disappearing with the dissolution of the present one; some arise only now and re-occur in future moments; and again, the life-time of others may be limited to this moment only. Such a differentiation is certainly significant, just as it makes a difference whether we meet with certain people or ideas in youth, manhood or old-age.

The fact that parts of other moments of consciousness may, as it were, spread over the present moment or extend beyond it, makes for an intricate interlacing and a close organic continuity in the world of mental things. There are no "empty spaces", no disconnected events in the universe of the mind, though the connection may often be very loose and remote. Even if a psychic event breaks in quite unexpectedly, it does not arise from nothingness but is related to a perhaps distant past, the gap being bridged by subconscious mental processes. Here we meet again the "third dimension" of mind — its "depth" with regard to time, already referred to (p. 53). A minimum of psychic continuity is always given by the seven "factors common to all consciousness". But we have also to keep in mind the element of diversity in those seven factors. In their repeated occurrence they are not identical in the strict sense, but appear greatly varied when viewed in their actual manifestations. They are "common" factors only as concepts abstracted for the purpose of methodical exposition. But there is nevertheless enough (relative) identity in them to maintain the continuity in the mental process. Also with regard to the already mentioned connection of an unexpected event with its conditions in the past, we must not forget the element of diversity. Taking this in account we spoke intentionally of the event as being *related* to a past event, not as being caused by it, which happens only in certain cases. Otherwise we should land in complete determinism,

which results in a static view of the world. Though, strictly spoken, there are no completely new events, there are, on the other hand, also no quite identical repetitions in the material and mental universe. The truth is in between, that is, in the middle path of Dependent Origination: "Both these two extremes the Perfect One has avoided and has shown the Middle Doctrine (*majjhena dhammaṃ*) which says: On Ignorance depend the Kamma-formations" (Samy. Nik. XII, 35). That is to say, the middle path of the Buddha appears here as the law of conditionality — as the fact of correlation, which is what is really implied when we speak, somewhat vaguely, of continuity. It is, in fact, the energy inherent in the conditions (*paccaya-satti*) which creates what is called continuity or continuum.

To effect continuity is a prominent function of consciousness, and this was already recognized in the Aṭṭhasāliṇī. Among the traditional categories of definition, the "manifestation" (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of consciousness is called "connecting" (*sandahana*) which is explained as follows: "Consciousness presents itself as 'connecting', because when any later state of consciousness arises, it does so by immediately succeeding the preceding state; that is why 'connecting' is its manifestation" (p. 112).[30]

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30. This holds good also of the subconscious life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*). The word *aṅga* in the compound *bhavaṅga* is usually explained in the Commentaries by *kārana*, "*cause*"; accordingly the entire term would mean literally "cause (or condition) of (continued) existence". But we would suggest that *aṅga* may here have the alternative meaning of "link" as well, and consequently *bhavaṅga* would signify "link of existence".

This implies that each state of consciousness is "open" to the past as well as to the future: it has "depth" in time. Though a moment of consciousness has no rigid boundaries, it nevertheless does not lack individuality — in the same way as there will be a characteristic blend of colours where several multicoloured beams of light intersect; but the shade of it will change at once if even one of these beams of light moves away or varies its intensity. Likewise, when a change of direction or intensity occurs in the components of consciousness, the "colour" of the subsequent mental state will be different. Apart from the divergent past and future "life-story" of the single components of consciousness, also in the point of their intersection; that is, in the given moment of consciousness, there is no motionless stability or self-identity. A single moment too passes through the three phases: (1) the Arising (*uppāda*) or the nascent state, (2) the (relative) Stability (*ṭhiti*) or state of continuation, which may be understood as the point of culmination of the respective process or as the point of the closest contact in the temporary combination of mental factors, (3) the gradual Dissolution (*bhanga*) of that combination. In other words, these three phases represent the approaching and departing movement in the mutual relationship of the mental concomitants. This corresponds to the changes occurring in that greater temporary combination, called "personality", and in the still greater one of society where a similar rhythm may

be observed. We spoke of it previously as the alternating process of assimilation and dissimilation.

Here in this context, our purpose is merely to explain the first statement of the commentarial stanza (104): “By time the Sage described the Mind…” We found that this statement has a twofold meaning: firstly a moment of consciousness is limited in its duration by the simultaneity of its concomitants, and only by that simultaneity of factors can a description of it be given; secondly, a moment of consciousness, in its full significance, with all its implications, can only be explained in terms of time, and by referring to all three divisions of time to the past, present and future. Because of the conditioned nature of consciousness, no present mental state is self-explanatory.

The second statement of the stanza says: “…By the Mind he described the Time.” That means that the *time* mentioned in the second part of the sentence (i.e. the duration of the mental factors in their momentary combination) is referred to, and thereby described by the state of *consciousness* as classified in the first part of the sentence. Here, time is “denoted by reference to” consciousness (cf. *upādāya paññatto kālo*; p. 165). But quite apart from the denotation and description of a particular time-period in terms of consciousness, time in general can be conceived only as the conscious experience of it. This subjective — or better, psychological — character of time becomes particularly distinct when time seems to

pass either very slowly or very quickly; slowly in a mental state of dullness or expectancy; quickly in interesting activity or mental absorption. Other examples of the decisive influence of the psychological factor in the experience of time are the contraction of time in dreams as well as in the flash-like retrospect of one's entire life when faced with death. It is also evident that there will be a different time-experience and time value in the lives of an ephemerid; a dog, a man and a 200 years old tortoise. To an insect living but a single day, the morning, noon and evening of that day will have the same significance as childhood, maturity and old-age have for man. Each creature, at the end of its life span, will feel that it has lived a full life, irrespective of the number of the hypothetical "objective" time-units. William James says in his *Principles of Psychology*: "We have every reason to think that creatures may possibly differ enormously in the amount of duration which they intuitively feel." We may tentatively say that time-value or time-experience depends on the intensity of consciousness and on the life span, the first being the more "subjective" and the other the more "objective" factor. This shows again the interweaving of these two forces — subjectivation and objectivation — in each aspect of life, which we earlier illustrated by the internal and external relations present in each moment of consciousness.

These examples of the psychological character of time suggest that there exist different planes

of time corresponding to different levels of consciousness. A few provisional remarks about this are given in the next chapter.

2. Planes of Time

> "It is now held that each series of events has its own time order, and it is difficult to relate the one to the other since there is no common standard time."
>
> Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*

From what was said in the last chapter it seems that the Buddhist teaching of the relativity of time is not limited merely to the statement that time is a relational concept, related to, and inseparable from, the events occurring in it. By inference we may assume that Buddhist philosophy also acknowledges different planes of time, though they are not mentioned *in abstracto*. This puts the relativity of time on a still wider basis.

Any phase or aspect of any life process has the inherent potentiality of an increase or decrease in the scale of its varying intensity, extending far beyond the horizon of the particular point of observation. Science has shown that there are sound and light waves beyond our perceptual capacity ascertainable by deduction or by experiment with an apparatus more sensitive than our human sensorium. In the same way we need not suppose that time is limited to the radius of the human time-

experience and that there is no increase or decrease in its intensity. There are certainly time-planes below and above the range of average human consciousness, which may likewise be either inferred by deductive methods or actually experienced in the "experimental situation" of meditative practice in which the range and sensitivity of average consciousness may be greatly expanded.

In Buddhist Pāli literature we have met so far only two examples of express references to different time-planes and these are extreme cases below and above average time experience. The fact that they are extreme cases might be accidental and attributable to our still uncompleted survey of the scriptures from that point of view; or it can be explained by the fact that the differentiation of time levels is more evident in such extreme cases and cannot be neglected when the respective phenomena are investigated. These two cases are (1) matter, (2) the meditative attainment of Cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*).

(1) ***Matter***: in the post-canonical Abhidhamma literature it is said that the duration of a material phenomenon is that of 16 moments of consciousness. In other words, one material time-unit equals 16 mental time-units of average human consciousness. The number 16 should not be taken as a definite time measure, the less so since the unit of one moment of consciousness is metaphorically defined as "the billionth part of a flash of lightning." It is only the ratio of 1: 16 — a

comparative relation — which is expressed here. In the same way, a complete process of five-sense perception (*pañcadvāravīthi*) has been hypothetically determined as lasting 16 moments,[31] in order to fix the proportional duration of the single phases of that process; for example, Impulsion (*javana*) occupies seven of these sixteen. The relative duration of a material unit was determined as equalling that of a complete perceptual process, that is, 16 moments. The choice of the number 16 may have been influenced by the fact that in India "sixteen" was and is a very popular measuring unit of space, time etc., often used metaphorically.[32] A westerner with his decimal system would have chosen "ten" as a starting point for distributing proportional values.

By the ratio 1: 16 an estimate of the relative velocity of corporeal and mental processes is given — the first being considerably slower than the latter. The Commentary to the *Vibhanga* says: "In corporeal things change is difficult and cessation slow, in mental things change is easy and cessation quick."

To circumscribe in that way the time rhythm of corporeal things in terms of consciousness is jus-

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31. Leaving aside the preceding moment during which the object existed without being perceived (*atītaṃ ekacittakkhaṇaṃ*) which properly does not belong to the *vīthi* itself.

32. See, e.g., the well-known passage in Itivuttaka: "Just as the light of the stars is in its intensity not the sixteenth part of the light of the moon, likewise all those meritorious actions forming the basis (of rebirth) are, in their value not the sixteenth part of Love, the Liberation of Heart."

tified (1) by the second definitory principle laid down in the commentarial stanza: "By the Mind he described the Time", (2) by the close connexion between time and consciousness corresponding to the connexion between space and matter. But there is yet a third point which is important to remember when material processes are related to or explained by mental ones: it is a fundamental idea of Buddhist philosophy that there cannot be existence of matter without a kammic consciousness desiring life in a material world. "If, Ānanda, there were no kamma maturing in the sensuous sphere, could sensuous existence (*kāma-bhava*) appear? — Surely not, Lord." (Angutt. III, 76).

Of course, this must not be taken to imply an idealistic conclusion; for mind, like all component things is a conditioned phenomenon and cannot be regarded as a sole cause, be it of matter or of anything else. But avoiding the extreme beliefs in primacy of matter or primacy of mind, we may say that both matter and mind are manifestations of kammic energy in varying distance from the culminating point of that energy. We may also express it thus: that around the centre of generative kammic energy several peripheral circles revolve. Closest to the centre we have to imagine the kamma-results proper (*vipāka*), which are only mental states. It follows the circle of such matter as is directly produced by Kamma (*kammaja-* or *kammusamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*) that is only one division of matter. After that come kinds of matter produced by consciousness

(*citta-samuṭṭhāna*), by food (*āhāra-samuṭṭhāna*) and by such physical influences, as temperature etc. (*utu-samuāāhāna*). The latter, too, though most distant from the centre, must be assumed to be still connected with the kammic force.

Though the rhythm of matter is so much slower than that of mind, the life-time of a single material unit is as little within the range of our direct perception as that of a mental unit. Nevertheless it is owing to that increase in duration that such continua of inorganic matter as are directly perceptible, produce the impression of relative constancy. And this impression of the constancy of matter, linked with the innate human longing for permanency, not only allows the poet's mind, so sensitive to the fleetingness of short-lived things, to find a spell of soothing rest in the contemplation of the "eternal hills", but is also responsible for theories about the primacy of matter and for belief in an objective and abiding material world. The probability that this our earth may still be there long after all human, animal and plant life has ceased to exist is different only in degree but not essentially from such evident facts as that the work may outlive the worker, an effect its cause etc.

(2) ***The Attainment of Cessation***: while matter exists on a time-level — or better, changes in a time-rhythm — slower than that of mind, and comparable to the infra-red end of the spectrum, there are also vibrations, corresponding to the ultra-violet rays, which are so completely beyond

the range of average human consciousness that in Buddhist psychology of meditative experience they are only spoken of in terms of negation and exclusion similar to Nibbāna. We refer here to the meditative Attainment of Cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), a term that signifies the temporary cessation of perception and feeling (*saññā-vedayita-nirodha*). There are also gradual transitions to that highly abstract ultra-conscious state, just as there are between any two points in the Round of Samsara. These transitions are the four Non-corporeal Absorptions (*āruppa*). Here the rate of mental vibrations is already so intensified as to suspend contact with the world of matter and its special time-rhythm. The suspension can take place either in the brief periods of meditative absorption in the case of a human meditator, or in an inconceivably long life-span in the case of a rebirth in the incorporeal worlds (*arūpa-loka*).

In this context, it is worth noting that what is now an exceptional meditative experience may, if the affinity to that experience is sufficiently strong, become the normal status in a new existence. Any peripheral events may become the centre, and exceptions the rule of a new life in a higher or lower sphere. The territories of the Samsaric spheres have fluid boundaries. "Neighbouring" spheres may widely overlap. The human life, for example, is in certain aspects regulated by laws pertaining to the realm of matter and to the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The human mind

requires the regular tidal movement between the peak of its strenuous activity during the day and its subsidence into the subconsciousness of sleep. The interpenetration with higher regions, surpassing average human consciousness, is much less extensive and much rarer. There are, indeed, some rare contacts with the realm of higher spirituality and intensified consciousness: in meditation, religious inspiration, artistic intuition, etc.; but they are followed only too quickly by a relapse into the relative dullness of everyday consciousness. So there is, firstly, an actual and regular interpenetration with lower spheres, including their different time-levels, and, secondly, there are the potential or rare contacts with the higher planes of existence and time, which may extend up to the four incorporeal Absorptions. The last of them (which may be followed by the Attainment of Cessation) is called *Nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana*, "The Realm of Neither-Perception-nor-Non-Perception" ("the ultimate limit of perception", *Anagārika Govinda*). The twofold negation in the name of this meditative state has to be understood as referring not only to the function of perception, but to all components of consciousness. Here consciousness has reached such a degree of refinement that even the name "consciousness" is no longer quite appropriate and is retained only because there is still a residuum of sublime mental activities directed to the most abstract and sublime object imaginable: the previously obtained experience of the Realm

of No-thing-ness: which is the preceding stage of attainment. Here the tension between the subject and object is naturally so exceedingly low that all that we call consciousness and time is on the point of vanishing completely. Consciousness, in fact, means to be aware of an object, and "time-experience" means being aware of the relative movements of the subjective and objective aspect of a perceptual process.

The borderline of consciousness and time, reached in that fourth incorporeal absorption is transcended by the *Attainment of Cessation*. This is trenchantly expressed by the exclusion of that meditative state (1) from the normal time-order of subsequent mental states, (2) from the systematization of all "things" in *Dhammasanganī*.

The first point, exclusion from the normal time-order, is stated in the *Paṭṭhāna* (*Pañha-vāra* §§ 4, 5) in the following way: "After emergence from the Attainment of Cessation, the (previously obtained) wholesome state of the Realm of Neither-Perception-nor-Non-Perception is a condition for the attainment of Fruition (of *Anāgāmita* or *Arahatta*), by way of proximity or contiguity (*anantara*, or *samanantara-paccaya*)." That is to say, the intermediate state of Cessation is not counted when the time-relation of the two other states is said to be one of immediate succession. The obvious conclusion is that the state of Cessation must have been assumed to take place on quite a different time-level. This is emphasized by the

statement that, from the view of the human time-rhythm, the Attainment of Cessation may last for seven days.

As to the second point, the exclusion from the "Enumeration of Things" (*Dhammasangaṇī*), we read in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī*" (p. 346): "It has been pointed out that in this triad (of wholesome, unwholesome and neutral things) the following states do not obtain: the three characteristics, the three concepts, the space obtained after the removal of the kasina, empty space, the object of the consciousness of the Realm of Nothingness (that is "Infinity of Space"), and the *Attainment of Cessation*." The Sub-Commentary (*Mūla-Ṭikā*) remarks that all these are not included because they are not "real things" (*sabhāva dhamma*). "There is no real thing (*sabhāva*) not contained in the Triad of the Wholesome etc." Furthermore, the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 709. PTS) remarks that the Attainment of Cessation can neither be said to be conditioned nor unconditioned (*sankhata-asankhata*), neither mundane nor supramundane (*lokiya-lokuttara*). Why not? Because it does not exist in reality (*sabhāvato natthitāya*). But because it has been entered into by the meditator, it is called "produced" (*nipphanna*) and not 'unproduced' (*anipphanna*)."

When in the above passage the quality of a "real thing" is denied to the Attainment of Cessation, it certainly does not mean that this state is "unreal" in the sense of a hallucination or imagina-

tion. We should therefore better speak of it as being "differently real" because all the data of our experience of reality and even of the most sublime states of Absorption are absent in that state. In the same way, Nibbāna may be said to have no "existence" in terms of the *khandha*-world, but by denying its reality we should fall into the error of annihilationism (*uccheda-diṭṭhi*).

In this context our aim was only to put on record that Buddhist psychology of meditative experience knows of a time-level that leaves our own so far behind that it can only be spoken of by a paradoxical statement, namely, by its assignation to, as well as the annulment of seven days of our own calendar.

3. The Concept of the Present in the Abhidhamma

We have observed earlier (p. 42 f) how Buddhist philosophy does not stop short of the rigid and "two-dimensional" concept of time, and particularly of the present, resulting from analysis. Through its philosophy of relations involving a synthetical method, the Abhidhamma Philosophy adds the third dimension of "depth in time". The present which, when subjected to analytical treatment only, tended to become an insignificant point of intersection between past and future with a most elusive and even illusory nature, is now charged

with energies deriving from the past and with a significance extending to the future — both in varying degrees, starting from very weak connexions up to a definitely determined course, which is, however, limited to very few cases.[33] To express this dynamic view of time, special terms were required, beyond the conventional and therefore too static concepts, of past, present and future. We proffer the opinion that it was for this purpose that the "Triad of Things Arisen, Not Arisen and Bound to Arise" (*uppannā*, *anuppannā*, *uppādino dhammā*) was included in the Dhammasanganī (§§ 1035–37) and that the commentarial four categories of *uppannā* were formed, which will be dealt with later.

But the Triad of Things Arisen was not intended to supersede the Triad of Things Past etc. (Dhs. § § 1038–40). The latter has an importance of its own in the much more frequent cases when it is necessary to distinguish between the three periods of time and the objects existing in them. Also as a corrective against the opposite extreme, this Triad of Things Past etc. is required in order to insist on the (relative) differentiation of the three periods of time and to counter the tendency to obliterate them completely. This tendency (as well as its opposite) appears again and again in the history of philosophy, and the following emphatic

33. i.e., the eight stages of Sanctity (*ariyamagga* and *ariyaphala*), the five evil actions entailing determined results, and three kinds of pernicious views.

words of the Buddha may well have been directed against similar contemporary ideas:

"Monks, there are three unconfounded appellations, expressions and designations, unconfounded before, they are now unconfounded, and cannot be confounded; they are not rejected by wise ascetics and brahmins. Which are these three? For such corporeality (feeling etc.) that is past, gone and changed, 'It has been', is here the (right) statement, the usage, the designation. The statement 'It is' does not apply to it, the statement 'It will be' does not apply to it…" (Samy. XXII, 62).

Within the Buddhist fold the philosophical trend to obliterate the distinction between the three periods of time came very much to the fore in the early Hinayanist school of the Sarvastivadins (and Vaibhāsika), who maintained that dharmas (conceived as the ultimate unchangeable elements of existence) persist through all three periods of time which have only conventional validity and that things appearing in these three time-periods have only phenomenal existence. These ideas obviously contradict two basic conceptions of Buddhist doctrine; namely, impermanence and insubstantiality. In view of such consequences it is therefore imperative not to forget the relative differentiation of time manifested in the fact of change or impermanence. Following the principle of the twofold method, we stress this complementary aspect just here before going to deal with the other, more neglected aspect of the relations between, and the

partial interpenetration of, the three periods of time.

Before dealing with the term *uppanna*, which is particularly relevant in that connection, we shall mention briefly the three divisions of the term *paccuppanna*, “present”, as treated in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* p. 420 (parallel passage in the *Visuddhi-magga*, p, 431, PTS). These three kinds of the “present” are given in an order of increasing duration: (1) The momentary present (*khaṇa-paccuppanna*), extending only over the three phases of a single moment of consciousness: this is to be regarded as “present” in the strict sense, though not actually perceptible; (2) The serial present (*santati-p*) comprising a series or continuum (*santati*) of moments. The *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* records the definitions made by two schools. The first (that of the Reciters of the Medium Discourses) says that it lasts for 1–2 continua (*santati*), which are defined by examples such as the time required for things to become visible after an abrupt change from daylight to a dark room or conversely. The second school of thought (that of the Reciters of the Grouped Discourses) distinguishes material and mental continua. The former are explained by the aforementioned and other examples: the latter by the duration of 2–3 processes of Impulsion (*javana-vīthhi*), that is by 2–3 processes of a complete perception, each lasting 16 moments. We should hesitate to ascribe actual perceptibility to a duration of 2–3 processes, although, on the other hand, these examples imply a duration

somewhat too long for conveying the idea of "present". Still we must suppose that the second division, the "serial present", is intended to refer to the actual experience of a "Now". The third division stands apart: it is the present with reference to the present life term or present birth process (*addhā-paccuppanna*):

We now turn to the term *uppanna* for which a fourfold division is given in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 66) with a parallel passage in the *Visuddhi-magga* (p. 687 PTS).

(1) *Vattamān-uppanna*, that is, presently or actually, arisen. *Uppanna*, being grammatically a past participle, can also be taken here in the meaning of a "present tense" for which *vattamāna* is the grammatical term. It is identical with the "momentary present" (*khaṇa-paccuppanna*; see above).

(2) *Bhūtāpagat-uppanna*, that is, "arisen", in the sense of "gone after having been". The *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* and the Sub-Commentary paraphrase the first part of that compound (*bhūta*) by *anu-bhavitvā*, "having experienced", and, alternatively, by *bhavitvā*, "having been". In the first case it is explained as follows: "By greed etc., or their opposites, unwholesome or wholesome Kamma experiences the taste of the object (*ārammaṇarusaṃ anubhavati*)". We suggest that the "experience of the taste" refers to the evaluation of the object by greed, non-greed etc., which, as the Sub-Commentary stresses, can be performed only by

kammic consciousness, at the stage of Impulsion (*javana*). This evaluation impresses a strong mark upon the entire cognitive process, and, together with that associated mark of evaluation, the image of the first perception is taken up by the subsequent states of consciousness. This may happen in two ways. In order to bring about the result of a complete perception such as we are actually aware of, there is required a sequence of several serial processes (*vīthi*) of 16 moments each. The later *vīthis*, being repetitions or variations of the first, are naturally influenced by the evaluating act of the first *vīthi*. Further, on the occasion of a later encounter with the same or a similar object, the original association of it with a feeling of attraction or aversion will greatly prejudice any later evaluation of it. In such ways a certain part of past kammic energy (*kammavega*), quite apart from its maturing later into kammic result (*vipāka*), is transmitted to present states of consciousness. To this extent this past evaluating experience (*anubhavitvā*), though "having gone" (*bhavitvā*) has present significance. Being active within the present, it may well be regarded as belonging to that qualified conception of the "present" implied by the term *uppanna*.

When *bhūta* is explained as *bhavitvā*, "having been", this second category of "things arisen," refers to everything conditioned (*sankhata*) which, after having passed through the three phases of its existence in the present, "has gone". If this last explanation had been given alone, we should be

inclined to think that *bhūtāpagat' uppanna* referred merely to the use of the word as a past tense. But against this supposition there is firstly the rather involved term *bhūtāpagata*, which would have been unnecessary to express such a simple matter; secondly and particularly, by the emphasis on the evaluating function of kammic consciousness the first part of the compound (in the sense of "having experienced") receives a greater stress than the second part expressing the fact of "having gone".

We therefore suggest that this second category of *uppanna* intends to express the share of past mental states in present ones, particularly that of the active, that is, kammic mental states.

(3) *Okāsakat'uppanna;* that is, "arisen", in the sense of "opportunity made". It includes (a) that *by* which an opportunity is made, (b) that for *which* an opportunity is made.

(a) The first is the Kamma of the past by which an opportunity for the arising of its corresponding kammic result is made. The *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* (p. 66) says: "Though being a thing of the past it excludes any other kammic result and makes an opportunity only for its own result". That is to say, though being past, it still exercises a selective and purposive activity. Though not being "real" in the sense of present existence, it has, on account of its being "active" in the above sense, to be included in that wider conception of "actuality" as implied by the term *uppanna*. This past Kamma "by which an opportunity is made", is identical with that of the

previous division ("gone after having experienced"). The difference is that here the persisting of the past Kamma refers to its corresponding Kammic result (*vipāka*), while in the previous category the other effects of that past Kamma have been considered.

(b) That "for which an opportunity is made" is the corresponding kammic result of the past Kamma. Though being a thing of the future, it nevertheless counts as "arisen" in the sense of having a definite opportunity or chance to arise. It is identical with the "things bound to arise" (*upādino dhammā*) belonging to the above-mentioned Triad in the *Dhammasanganī* (*uppanna-ttika*). About these "things bound to arise", the Aṭṭhasāliṇī says (p. 360) that they are not to be regarded as non-existent (*natthi nāma na hoti*). This is another proof of the dynamic conception of actuality and time, to be found in the canonical Abhidhamma and its earliest commentaries.

In this third category of *Okāsakat-uppanna*, the relation is shown between certain things of the past and of the future (leaving out the present) — both regarded as "arisen".

(4) *Bhūmiladdh-uppanna*, that is, "arisen", in the sense of "having obtained a soil", that is, a fertile soil for the actual arising. This applies to potential defilements (*kilesa*), which are 'potential' in the sense of possessing a fertile soil from which they may actually sprout when the other conditions for their arising are given. This soil (*bhūmi*) is pro-

vided in all three planes (*bhūmi*) of existence by the individual's own Groups of Existence (*khandha*) as long as the respective defilements are not yet eliminated by one of the Stages of Sanctity ("Stream-entry", etc.). The *Visuddhi-magga*, in an instructive elaboration of our passage, lays particular stress on the fact that this fertile soil for the arising of defilements consists in the individual's own life process and not in the outer world of tempting objects. Here we have a noteworthy reiteration of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine that man is not bound by the external world but only by his own craving. Not only the actuality, but also the potentiality, of bondage is centred in the individual, that is, in the subjective side of the impersonal life process.

In order not to leave any doubt about the meaning of the word "soil" (*bhūmi*) in this context, we shall elucidate it by the example of the visual perception of a pleasant form. Let us suppose that this perception was not followed immediately by conscious craving or enjoyment because it was superseded at once by a much stronger impression on the mind. Nevertheless this "deferred" defilement of sensual desire (*kāmarāga*) for beautiful forms may spring up at some later moment, for example, when that previous visual perception is remembered. The "soil" for its appearance was provided by the Groups existing at the time of the previous visual perception: the Group of Corporeality being represented by the eye, etc., the four mental Groups by the visual consciousness and by the

visual perception, the feeling, the will etc., connected with it. Until the Fetter of Sensual Desire (*kāmarāga-samyojana*) is severed on entering the Path of the Non-Returner (*anāgāmi-magga*), this defilement underlies the continued process of the individual's Five Groups; it is dormant or latent in their foundation or at their root; it is; as it were, the sub-soil to that soil. With all these later terms we have been paraphrasing the Pāli term *anuseti* (cf. *anusaya*, proclivity, tendency, bias), which is used in this connection in the *Visuddhi-magga* thus: *tesu tesu* (*khandhesu*) *…kilesa-jātam anuseti*, "this species of defilement underlies the respective Groups of Existence."

These potential defilements may be compared to dangerous microbes infesting the body, which, though in a latent state, may become active at any moment when conditions are favourable. It is this soil of the khandhas impregnated with potential defilements which is meant by the Abhidhammic categories of "things favourable to defilements, to cankers, etc." (*sankilesikā* and *sāsavā dhammā*) and kindred terms in the Triads and Dyads of the *Dhammasangaṇī*.

The fourth category of *uppanna* refers to things that may possibly arise in future. It differs from those future things of the third category "for which an opportunity is made", in so far as these latter things are related to an actual kamma of the past while the fourth category relates only to the proclivity of things. The things of the third category

are therefore to a much higher degree determined than those in the fourth, because, besides cases that are absolutely determined (see p. 183 note), actually any other kind of kamma-result must eventually arise if not effectively counteracted. They are, therefore, nearer the borderline of factual reality than the mere proclivities of the fourth category. This relation to factual reality was probably the principle underlying the sequence of enumeration of the four categories. Beginning with factual reality, that is, "things presently arisen" (*vattamān-uppanna*), the other three divisions progressively decrease in actuality.

It is important to note that according to the *Visuddhimagga* (p. 689 PTS) only the things of the fourth category (*bhūmiladdh-uppanna*), that is, potential defilements, can be overcome, or, more correctly, can be prevented from actually arising.

As an historical sidelight it may be added that the views of the Sarvastivadins about the co-existence of the dharmas in all three time-periods are reduced to their proper proportions by the commentarial exposition of *uppanna*. It is shown here which parts of the past and the future have or may have active and potential significance for the present and may therefore be regarded as actualities, though not realities. But it is certainly not accepted in Theravāda, and it is also not tenable, that this can be said of all things past and future. It is quite possible that this disquisition on the term *uppanna* was partly intended for use as a refuta-

tion of the Sarvastivadins who most probably were already in existence at the time of the ancient commentaries on which those of Buddhaghosa are based.

It should be mentioned that the commentarial fourfold division of uppanna does not appear in the explanation of the Triad of Things Arisen (*uppanna-ttika*), but on the occasion of first sentence of the *Dhammasanganī*: *…kusalaṃ cittam uppannam hoti*". It is said that in that context the first category of "presently arisen" applies. In the canonical triad itself, *uppanna* is defined by exactly the same words as *paccuppanna*. But as the defining terms are rather noncommittal we must not necessarily conclude that the meaning of "presently arisen" holds true here as well. Also the statement in the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* that the Triad of Things Arisen extends over two time-periods (i.e. past and future) does not necessitate that limitation for "presently arisen", because the commentarial conception of *uppanna* does not comprise the actual *things* of the past, but only their persisting energy, that is, their conditioning influence, still active or latent in present and future. It has further to be noted that in the commentarial conception of the term *uppanna*, the "things bound to arise" are only a sub-division, belonging to *okāsakat'uppanna*, though not mentioned under that name. In the triad, however, they are not included in the term *uppanna*, but form a separate class. Although, as we see, the *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* does not in any way relate

the four categories of *uppanna* to the canonical triad, we feel justified in doing so because both groups of terms are obviously intended to introduce a more elastic and dynamic conception of time. So we suggest that the commentarial four categories may be taken to cover the same field as the *uppannā dhammā* and *uppādino dhammā* of the canonical triad. For any further development of the Abhidhammic thought it seems to us important to bring into relation, and if possible into agreement, the terminology of the different periods of the Abhidhamma literature, as far as it is philosophically justified, even if, as in our present case, no complete historical proof can be furnished.

Concluding Remarks

The past course of movement and the direction to which a process moves, doubtlessly belong to the co-determining factors of a present situation. Parts of the past and of the future are, though not real, yet actual, in the sense of acting on the present. In the life of the individual as well as of mankind this fact is illustrated by the powerful influence of traditions and of ideals, the one being the surviving past, the other the anticipated future. But there is still another unreal factor acting upon the present: it is the potency or potentiality of a situation, comprising its unmanifested possibilities, its neglected aspects, the deliberately excluded alternatives, the

roads open but not pursued. Never can all aspects and potentialities of a situation manifest themselves simultaneously. Some of them may well appear in the next moment, others in a near or a distant future, either after being remembered and taken up consciously or after undergoing a subliminal maturing process. But the significance of these potentialities is not restricted to the future. They are operative in that very moment. For example, the excluded alternatives will influence the speed, the energy and the duration of the movement proceeding in the direction decided upon. This influence may be retarding or accelerating, according to circumstances. That is to say, these potentialities are co-determining factors of what we may call the "specific weight" of the given situation; and on this "specific weight" depends the amount of influence which the respective moment of consciousness itself is able to exercise. In this connection, whether there was conscious awareness of the various potentialities and alternatives or not, is also a relevant factor. Here enters the Abhidhammic distinction of spontaneous (*asankhārena*), and non-spontaneous (*sasankhārena*) actions.[34]

The fact that the potentialities of a situation cannot be excluded from a dynamic concept of actuality was not only recognised in the commentarial period of Pāli literature, as illustrated above in our exposition of the term *uppanna*, but cogni-

34. See also p. 101 where the importance of the factor of potentiality has been dealt with in another context.

zance of it is impressively documented in the probably oldest part of the canonical Abhidhamma. In the *Mātikā* ("Table of Contents" or "Schedule") which is elaborated in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and forms also the basis of the *Yamaka* and the *Paṭṭhāna*, there are no less than nine terms referring to the potentiality of defilements differently classified. We have already mentioned:

Things favourable to defilements (*sankilesika dhamma*)
" " " cankers (*sāsavā dhammā*)

The remaining terms are:

Things favourable to fetters (*samyojanīyā dh.*)
" " " bonds (*ganthanīyā dh.*)
" " " floods (*oghanīyā dh.*)
" " " yokes (*yoganīyā dh.*)
" " " hindrances (*nīvaraṇiyā dh.*)
" " " clinging (*upādānīyā dh.*)

When the *Mātikā*, that remarkable systematization of reality, was laid down in the Abhidhamma, it was obviously regarded as indispensable not only to distinguish things which are, for example, defilements or not, and things which are presently associated with them, but also to include in a special category those things which are favourable to defilements, that is, which provide a fertile soil for them (*bhūmi*), in the sense explained above.

The *Aṭṭhasāliṇī* on the *Mātikā*, gives the following interesting definitions:

"*Things favourable to clinging* are those which, when becoming objects, are favourable (*hita*) to clinging, owing to their connection with (or affinity to) clinging (*upādāna-sambandhena*).

"*Things favourable to defilements*. By offering themselves as (lit: making themselves into) objects for a defilement they are liable to it (lit: deserve it; *arahanti*); or because they have adapted themselves (*niyutta*) to a defilement they cannot escape being its objects."

According to these instructive explanations, those things providing the fertile soil for defilements are, as it were, attuned to the respective defilements; they engage each other like cogwheels; or their relation is like that of bodily susceptibility and virus.

Only in the light of a dynamic view of actuality that admits the factor of potentiality, and by a dynamic conception of time that admits partial interpenetration of the three time periods, will the importance and the implications of these Abhidhammic terms be fully understood. In calling attention to these neglected but important terms and pointing out some of their implications, our intention was to appeal for further textual and philosophical investigations in this field.

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ABHIDHAMMA STUDIES

Researches in Buddhist Psychology

Nyanaponika Thera